Third, and perhaps most important, the U.S. must remind Abbas that in the post-Saddam era, the rules of the game have changed regarding Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. During Abbas’s inaugural address, he paid lip service to Israeli apprehensions with a plethora of conciliatory phrases. Missing was the following:
“The Palestinian Authority categorically and unequivocally accepts a Jewish state living side by side with our future Palestinian state. Under an anticipated comprehensive peace agreement, we, the Palestinians, promise never to insist on any measures that will demographically threaten the Jewish character of the State of Israel. Like Israel, we recognize the refugee tragedy as encompassing both parties and consequently agree that the issue must be dealt with realistically, impartially and in an agreed bilateral framework. As prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, I will do all that is in my power to encourage, enforce and uphold these positions for the sake of my people and for the sake of peace.”
This, I believe, is the statement Israel is looking for. What’s incredible is that while we talk about wanting ‘deeds, not words,’ Israelis still have not received the right words, not even during the Oslo ‘peace process.’ The statement Abbas should have made (and should still make) is a repudiation of the inherent rejection of Israel as a Jewish state implied in the ‘Right of Return’ – the Palestinian dream of flooding Israel with millions of refugees and their descendants.
The ‘Right of Return’ must be addressed now, not later. If the Bush administration cannot convince Abbas to at least modify this state-killing clause – to water it down or creatively render it impotent – there will be nothing for Israelis and Palestinians to talk about. Regrettably, the road map does not explicitly insist that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state. It says that the PA must issue ‘an unequivocal statement reiterating Israel’s right to exist in peace and security.’ It says that the PA must call an ‘immediate and unconditional cease-fire.’
It does not, however, say that the Palestinians must recognize Israel’s right to self-determination as a Jewish state, authenticated by a unique history, religion, language and culture.
These are Israel’s fundamental prerequisites for peace. Whether Abbas or any Palestinian leader can live up to them is, frankly, irrelevant, since no peace is preferable to another Munich Pact.
Perhaps, as Ze’ev Jabotinsky famously remarked, “The only path to an agreement in the future is an absolute refusal of any attempts at an agreement now” (The Iron Wall, 1923). While Jabotinsky envisioned his ‘iron wall’ expanding beyond the Jordan River, the concept still retains merit. Draw borders, protect these borders with force and will, and clearly articulate the benchmark for a future settlement.
Jabotinsky’s prerequisite for peace was the Arab acceptance of the inevitability and indestructibility of the Zionist dream. This dream has changed over the years. In Israel today – for the first time – the establishment of two states west of the Jordan is a bipartisan policy. However, Jabotinsky’s prerequisite remains relevant. The Palestinian leadership still believes it can defeat Israel, if not on the battlefield then perhaps in the maternity ward. Couple the high Palestinian birthrate with international sympathy, cynical indifference in the Arab world and inconsistent U.S. policy, and the PA has reason to be optimistic – hence the necessity of a firm and consistent American position.
Abbas is understandably hesitant to jeopardize his ascendancy by throwing out too many conciliatory gestures too early on. Still, those bracing for an Abbas-led psychological breakthrough (on the order of Sadat going to Jerusalem) are well advised not get their hopes up. With or without Arafat, Abbas is a man of his time and of his movement, the PLO. “Just another petty anti-Semitic thug,” as Michael Freund put it in a Jerusalem Post column that chronicled, through direct quotes, Abbas’s history of racism and incitement.
