Editor’s Note: Victor Davis Hanson, the widely respected military historian whose work has frequently been featured in The Jewish Press, was interviewed by John Hawkins, editor of the website Right Wing News. Following are highlights of their exchange:
John Hawkins: Why do you think there is such a profound difference between the American and European view of the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians?
Victor Davis Hanson: There are a variety of reasons that can properly be debated about their relative roles. But we can agree on the general picture — fear and appeasement of terrorists; rising Muslim populations (largely unassimilated) in France, Germany, and Scandinavia; inherent anti-Semitism; identification of Israel with the U.S. as an overdog; guilt over past colonialism; financial interests in the Arab world along with concerns for oil supplies; and generally the largely backdrop of easy and cheap ways of opposing the United States in ways that cost nothing but alleviate European concerns about stature, pride, and their own diminished role in the world. That is not to say there are not legitimate issues; it just explains why the Europeans would allow a quarter-million Muslims to be butchered under their noses in the Balkans when they had the power to stop it, and yet fret over Palestinians far away. The end of the Soviet threat and the rise of the EU are creating a new tension in the West, and it will only quicken and manifest itself in ways well beyond disputes over the Middle East.
How effective has the war on terrorism been so far? Is there anything we’ve done surprisingly well or unusually poorly since 9/11 in your opinion?
By any standard, it has been a success — destroying an enemy 7000 miles away in less than 6 weeks, while disrupting and scattering a sophisticated terrorist network worldwide. More importantly, there is a new sophistication in our thinking about a great many Arab autocracies whose conduct has been quite duplicitous, along with a new awareness about Europe. All this shows a growing sense that the administration has now sized up the nature of the conflict, who our friends are in the trial ahead, who are enemies, and who are on the sidelines waiting to jump in when they see a clear cut winner. I might have gone more quickly into Iraq after the successes against the Taliban; but I don’t think such hesitation will ultimately matter much.
Hypothetically, let’s say that somehow, some way, George Bush [had decided] not to invade Iraq….What do you think the consequences of that would have been?
Not much for the first six months or so, as terrorists and autocrats scouted the terrain. But within a year it would be an utter disaster and quite dangerous for Americans. There would be a sense, rightly or wrongly, that the United States had backed down, that we were terrified of Saddam’s weapons, that we heeded the advice of Saudi Arabia and co., that the Europeans had prevailed in reining in a rogue US, and most importantly, that countries with frightening weapons, in a climate where 3,000 Americans had been murdered and our icons in New York and Washington damaged or demolished, had found a formula to blackmail, a la Korea, the United States. In other words, the loss of so many Americans would mean nothing, and we would soon return to the era of 1983-2001 when Americans lectured, sent a Cruise missile or a few planes when attacked, and then went back to things as normal….
How should we handle Saudi Arabia?
