For fifty years, many world leaders and politicians have been promoting the idea that “there’s no alternative to a Palestinian state, the ‘two-state-solution’” (2SS) – despite on-going terrorism and the fact that such a state will be run by terrorists who are committed to Israel’s destruction.
Supporters of the 2SS argue that Arabs who call themselves Palestinians and support terrorism are entitled to a state, “self-determination,” and “ending the occupation,” which includes Judea, Shomron, Gaza and east Jerusalem – the “West Bank,” areas conquered by the IDF in the 1967 Six Day War. In other words, they advocate for Israel to withdraw to the cease-fire/armistice lines of 1949, arguing that this is required according to International Humanitarian Law, regardless of the Palestinian refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist and to end terrorism.
This is based on the Palestinian narrative of “The Nakba” (catastrophe) – their failure to annihilate Israel in 1948; “The Right of Return” for millions of Arab refugees to Israel; and their claim to all of what was called Palestine under the British Mandate and by the League of Nations. It is the basis of the PLO Covenant and the Hamas Charter – and is the foundation of Palestinian identity. Renouncing such beliefs is not only improbable; it is virtually impossible. Disputes over territory can be resolved, but not over ideology.
THE ANSWER offered is an opposition to a one-state solution – “from the (Jordan) river to the sea” – both by Palestinian terrorists and by Israel. The Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 and the 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (the “Disengagement”) were intended to deal with this problem. Instead, they made it worse.
Nevertheless, Israeli leaders and the international community believed that making political and territorial concessions and offering economic incentives would result in peace, or at least an end to violence. That delusion ended on Oct 7, 2023. The problem, however, is a cognitive distortion: that “there is no alternative.
“No alternative” is a unique belief, and is politically only applied to the 2SS. There is rarely no alternative. Although it prevents any critical thinking, and examination of other possibilities, it remains a powerful and dominant mantra. The danger of believing this mantra is not only in its assumption that a Palestinian state is the only basis for discussion and negotiation, but that it legitimizes Palestinian terrorist organizations that would lead such a state. It is a subtle way of avoiding what Palestinianism means and ignoring threats to Israel’s existence, especially from Iran and its proxies.
“No alternative,” therefore, is a form of absolutist thinking that requires abandoning reason and rationality, and avoiding questions of a fundamental premise. It denies the basis of all human endeavors: free and open inquiry.
THE PURPOSE of the Oslo Accords, from Arafat’s perspective, was not peace, but to advance his agenda to destroy Israel. Receiving territorial, political and economic concessions, legitimacy, and recognition for the 2SS served his strategy. Many Israeli leaders ignored the risks.
Then-prime minister Ehud Barak’s offer at Camp David in July 2000 (22 years after PM Yitzhak Rabin signed the original peace accords there) to give Arafat almost everything that he wanted confirmed to the PLO leader that he was right: Israel was willing to surrender and withdraw to the 1949 Armistice lines. Despite increased terrorism, the UN and the international community prefer a quasi-Palestinian state and the 2SS.
According to former US Middle East envoy Dennis Ross, who was at Camp David and wrote two books about it, the reason that Arafat rejected Barak’s offers was because the conflict itself was his identity; it is the basis of “Palestinian national consciousness.” He initiated the Second Intifada two months later in September 2000 to prevent a resolution of the conflict (Intifada 2 lasted until February 2005, six months before the beginning of the Disengagement). The 2SS and terrorism are Arafat’s real legacy to ensure that the conflict will remain.
Arafat was born in Cairo; he is therefore not a Palestinian. His identity, however, was shaped not only by the conflict, but by the narrative, especially The Nakba. Palestinianism began in 1948 with the war to annihilate Israel and its failure – it instead became the Jewish state’s War of Independence – and continued with the 1967 Six Day War.
FOR PALESTINIANS, the nascent Jewish state was a “catastrophe,” and it continues to define their identity. For them, it is similar in a way to our connecting the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel. We say “Never again”; for Palestinians it is “Don’t forget The Nakba,” “the refugees,” etc. For us, the Holocaust is part of our national identity; for Palestinians, The Nakba is the definition of what Palestinianism means.
Instead of being treated as a war criminal, however, Arafat was honored as head of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO. Even President George W. Bush, following the terrorist attack on 9/11, the war in Iraq and during the Second Intifada, declared his support for the 2SS.
A symbol of hatred and violence, the solution was widely accepted as “the only alternative.” Support for this mantra has undermined efforts by Israel to resolve the conflict and led to the rise of Hamas, other Islamist jihadist groups, and Iranian proxies, such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.
Support for the 2SS, therefore, prevents any rational, meaningful consideration of other, far better proposals for both Palestinians and Israelis and the entire region. For example: having them move to other Arab and Muslim countries, developing tribal/clan-based socio-political entities, or giving them Israeli citizenship conditioned on allegiance – like Arabs who live in Israel.
Although these options all have their own difficulties, they are possible alternatives. The one-dimensional, tunnel-vision demand for the 2SS is a recipe for continuing the conflict, not for resolving it.
