During the course of the Iran nuclear negotiations, Secretary of State Kerry insisted that the only issue on the table was the kind of impediments the U.S. and other world powers could throw in the way of Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations in return for the lifting of economic sanctions.
There was no thought, he said, of according Iran an additional payoff in the form of international legitimacy for agreeing to accept restrictions on its nuclear program. Specifically, there would be no effort to bring Iran into other negotiations designed to address world problems.
In other words, Iran would not be given a pass for its continuing activities as the leading supporter of terror groups around the world. In order for the Iranians to be considered a player in good standing on the international stage, they would first have to end their key role on international terrorism. Indeed, a good part of the argument made by many against the nuclear agreement was that, despite Mr. Kerry’s assurances, it did not stipulate Iran’s renouncing terror as a necessity precursor to the lifting of sanctions.
At all events, the skeptics have already been vindicated. A big headline in The New York Times last week informed us that “After a U.S. Shift, Iran Has a Seat at Talks on War in Syria.” The story went on to explain:
The inclusion of Iran in the talks represented the first time that the United States has chosen to formally engage the Iranians diplomatically on the Syria issue. It also came a little more than three months after Iran signed a historic nuclear accord with the United States and other powers that promised to end Iran’s economic isolation in return for limits on its nuclear enrichment, suggesting an effort to broaden the discussion beyond the successful negotiation.
The story also noted that the pivot by the U.S. “reflected how rapidly the dynamics of the war have changed. Clearly worried about the military support that Russia and Iran are providing to prop up President Bashar el-Assad, the United States has concluded that the only hope for easing Mr. Assad from power is to find a political solution with his two sponsors….”
Iran’s participation also appeared to signal how quickly the Iranians are emerging from decades of U.S.-imposed marginalization.
It is hard to believe the Obama administration did not anticipate the emergence of a newly empowered Iran. And the failure of the U.S. to react in any meaningful manner to Russia’s aggression in Georgia and Ukraine made it a virtual certainty that there would be an effort by the Russians to make a move in the Middle East, where they had not had a foothold for more than four decades – and that a partnership with Iran was the likeliest vehicle for doing so.
Once again we see the consequences of the U.S. being viewed, by allies and adversaries alike, as a paper tiger.