Internal Factors Affecting the Israeli Psyche: Expectations and the Formation of Trauma
The Israeli public has traditionally had positive views of the military, especially during times of conflict. A study several years ago found that “the Jewish-Israeli public’s trust in the IDF generally remains very high and stable and strengthens significantly when the cannons start to roar.”1 While evidence shows that this still applies, there is a feeling among some that some of that trust has been questioned, with proof that this includes both the political and military echelons in Israel.2 The colossal collapse of intelligence and operational response by the IDF on October 7, the massive loss of life and the kidnapping of 251 Israelis and foreigners have resulted in perceptible distress in almost all strata of Israeli society. The continued war with ongoing casualties of IDF personnel, at times daily, has contributed to a malaise and sadness that, at times, has been mixed in with anger.3
In the immediate aftermath of the attack, there was a reported 30% rise in demand for psychiatric drugs.4 As much as 35% of war-related casualties were also found to be related to psychological issues.5 As time moved on, it became clear that the individual mental health needs of Israelis have increased, with talk of an impending mental health “pandemic.”6
On a broader societal level, the presence of trauma continues in the background as daily life moves on. Israelis not only face the challenges of the consequences of the October 7 attack but also the challenges of an ongoing and threatened expansion of the conflict. The nature of Israeli society is such that there is little emotional separation between those who suffered direct consequences of the attack in Gaza border communities and the Nova festival and those who did not.7 Added to this are the military casualties of soldiers who are family, co-workers, and neighbors and who have so much in common with the average citizen, making it indeed a “people’s army.”8
It may be helpful to see Israelis as experiencing a “circle of trauma” where the outer circle is a collective one that is shared by most of the population. Within this outer circle are various smaller “circles” that include those who have experienced or continue to experience additional, more specific traumatic experiences such as losing a family member, being displaced from one’s home, or having a relative held hostage.
The “More than Normal” Changes in Israel
“Normal” life in Israel consists of a routine that includes regular reserve military service, exposure to and constant vigilance for terrorist attacks, high taxes, and social challenges. Since October 7, each of these factors has blurred the line between “normal” routine and heightened anxiety owing to what can be categorized as “more than normal” living. One writer described it as “The war (that) invades every public space with unbridled persistence. A new, seemingly irrelevant layer is constantly added to everyday objects and experiences.”9
The Stresses of Reserve Duty
Reserve duty has long been considered a necessary burden on Israelis, accepted as a fact of life. The mass mobilization following October 7, however, has taken this burden to new levels, with thousands of reservists in need of mental health support, struggling with the challenges of operating an independent business, being laid off from work, and coping with family issues.10 Organizations have been mobilized11 to deal with the recognizable but not yet fully documented psychological ramifications facing individuals and families of reserve soldiers, some of whom have been away from home for many months on end. For its part, the IDF has recognized this and has instituted limited program funding12 for counseling for individuals, couples, and families of reserve soldiers in need of mental health assistance since October 7.
Increased Terror on the Roads
Another phenomenon that has increased is that of “terror on the roads,” where lethal Molotov cocktails, rocks, and gunfire are directed against Israeli vehicles driving on roads in Judea and Samaria, where the Hamas terror organization is resurgent. Even before October 7, the threat was recognized as a dangerous13 phenomenon that called for increased IDF involvement.14 However, since October 7, the frequency of such attacks has increased, as documented by the organization “Hatzalah Without Borders,” which maintains a Telegram account15 that has recorded the increase since October 7.16
“Settler Violence”
A politically sensitive issue plaguing Israel has been the allegation of “settler violence” leveled against Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria even before the war.17 Since the war, this behavior has come under increasing scrutiny and has been widely condemned by international actors.18 While the roots of this violent behavior are most certainly not explicitly linked to the events of October 7, a study by Brookings contends that there has been a “surge” since then.19 Although some dispute this,20 the images of rampaging settlers labeled as “extremists” may further deepen the psychological alienation experienced by a significant portion of the Israeli public living in what the world calls the “West Bank “despite the legality of their communities21 and the public condemnation of extremist activities by community leaders.22
From Unity to Discord: The Hostage Debate
Initially, Israelis were united in their views regarding the necessity for continued military response against Hamas in Gaza. While support for the war effort is still strong among most Israelis,23 there have been signs of fissure, especially in the weekly protests demanding a ceasefire deal to free the hostages.24
The issue of how best to approach freeing the kidnapped hostages is perhaps the most central consequence of the war. While the government has continued an approach of increased military pressure25 to soften Hamas demands, others, particularly those hostage families leading weekly vigils and protests, take a more demanding approach that calls for far-reaching concessions and eschews a strict military response.26
The contrast between a strategy of continued war to eliminate Hamas as a fighting or ruling force and a strategy of agreement to limit the initial war goals to secure a deal has split Israelis, with one survey finding a slight majority (56%) favoring a hostage deal over continued military action.27
Displacement: The Israeli Refugee Crisis
Since the October 7 attack, tens of thousands of Israelis have been displaced from their homes and communities. Initially, this was in the South, where communities were destroyed or targeted with ongoing missile attacks. This homelessness very soon spread to the North, where, after Hizbullah joined the war effort, whole communities in rocket range became virtual ghost towns. The failure of definitive government action to restore these communities (the IDF has limited itself to reacting in a predominantly “tit-for-tat” manner and has not yet initiated an offensive that would restore safety to the North) has resulted in demands for broadening the war to include an invasion of Lebanon.28 The discord has resulted in one demonstration that included a call for residents of the North to “disengage” from Israel.29 Others have noted what they call the “forgotten citizens” of the North.30
Equitable Sharing of the Burden: The Israeli Draft Crisis
For years, one segment of Israeli society known has the “Haredim” (or ultra-Orthodox) have been exempt from mandatory military service.31 After October 7, with the increased demands on reservists amidst the absence of Haredi conscription,32 public demand for a “sharing of the burden” became more pronounced. This came to a head once the Supreme Court ruled against blanket Haredi exemptions,33 sparking anger in the Haredi sector and calls to refuse to obey any conscription notice.34 Some demonstrations turned violent and included illegal blocking of highways and traffic35 (note: this tactic was also employed by hostage families pressing their demands). 36 (For a background on the origin of the Haredi exemption, see this footnote.37)
Political instability
Prior to the October 7 attack, Israelis were experiencing a government that was formed after a series of multiple elections over the years that failed to produce a clear winner and the ability to form a viable coalition. The war and the tensions raised increased an already fraught atmosphere that existed immediately before the war, with public disagreement over a proposed judicial reform initiated by the government. This proposal resulted in large demonstrations that persisted until the October 7 attack. While the brutal and tragic events surrounding the outbreak of the war led to initial unity with a significant opposition faction joining the government, this unity eventually dissipated, leaving the public again in a state of uncertainty about Israel’s political future. Part of the reason for the renewed political tension is an apparent shift by the opponents of judicial reform before the war to efforts ostensibly seen as designed to support the demands of the families of the hostages to reach a ceasefire agreement, as well as efforts to aid victims of the war following October 7. 38 Whatever the reason behind the effort, the renewed political tension, along with renewed calls for new elections and changing the government39 also contributed to the tension experienced by the public. Complicating this feeling are tensions within the government itself and between the government and the military leadership, especially between the prime minister on one side and the defense minister40 and the army chief of staff41 on the other. Some see these tensions as stemming from differences in strategy,42 while others see it as arising from political considerations.43 Either way, the public is more uncertain and unpredictable about the future.
Questioning the IDF
Long considered a “sacred cow” in Israeli society, the military establishment’s massive failure noted earlier has created a sense of concern for many Israelis. As some experts have expressed, one would think this would lead to decreased confidence in the IDF. Evidence, however, has shown the opposite. While confidence in political institutions has declined, it was found that confidence in the IDF increased, with over 86% of Israelis expressing confidence.44 However, a word of caution is in order, as a recent study by the IDF showed, “The IDF was not prepared for the extensive infiltration scenario that occurred.” More investigations are to follow, and the possibility that further conclusions confirming IDF failures may change the current relatively high confidence levels in Israel’s military establishment.
External Factors: Israel as an International Outcast
Although Israel has, since 1967, been widely criticized as an occupying power and violator of the human rights of the Palestinians, the criticism has never reached levels that created actual formidable legal moves that included accusations of genocide. When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the South African claim that Israel had committed genocide had “plausibility,”45 a new and far more noxious standard of judging Israel was reached. The ruling was but one part of a chain of events that included, among many others, street demonstrations in San Francisco,46 New York,47 in front of U.S. synagogues48 and protests on university campuses.49 On some occasions, the protests included actions that directly threatened “Zionists,” such as one incident where a group of protestors entered a New York subway asking “Zionists” to identify themselves”50 and leave. Another protest took place at an exhibit honoring victims of the October 7 Nova festival massacre.51 The atmosphere created abroad led Israel to issue a travel alert to some popular destinations,52 with reports indicating significant anxiety among Israelis abroad53 and hesitations among others to even travel abroad.54
Israel Physically Isolated
Adding to the anxiety is an “on-again, off-again” ability to plan for travel abroad with recurring cancellations of airlines flying to Israel. Flights have been disrupted several times since the war, including during the busy Passover season.55 The latest disruptions include multiple foreign airlines, some with no projected date to resume travel.56 These cancellations resulted in thousands of Israelis stranded abroad, another anxiety-provoking situation.57 Israelis’ feeling of emotional isolation is now combined with tangible physical isolation, along with the uncertainty of when the problem will be resolved. These restrictions have further confined Israelis’ movement, with travel within Israel limited, making an already small country psychologically even smaller and further contributing to a sense of loss of control over one’s destiny.58
Political Isolation
All the above is combined with evident changes in how countries relate to Israel. Turkey, with its already shaky relationship, has upped its anti-Israel rhetoric and instituted an economic boycott, and voiced veiled threats.59 Relations with the European Union, Spain, Norway, and Ireland have deteriorated with announcements of intentions to recognize a Palestinian state.60 Norway’s intention to recognize a Palestinian state provoked a move by Israel to revoke the diplomatic accreditation of Norwegian representatives to the Palestinian Authority.61 Foreign leaders, such as France’s Macron, have made direct statements implicating Israel in the killing of women and children.62 But perhaps the most distressing aspect of this isolation is the perceived tension with the United States, Israel’s most important ally.63 It is important to note that this tension has not moved the United States from its policy of standing by Israel, as military assets have been moved several times to the Middle East in the face of Iranian threats.64 Nevertheless, public statements repeatedly taking Israel to task for what are claimed to be excessive Palestinian civilian casualties65 have led to a need to see how these differences can be resolved.66 There has been legitimate speculation that the strategy of some Democrats, especially in an election year, involves projecting a sense of “balance” on the Israel-Palestinian issue.67 However, this also has raised concerns that antisemitism on the part of certain party activists is driving decision-making.68 In either case, some Israelis may see this as another reason for concern, especially considering the historic bipartisan support of Israel by the United States.69
Psychological Asymmetry
The relative psychological advantage of Hamas and other terrorist groups over democratic societies like Israel is known as “psychological asymmetry.”70 Since Hamas, which does not consider itself bound by international humanitarian norms, can engage in otherwise unacceptable behavior that includes using human shields, intentionally sacrificing civilians, and exploiting exaggerated casualty figures, they hold a propaganda and influence advantage over an Israeli military that “acts by the rules.” This asymmetry has created an environment that has nurtured an effective strategy by fostering increased criticism of Israel, leading to international pressure restricting military options. The conditions that have increased psychological stress on the Israeli public stem from this concept as well. The more that Hamas is seen as a victim, the more that Israel and Israelis are viewed as responsible for that victimhood. The continued use of the “victim” strategy by Palestinians and Hamas will continue to result in actions that will pressure Israel and lead to continued psychological angst for the public.
Positive Psychological Factors: Inoculation and Resilience
Years of being subjected to war, missile attacks, terror attacks, and general uncertainty have created what is known as “psychological inoculation” for the Israeli public. Like biological inoculation, psychological inoculation (related to Meichenbaum’s stress inoculation training71) involves building emotional coping skills to psychologically traumatic situations through repeated gradual exposure to stresses that are successfully coped with. The Israeli experience has been a natural laboratory for stress inoculation and can be said to play a role in the flip side of trauma, namely resistance. Israel has established a network of “resilience centers”72 throughout the country that specialize in helping people learn “…how to take targeted actions to improve personal and community capacity in a manner that allows for the continuation of normal family and community life, even in times of crisis.”73 The resilience of Israeli society in the face of continued threats and trauma is evidence of the ability to rebound and function despite the difficulties experienced. Even after months of war, Israel still ranks fifth (ahead of countries like the United States, Canada, and Germany) in the world in self-perceived happiness,74 showing the power of Israeli resilience and coping despite significant stress.
Summary
Israel has undergone almost a year of unprecedented challenges sparked by October 7, 2023. Psychological reactions have been influenced by the shock of the collapse of the IDF’s ability to protect its citizenry and the subsequent murder and kidnapping of so many Israelis. This has been complicated by the continued losses of IDF soldiers and the international reaction to the war that has painted Israel as an outcast nation and its leaders as “war criminals.” We have reviewed some of the factors psychologically impacting Israelis, such as a sense of isolation, a lack of personal control, and abandonment by others. We also touched on both external and internal factors that stoke these feelings. This review is not exhaustive and includes other factors such as economic ramifications (loss of tourism, loss of business, cost of reserve duty and munitions, lowering of Israel’s credit rating75) and individual factors (e.g., exacerbation of previous personal issues). The way the Israeli media covers the war is another factor that deserves a separate and more extensive analysis. Despite the challenges, resilience, which continues to be tested, persists.
The outlook remains challenging with the continued threats of Iran’s “axis of evil”76 having the potential to create yet unknown consequences for an already traumatized Israeli public.
{Reposted from JCPA}
