RABBINIC PROHIBITION
There are those who question whether it is PERMISSIBLE to aid another in going against the Torah’s laws, even though the transgressor can readily sin without any assistance. The Tosafot (Shabbat 3a) say:
“Nevertheless, [even on one side of the river] there is still a RABBINIC PROHIBITION [to hand him the cup of wine,] for we must distance others from transgressing.”
This prohibition can be explained in three different ways:
A. There is no biblical prohibition of lifnei iveir “on one side of the river,” but Chazal extended the prohibition on a rabbinical level.
B. Lifnei iveir is totally inapplicable, but there is a rabbinic prohibition related to tokhacha, the mitzva of REBUKE.
C. There is no prohibition of lifnei iveir, but a rabbinic prohibition of “mesayei’a biydei ovrei aveira,” HELPING ANOTHER SIN. “Lifnei iveir” and “mesayei’a” differ in nature. Lifnei iveir prohibits setting up a situation where a sin will easily be committed. Mesayei’a means participating in another’s sin. A group of Acharonim, based on Rashi (Gittin 61a), maintain that mesayei’a applies only at the time of the sin, whereas lifnei iveir applies even beforehand – its whole essence is “placing a stumbling block” before the blind man trips.
Our situation, where arranging programming or inviting guests will probably result in Shabbat transgression, now becomes particularly problematic. Even though I do not hand the participant or guest his car keys, might there not still be a rabbinic prohibition involved in inviting him?
Whether our case is prohibited might depend on which of these three possibilities we accept. A rabbinic level of LIFNEI IVEIR (A) should still apply to our case; so would a rabbinic mitzva of REBUKE (B). However, if participation in the sin, “mesayei’a” (C), applies only at the time of the sin, our case would not be included in the prohibition, since no sin is committed at the time of the invitation. Two out of three approaches would view organizing programming that involves participants’ Shabbat desecration as rabbinically prohibited.
REMA’S RULING
Do later halakhic sources cite Tosafot’s idea of a rabbinic prohibition applying even to “on one side of the river?” The Rema (YD 151:3) records a dispute among the poskim about whether it is permissible to sell Gentiles items that will likely serve as part of idolatrous religious services. He rules leniently, but writes that one who is pious, a “ba’al nefesh,” should act stringently. The Rema’s leniency can be understood in several ways:
I. The Shakh (YD 151:3, note 7) quotes the Rema’s own Darkei Moshe (notes on the Tur), who explains that when modern day Gentiles refer to God, they are referring to the real God. Based on this, the prohibition against doing business with a Gentile because he might, in the heat of an argument, swear in the name of his god does not apply nowadays. [A Jew causing him to do this transgresses the verse, “The names of other gods should not be heard on (here, because of) your mouth.”] If this is the source of the Rema’s leniency, it does not have universal application, but is rather limited to idolatry prohibitions, leaving other cases still rabbinically prohibited.
II. The Shakh adds that if the prohibition mentioned by the Tosafot is based on the mitzva of rebuke, it is not applicable to non-Jews. Lifnei iveir is applicable to everyone; the classic case quoted by the gemara is handing a limb taken from a live animal (prohibited by the seven Noachide laws) to a non-Jew. Rebuke, based on the verse, “You shall surely rebuke your compatriot),” does not apply to a Gentile or an apostate Jew, according to the Shakh. However, it would be difficult to consider people participating today in “kiruv” programs as apostates, thereby making it permissible to bring about their desecration of the Shabbat.