The Israel-U.S. relationship cast its shadow on all major events in Israel’s ongoing multi-front war.
Throughout the long months of fighting, the two nations maintained a complex give-and-take dynamic, at times slipping into confrontations both covert and overt. “It was truly like a tug of war,” according to an Israeli source deeply involved in the intense negotiations with the Biden administration.
Israel Hayom’s investigation, based on hours of in-depth conversations with Israeli sources who participated in the highest-level forums, aims to map out the web of relations between Israel and the U.S. as it evolved during the war and behind closed doors.
Last week, we recounted how Israel managed to harness U.S. military might to deter Iran and Hezbollah, described America’s staunch opposition to the ground entry into Gaza and to a pre-emptive strike in Lebanon, and concluded with the sharp struggle between Washington and Jerusalem over humanitarian aid to Gaza and the impending incursion into Rafah.
In this second part, we’ll reveal why the IDF’s entry into Rafah was delayed; how U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan learned about the assassination of Maj. Gen. Hassan Mahdavi (also known as Mohammad Reza Zahedi), the commander of Iran’s Quds Force for Syria and Lebanon; where the heavy bombs withheld by the White House were located; and how Jerusalem managed to persuade Washington to support the ground invasion of Lebanon.
‘We chose to narrow gaps‘
As early as January 2024, the IDF chief of staff instructed Southern Command to prepare an operational plan to eliminate Hamas’s Rafah Brigade.
However, implementation was delayed due to the prolonged IDF operation in Khan Yunis. In March, it was postponed again, this time due to a severe shortage of munitions. The Biden administration was reluctant to supply Israel with these munitions due to its frustration over the lack of humanitarian aid to Gaza.
At that stage of the war, Israel suffered, among other things, from a stuttering American supply of 120 mm tank shells, essential for continuing the fight. The situation was so critical that meetings were held between senior Israeli political and military officials on the munitions issue almost daily. Meanwhile, IDF tank commanders in the field were ordered to conserve shells.
Even after Israel finally decided to enter Rafah “with what we had,” as an Israeli source put it, the decision’s implementation was repeatedly postponed due to American pressure. On March 10, 2024, President Joe Biden stated in a television interview that an Israeli entry into Rafah would be a “red line,” and even an untrained ear could immediately understand that Washington was sharpening its tone toward Israel.
The original plan formulated by the Southern Command for action in Rafah involved a pincer movement from north and south, which would trap Hamas terrorists inside the city. But the Americans, fearing images of massacre and starvation—“it was a political matter, not a value-based one,” a senior Israeli source analyzed—disliked this plan.
A few days later, a Zoom meeting between Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi, Sullivan and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken devolved into an ugly shouting match. The Americans were on the verge of an explosion.
According to a military source, “We could have gone for Rafah in defiance of the U.S., but that would have led to non-supply of weapons or non-support at the U.N. The political echelon instructed the IDF to “do Rafah with the Americans.” A political source confirmed, “We could have told the Americans ‘Go to hell,’ or we could have worked to narrow gaps with them. We chose to narrow gaps.”
Following the political echelon’s directive, the IDF continued refining the operational plan for Rafah to meet American demands. According to a senior Israeli, this polishing process lasted about six weeks. He describes this period as a “tormenting tango dance” with the Americans.
It now emerges that this “tango” was at the heart of the delay in entering Rafah, a topic that dominated public discourse in Israel during those days and turned into a political blame game, with IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi one of its victims.
The alternative plan eventually formulated by the IDF, after repeated refinements at Washington’s request, was based on entering Rafah only from the south, along the Philadelphi Corridor. This would allow the civilian population (and thus also Hamas terrorists) to evacuate from the city more easily.
Indeed, Israel ultimately acted without U.S. approval. According to an American report, Biden reportedly exclaimed “He’s a f*****g liar,” referring to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after learning that the IDF had entered Rafah.
‘Even a soccer game isn’t won with a tie’
While the ground entry into the city was being delayed, the war’s most Hollywood-type scene unfolded.
One of the central figures in managing relations with Washington was Israel’s Ambassador to the U.S. Mike Herzog, who stepped down from the post on Jan. 24. Herzog, together with the military attaché in Washington, Maj. Gen. Hidai Zilberman, spent countless hours navigating the corridors of the White House, State Department and Pentagon, attempting to soften American opposition to Israeli moves.
His role reached its zenith in the lead-up to the Rafah entry, when Herzog would attend meetings with American officials, armed with aerial photographs and battle diagrams rolled up under his military secretary’s arm, which he would present for approval.
On April 1, at 11 a.m. Washington time, Herzog and Zilberman were scheduled for another high-level coordination meeting ahead of the entry to Rafah. This time, the duo was invited to the White House Situation Room. An encrypted video call was to take place with the Israel defense HQ in Tel Aviv.
The meeting was supposed to focus on the Rafah entry plan, which was at the core of the dispute between the administration and Israel at that time. However, exactly one hour before the meeting’s start, Israel eliminated Iranian Maj. Gen. General Mohammad Hassan Mahdavi, commander of the Quds Force’s Syria and Lebanon Corps, without prior notice to the U.S.
“The discussion was meant to be about Rafah, but an hour before, the Middle East turned upside down,” recounts someone familiar with the meeting details. At one minute to 11, as Sullivan was about to enter the Situation Room and open the meeting, military attaché Zilberman intercepted him at the door threshold. “Sir, I need to tell you something,” he whispered. “We just eliminated the Iranian general responsible for Lebanon and Syria.”
Sullivan’s face blanched. “Sullivan was utterly unprepared for this update, to put it mildly,” a source privy to the meeting details said.
Israel knew the U.S. would not welcome Mahdavi’s elimination and therefore didn’t update them on the operation details in advance. Naturally, the Americans feared such an action would drag Iran into an all-out war, a scenario they had been trying to avoid since October 2023.
But Israel believed Iran wouldn’t be drawn into war, partly because the assassination occurred in a building near the Iranian consulate in Damascus, not in the consulate itself. However, Tehran claimed the assassination was carried out in a building officially belonging to the consulate, effectively an Israeli attack on Iranian soil.
The Islamic Republic promised a forceful response, much to the Americans’ dismay. “We didn’t anticipate the Iranian response,” an Israeli source candidly admitted, “but they constructed a narrative that gave them legitimacy to attack Israel directly.”
Jerusalem found itself in a precarious situation. It was clear that to thwart the Iranian response to Mahdavi’s elimination, Israel needed America by its side—the same America that wasn’t updated on the assassination details and opposed the Israeli decision to enter Rafah.
Once again, CENTCOM (U.S Central Command) commander Gen. Michael Kurilla, IDF Chief of Staff Halevi’s close friend, was called to action. Immediately after Mahdavi’s elimination, Halevi briefed Kurilla on the attack details.
A few days later, when the IDF began detecting signs of Iran preparing a counter-attack, Halevi called Kurilla again. “Everything we’ve built is now being put to the test,” the chief of staff told the CENTCOM commander.
Within hours, Kurilla informed Halevi he was preparing to come to Israel. That weekend, Kurilla landed in the country, joined an IDF General Staff Forum meeting, and descended to the operations pit. There, together with Halevi and Israeli Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, he orchestrated the international coalition operation that would repel—almost entirely—the first-ever Iranian missile and UAV barrage aimed at Israel. The Americans proved they wouldn’t abandon Israel in its hour of need, regardless of how much it tested their patience.
Following the Iranian attack, the U.S. pressured Israel to refrain from its own response. “Take the win,” Biden told Netanyahu after it became clear that most Iranian missiles were intercepted en route to Israel, with minimal damage from the attack. In response, Dermer called Sullivan. “Even a soccer game isn’t won with a tie,” he argued.
Israel’s counter-attack on Iran was indeed minor, but according to Israeli sources, this wasn’t solely due to American interests. There was a genuine fear in Jerusalem that escalation with Iran could spiral out of control. After a series of discussions, it was decided that the Air Force would target an S-300 air defense system radar near one of the nuclear facilities in Isfahan. According to a senior Israeli, the Iranians remain baffled as to how Israel managed to attack the radar.
‘No disaster occurred‘
Only after concluding the round with Iran, in early May 2024, did Israel permit itself to launch a ground operation in Rafah. Almost daily, attaché Zilberman would present himself at the Pentagon, armed with aerial photographs of the ground movement.
The Americans were indeed placated, but not for long. Even earlier, in an attempt to prevent Israel’s entry into Rafah, the U.S. Department of Defense had blocked a weapons ship bound for Israel. This shipment included, among other items, heavy 2,000-pound bombs for the Air Force. A few days later, during Blinken’s visit to Israel, he joined then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on a tour of the Kerem Shalom Crossing, witnessing firsthand the humanitarian aid trucks entering Rafah.
The American embargo on a specific weapons component for Israel remained below the public radar at this stage. Gallant, keenly aware of how crucial the heavy bombs were for continuing the fight, attempted to discreetly resolve the impasse.
At the end of June, following carefully conducted negotiations, Gallant was invited to meet his counterpart, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, in Washington. Gallant sensed this trip might break the deadlock and allow the weapons ship to sail. This wasn’t mere conjecture: A week before the trip, U.S. Middle East envoy Brett McGurk called, saying Gallant needn’t worry about a return ticket from Washington. “You can return with the ammunition ship,” the American quipped.
However, mere days before the trip and while Israel was already maneuvering in Rafah, Netanyahu released an English-language video directly criticizing the Biden administration for halting weapons shipments to Israel. The administration was incensed. Sullivan personally called Gallant, informing him that following Netanyahu’s statements, the president had explicitly ordered the ship not to sail under any circumstances.
Gallant proceeded with his Washington trip, investing considerable time in trying to secure the ammunition ship’s release. He finally met with Sullivan at the White House. “These bombs are the IDF’s workhorse,” he told him.
“I had already convinced the president to release the ship despite the video,” Sullivan replied, “but then Netanyahu continued tweeting about the issue, and the president changed his mind.” This appears to have been the nadir in Israel-U.S. relations during the war.
Undeterred, Gallant proposed a compromise solution. He requested that the bombs be transferred to Israel but arrive under the classification of emergency stock (“interim deployment”), which would prevent the IDF from using them. Eventually, the bombs did arrive in Israel and remain here, but the U.S. did not authorize their use by the IDF, forcing it to manage without them.
President Donald Trump lifted the restriction on Jan. 25.
Dramatic move
The Rafah operation reignited negotiation talks between Israel and Hamas, with the U.S. deeply involved. By late May 2024, a draft agreement for a hostage release and ceasefire emerged for the first time.
According to an Israeli source, its formula closely resembled the agreement finally signed between the parties this month. The breakthrough in negotiations came after Hamas agreed, for the first time, to enter talks without first demanding an end to the war. “This was the first time I saw a real chance for an arrangement,” a senior Israeli revealed.
Unlike the first hostage release agreement in November 2023, this agreement was designed to span an extended period and include the release of hundreds of Palestinian terrorists with blood on their hands.
However, on June 27, three days after Netanyahu’s congressional speech, disaster struck. A Hezbollah mortar shell, intended to hit the newly established IDF Mountain Brigade command post near Mount Hermon’s lower cable car, missed its target and detonated on a soccer field in Majdal Shams. This tragedy claimed the lives of 12 Druse children and teenagers.
The Majdal Shams disaster undoubtedly marked the war’s most crucial turning point. It obliterated any chance at the time for a hostage release agreement, as Hamas calculated that it would drag Israel and Hezbollah into a northern war—a scenario the Gaza-based terrorist organization had desired from the outset.
Simultaneously, the timing of the Majdal Shams catastrophe, as the Rafah operation neared its conclusion, provided both the political echelon and the IDF with the tools and justification to shift the war’s center of gravity from Gaza to Lebanon.
“Majdal Shams was the watershed moment,” a senior Israeli stated. “The Rafah maneuver was nearing completion, allowing for the transfer of forces northward. We were poised to focus on the north, and now we had justification for a move in Lebanon.”
After visiting the disaster site in Majdal Shams, Gallant instructed the IDF chief of staff to prepare for the elimination of Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah’s chief of staff. At the same time, Israeli intelligence had Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in its sights and he was eliminated in the early hours of July 31 during a visit to Tehran visit. Ultimately, the assassinations of Shukr and Haniyeh occurred within hours of each other. In both instances, the U.S. received no prior notification.
“Following the assassinations, Gallant conferred with Austin. “Iran will clearly respond,” the defense minister told his American counterpart. “If you want to prevent escalation, you must assist us with defense.”
The response to the assassinations was delayed, finally materializing in October 2024.
‘Operation after operation‘
Even before the second Iranian direct aerial attack on Israel, a series of audacious steps unfolded in Lebanon. On Sept. 17, the “exploding pagers operation” erupted with a literal bang as Israel set off Hezbollah’s communication devices and the day after that, the Air Force launched “Operation Northern Arrows,” during which the IDF destroyed hundreds of Hezbollah launchers.
The next day, Maj. Gen. Oded Basyuk, head of the IDF Operations Directorate, entered the defense minister’s office. Catching Gallant at the office door as he was leaving, Basyuk said, “We have an opportunity to eliminate Ibrahim Akil, along with the entire leadership of the Radwan Force.”
That day, Sept. 20, the IDF assassinated senior Hezbollah official Akil in Beirut. Dozens of senior members of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force and figures from its operations division died alongside him.
“The events in Lebanon, from the pagers to Akil, unfolded without prior planning,” a senior Israeli admitted. “We didn’t predetermine our end goal; instead, we conducted operation after operation.”
It seems even the Americans were astonished by the dizzying pace of events, which proceeded with them entirely out of the loop. In Lebanon, unlike Gaza in general and Rafah in particular, the Americans posed fewer obstacles to IDF operations.
“Unlike Gaza, where it was politically challenging due to sympathy for Palestinians in the Democratic Party, there’s no empathy for Hezbollah in the U.S.,” a senior Israeli explained. “In Lebanon, Israeli and U.S. interests are much more aligned.”
Indeed, Israel’s moves in Lebanon during the final days of September 2024 encountered almost no American interference. The U.S. seemed to observe from the sidelines, almost admiringly. A week after Akil’s assassination, on Sept. 27, another opportunity arose—the chance to assassinate Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah.
If the Americans had managed to stomach all of Israel’s moves in Lebanon up to this point, Nasrallah’s assassination was particularly hard to swallow. Israel knew the White House would be furious about the move, which would shake the Middle East, but decided to proceed anyway, without coordination.
Softened terminology
The next major move Israel orchestrated began three days after Nasrallah’s assassination—the ground maneuver beyond Lebanon’s border fence. As expected, the Americans were unenthusiastic about Israel’s military action, but as usual, someone managed to placate them.
Before the maneuver commenced, Halevi conferred once more with his friend Kurilla. When Halevi informed the American general of his intention to bring an entire brigade into Kfar Kila, adjacent to Metula, Kurilla’s face darkened. “In the U.S. Army, a brigade comprises 5,000 soldiers. Is this the manpower you intend to bring into Kfar Kila?” he inquired.
Halevi clarified that it wasn’t. The Lebanon operation was planned on a scale of only hundreds of fighters. “So, when briefing Washington, avoid using the term ‘brigade,’” Kurilla advised. “Discuss the number of soldiers and tanks instead. It’ll be less alarming for them.”
Halevi complied. When the Lebanon operation plan was conveyed to Washington and presented to senior Americans, it didn’t mention “brigade” or “division,” but only hundreds of soldiers and a few tanks. During translation into English, the IDF battle orders were also toned down, with terms like “ground operation” replaced by softer military terminology.
As with Rafah, after entering Lebanon, the IDF sent videos to the Americans, reassuring them that ground operations were progressing according to approved plans.
“The pinnacle of coordination with the Americans throughout the war came after the second Iranian attack in October 2024, when we decided to respond by striking inside Iran,” an Israeli source revealed. “In this case, we were fully coordinated on what, when, what to do, and what not to do, as well as our joint messaging following the attack.”
Before the attack, Halevi and Kurilla spoke again. The IDF chief of staff presented the CENTCOM commander with several requests, without which the Israeli strike on Iran would have been impossible. Kurilla approved all requests, including scrambling American rescue teams who patrolled Middle Eastern skies in helicopters on the night of the attack, ready to assist any Israeli pilot forced to eject. This marked the first time in history that the U.S. provided Israel with such assistance.
The close U.S.-Israel coordination didn’t emerge in a vacuum. Gallant, who spoke with his counterpart Austin during this period, informed him that Israel was determined to strike Iran aggressively, potentially triggering an all-out war. “If you don’t want us targeting Iran’s oil fields, grant my chief of staff what he’s requesting,” Gallant said.
In reality, Israel never intended to set Iran’s oil fields ablaze. Only as the Biden administration ended its term, it could be revealed that Gallant employed the “Hold me back” tactic with Austin.
Regardless, Israel’s actions in Lebanon, which significantly weakened Hezbollah, paved the way for ceasefire talks between Israel and Lebanon, conducted by Amos Hochstein, the Biden administration’s envoy. The Lebanon agreement, signed on Nov. 26 and effective the following day, redirected attention to Gaza and the hostages.
It was now evident to all parties that they were keen to restart negotiation talks. “The current hostage release agreement’s origins lie in the Lebanon deal,” an Israeli source explained. “That’s where Hamas realized they were essentially isolated.”
The Hamas talks, conducted under Hochstein and the Biden administration’s auspices, progressed in “small steps,” according to that source, but already addressed specifics like withdrawal maps, names of released hostages and terrorists, and the outline of stages.
Trump’s election and promises to rain “hell on Gaza” energized these talks. “It created an atmosphere that accelerated the already positive dynamics,” a person involved in the negotiations said.
{Reposted from JNS}
