III. Many Acharonim, though, claim that according to the Rema’s ruling, lifnei iveir never applies in a “one side of the river” case. Only facilitating a transgression that was previously not a live option is prohibited.
RAV S.Z. AUERBACH’S APPROACH
A new perspective on situations like ours emerges from Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s Minchat Shlomo, responsum #35. Does lifnei iveir apply, he asks, to presenting someone with a lesser opportunity to sin in order to prevent him from another inevitable graver sin? Is it permissible to serve food to a guest who is non-observant (but sympathetic to Torah) because he will inevitably not make a blessing over it? True, this brings about his eating without making a blessing. On the other hand, refusing to treat him like a normal guest might very likely result in angering him to the degree that he will develop an antagonistic attitude to Torah.
Rav Shlomo Zalman answers that one should serve such a guest (although at the very end of the responsum he declines to come to a final decision). He says, furthermore, that if one sees another Jew drinking a cup of wine made from orla, a serious biblical transgression, it is permissible to switch it for a cup of stam yeinam (wine made by non-Jews), a rabbinic prohibition, if that is the only way to stop him from committing the graver sin. (Ed. – It is permissible to place a stumbling block in front of a blind man if that is the only way to prevent him from falling into a more dangerous pit.)
Rav Shlomo Zalman’s understanding of lifnei iveir is revolutionary. He points out that, although normally one may not himself transgress in order to save his fellow from a sin, a case of lifnei iveir is qualitatively different. When dealing with a lifnei iveir situation, one has to take into account what is the best strategy for contributing to the other’s overall good. “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” only refers to causing a fall that is, on the whole, destructive to the person. This approach relies on the assessment that a much more destructive situation might develop if one does not facilitate the lighter transgression. Therefore, in total perspective, an act which immediately decreases the severity of the impending sin is NOT by definition lifnei iveir.
We can further see from Rav Shlomo Zalman that a person’s present assessment, albeit somewhat speculative, is what determines whether lifnei iveir applies, even if eventually it turns out to have been mistaken. Applied to our case, it would be permissible to set up a situation where a person would desecrate Shabbat because the educational gains of his experience will help bring him to fuller observance of the Torah. If your assessment is that this programming will very likely bring this person closer to observing the Torah, especially since he is presently desecrating Shabbat in any event, it would not be defined as lifnei iveir.
LIMITING RAV SHLOMO ZALMAN’S HETER
Perhaps Rav Shlomo Zalman’s far-reaching approach should be limited.
1. Lifnei iveir applies both to facilitating a person’s committing a halakhic transgression as well as to giving misleading advice (e.g. on a monetary matter). The Acharonim make a distinction between the two. The prohibition against giving bad advice to another person is predicated on the other person’s not desiring the negative results of the advice. If, theoretically, he would want to lose money, it would not be prohibited to advise him improperly. Causing another to sin, though, is prohibited whether the other wants to sin or not; it is forbidden to give a nazirite a cup of wine even if he wants to drink it. This distinction arises from the following problem in Tosafot.