Secondly one may claim that this grant of freedom does not represent an absolute surrender of power. This may be understood from the vantage point that time itself is a creation as stated previously (an aspect also shared with the Rambam) , and that the act of foretelling may be understood within the framework of time and not outside of it. Consequently the lack of foreknowledge here is a lack of knowledge of a certain kind within time, but not a lack outside it, where in a certain sense all events are without sequence. Although this is something Gersonides does not claim it can be utilized in application the relinquishment of power.
In limiting God’s own knowledge, God allows humankind to participate in a further ongoing creation which may further be linked to the Kabbalistic notion of “tikkum olam” or the ongoing repair of the universe through justice and other means. A certain kind of intended withholding of knowledge confined to a particular context is thereby not a deficiency, but rather a way of opening doors to humankind partaking in such ongoing creation through tikkum olam. It should be recognized that Gersonides does not invoke “tikkum olam”, but it fits very well with this intended form of limited knowledge.
Another area where Gersonides showed amazing originality is his account of how we may understand God’s attributes. In this area he challenges Maimonides account where God is understood via negativa or by negatives in terms of what God is not. On the Rambam account the attributes imputed to God are in no manner similar to such attributes when used in relation to humankind, entailing that only in grasping what God is not can we acquire any sense of God’s being. Hence when God knows our future actions, God does so in a way entirely different that humankind knows. This approach argues Gersonides will not hold up since it leaves entirely undetermined God’s attributes. Gersonides then asks why speak of knowledge here as opposed to something else or even ignorance itself? This as the contemporary author Isaac Husik (A History of Mid-evil Philosophy) points out would be pulling the rug out from under us and leave us without any sense of what God is about. In its place Gersonides invokes the notion of Devine attributes that resemble human attributes but are carried to the level of perfection. One may call these “analogical attributes”. In humans they are, moreover, limited in their measure while in God as analogical attributes they are infinite in measure. Attributes such as mercy, wisdom, lovingkindness and power may be understood only within a human context where they are imperfect but may be extrapolated to the Divine level where they reside as perfect and infinite in measure. They may be said to exist in God in a primary sense while in humankind in a derivative sense.
It is significant here to recognize it is not simply the actual realization of these attributes that are beyond humankind but the very understanding of their nature that also escapes full grasp. This opens the door to a progressively deeper understanding which is exactly what “oral Torah” attempts to accomplish by serving as a pathway for “succeeding generations” to better understand God. It may also partially cast some light upon the problem to unjustifiable human suffering since God in terms of Devine attributes is never fully understood at any point in time. Gersonides in this connection maintains that God’s knowledge and goodness can only apply to universals and not particulars which is one way saying in an Aristotelean vocabulary that a deeper understanding within ever evolving concepts is needed for a better understanding, while a perfect understanding will never be attained. In Jewish rabbinic understanding we encounter a similar notion in the interpretive method of Remez alluding to hints of something greater.