There are many myths about former prime ministers who, upon encountering a “sleeping,” lackluster army, whose leaders were more interested in what David Ben-Gurion called “careerism” than actual security –thankfully were able to discover “oases” that operated completely differently than the rest of the IDF and inspired a new fighting spirit.
The first such example is Unit 101 under Ariel Sharon, Danny Matt, Meir Har-Zion and their comrades. Established after a string of failures on the part of the IDF, the unit carried out reprisal raids, and despite its short lifespan, created a model of unwavering determination, fighting spirit, high operational standards, and desire to make contact with the enemy, instilling these values in the army as a whole.
The second such example is Operation Defensive Shield during the Second Intifada. Up until that operation, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had been forced to absorb countless terrorist attacks while spouting such slogans as “restraint is strength” after inheriting a tired, bureaucratic army. He was finally able to find a few brigade commanders who told him they were his “Arik Sharons” in the IDF.
The truth is more complicated. Neither Unit 101 nor those brigade commanders in Operation Defensive Shield would have spontaneously emerged without the leaders in the highest echelons above them (David Ben-Gurion and Sharon, respectively) conveying two messages.
The first message was that the defense establishment must change course, without compromise, and that henceforth promotions would be only be earned by defeating terror and achieving success on the battlefield.
The second message was that they had their commanders’ backs. Unit 101’s operations, some of which were controversial even at the time, as Operation Defensive Shield certainly was, wouldn’t have been seen through to the end had the fighters not felt that those above them would support them upon their return to base, no matter the public or international outcry over their actions.
Similarly, Naftali Bennett has inherited an army reminiscent of those that Ben-Gurion and Sharon tried in vain to deploy: cumbersome, untrained, unskilled, and mainly – led by those who, to put it lightly, don’t crave initiative. The army is commanded by a chief of staff who immediately fell in love with public relations – launching his “Tnufa” (momentum) multi-year plan, which is essentially a campaign that has been known by many names, produced by his image consultants. In reality, though, he has canceled more initiatives than any chief of staff before him while molding the army as a static, technological force incapable of imposing deterrence or victory.
Prime Minister Bennett, as someone who once claimed IDF soldiers “are more afraid of the Military Advocate General than [Hamas leader Yahya] Sinwar,” must take a page from Ben-Gurion and Sharon. They also inherited a tired, lethargic general staff comprised of generals who prefer to contain problems and avoid out-of-the-box action and taking risks. These types of officers currently exist within the intermediate ranks of the IDF. Bennett needs to locate them and build his own Unit 101. He needs to talk to them, empower them, and forge the IDF’s new spirit with them. They are the ones – when the need arises for a Protective Edge 2.0 – who will get the job done and they are the ones who will be promoted.
If he doesn’t do so, we will get more of the same leadership, weakness, and avoidance. We’ll get more of the same officers who espouse caution and inaction, care more about their pensions, and mostly just want to finish their tenure “in peace,” without any commissions of inquiry and without doing their actual job: providing security.
{Written by Prof. Udi Lebel, lecturer at Ariel University and researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and reposted from the IsraelHayom site}
