(Israel Hayom via JNS) The deal to bring the hostages home from Gaza carries an immense, largely unspoken price—one that has received far too little attention, if any at all.
While some may support it and others oppose it, there exists a third path: acknowledging that this is a poor deal, albeit perhaps unavoidable, while simultaneously shattering the walls of media silence surrounding its dire consequences.
These walls bear an unsettling resemblance to the conspiracy of silence that prevailed before the 2011 Gilad Shalit deal (in which more than 1,000 terrorists, including the now-deceased Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, were released for one IDF soldier), which unleashed rivers of blood and fire upon us.
We must internalize that time is running out, and soon there may be no one left to save. Under the current conditions and circumstances, we have exhausted nearly every option to rescue our loved ones, and we have fallen short.
Those who insist may naively believe that after the deal, we can resume the war against Hamas at our discretion. However, we must simultaneously recognize the deal’s devastating repercussions and damage.
It is imperative to cling to the truth, no matter how painful, and to pose relevant questions—questions we have long avoided. We must confront the harsh realities we have whitewashed and repressed. This reckoning must occur now, mere moments before the first phase of the deal, and only then can we make an informed decision.
We must question aloud why the discourse surrounding the deal’s cost has focused for months solely on Gaza’s Philadelphi Corridor (on the southern border with Egypt), the Netzarim axis (in the middle of the Strip), the return of Gazans to the northern Strip, and the war’s conclusion.
Meanwhile, the release of hundreds of terrorists—hundreds of potential “Sinwars”—remains absent from the conversation, accepted as a fait accompli and an inescapable fate we must simply “deal with” and contain.
We should challenge the assessments of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) and the Israel Defense Forces that they can “manage” the released terrorists. On the eve of the Shalit deal, they made similar assurances and misjudged the reality.
We must ask them directly: Could you be mistaken again? Might Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar be wrong in 2025, just as Yoram Cohen was in 2011?
It is crucial to remember that since 1985, Israel has released thousands of terrorists through various deals, gestures and diplomatic frameworks. About half of them returned to terrorism and murdered Jews. Hundreds were killed or wounded by these released terrorists long before the Simchat Torah massacre on Oct. 7, 2023.
‘There will be a catastrophe‘
We cannot forget that the terrorists released by the government of Shimon Peres in the Jibril Deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the First Intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis.
Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the Second Intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives.
Those freed in the Shalit deal by the government of Benjamin Netanyahu built Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the Oct. 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: Where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?
We must recognize that, with high probability, the terrorists released to Judea, Samaria, Gaza and abroad will inject new life into Hamas—currently a battered and weakened terrorist organization. They will likely rehabilitate it and form its new leadership. History has shown us this pattern, and it is likely to repeat itself.
We must publicize the suppressed information about senior IDF and Shin Bet officials who admitted in Security Cabinet meetings that the influx of released terrorists into Judea and Samaria and Gaza will be catastrophic.
It is imperative to expose the list of master murderers whose release Hamas demands. This includes Ibrahim Hamed, commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Judea and Samaria during the Second Intifada, responsible for attacks including the double suicide bombing on Ben-Yehuda Street and at Cafe Moment in Jerusalem. It also includes Abdullah Barghouti, the bomb expert sentenced to 67 life terms; Ahmed Mughrabi, the Fatah-Tanzim commander in Bethlehem; and Abbas Sayed, who planned the Passover Seder massacre at Netanya’s Park Hotel, claiming 30 lives and wounding any more.
Many more such men exist. They will not transform into benevolent figures. They are all potential Sinwars, yet this fact remains largely undiscussed. While the present deal fulfills the commandment of redeeming captives, a noble value, it simultaneously represents a capitulation to terrorism.
We must acknowledge this reality: We were caught off guard, massacred, extorted, fought, sacrificed, conquered, emerged victorious, and ultimately—surrendered. Every past surrender to terrorism that resulted in kidnappings has paved the way for the next abduction, teaching Hamas and its ilk that kidnapping terrorism is highly profitable.
Undoubtedly, the catastrophic failure on Simchat Torah 2023 violated the social contract with citizens—elderly people, women and children kidnapped in their pajamas from their homes. However, we must ask ourselves a question we have long avoided: Does the proposed deal not violate our contract with all citizens of the state?
As Rami Igra, former head of the Mossad’s Captives and Missing Persons Division, put it: “They care about a hundred hostages. I care about nine million citizens …, and within those nine million, I also care about the hundred hostages.”
Originally published by Israel Hayom.
