Prime Minister Sharon’s dramatic policy U-turn, calling for the uprooting of 8,000 Israelis from their homes in Gaza and northern Samaria, has many critics. But perhaps the most devastating critique of the new disengagement plan are to be found in his own statements and those made by Sharon’s current supporters only a short time ago.
Ariel Sharon’s landslide victory over Ehud Barak in February 2001 was widely hailed by the right wing in Israel. Sharon immediately implemented his campaign promise of ‘no negotiations under fire,’ a welcome contrast to the policy of his predecessor, who had shamelessly continued ‘peace talks’ with the Palestinians even as the terrorism mounted.
Sharon inspired trust and projected consistency. As he himself stated in an interview with the Jerusalem Post on Sept. 17, 2001: ‘…I speak very clearly….In my mind, trust is the most important thing….For me, yes is yes, and no is no. I mean what I say and I say what I mean.’
The people of Israel believed the prime minister when he stated on April 24, 2002: ‘[The Jewish community of] Netzarim [in Gaza] is the same as Negba and Tel Aviv (din Netzarim ke-din Negba v’Tel Aviv). The evacuation of Netzarim will only encourage terror and increase the pressure on us.’
On July 18, 2002, in a letter of blessings marking 30 years since the founding of Netzarim, Sharon praised the courage and steadfastness of the community’s residents, to whom he referred as ‘the torch leading the camp.’ He added: ‘I am certain that we will celebrate with you and your children’s children many future celebrations…’
In early 2003, Sharon led the Likud Party to an overwhelming triumph over the Labor Party, whose prime ministerial candidate, Amram Mitzna, called for a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. During the campaign, Sharon and his Likud colleagues lambasted the Labor policy as a dangerous concession to terrorism.
Against the background of such declarations, the prime minister’s speech in Herzliya in December 2003 – in which he unveiled his disengagement plan – stands in stark and baffling contradiction to his previous statements.
Sharon’s U-turn must have been baffling to Uri Dan, the Mideast correspondent of the New York Post and a confidant, admirer and long-time friend of the prime minister. In a Jerusalem Post article of May 29, 2003, on the eve of the Aqaba summit, Dan stated that Sharon was giving the Palestinians ‘one last opportunity.’
Describing the prime minister as ‘an experienced seat-belt-wearing driver,’ Dan warned that if the Palestinians missed the opportunity, Sharon would drive his jeep ‘safely through the wadis and between the olive trees of Judea and Samaria, among the fruit orchards of the Jordan Valley, and alongside the hothouses of Gush Katif [in Gaza].’
More recently, in a Jerusalem Post article of April 8, 2004, Dan felt compelled to articulate the tough question that Sharon’s long-time supporters were asking: ‘Why is this leader who, throughout his life, has led us to victory over terror now ready to award Palestinian terror its greatest victory by withdrawing from Gaza?’
In an article of Feb. 5, 2004, Dan appealed to the prime minister to ‘visit every home in Gush Katif…make it clear to our brothers…that when you talk about relocating settlements you mean transferring their entire contents to a new place. The story of Yamit will not be repeated. Everything will be relocated, from the houses themselves to the piping under the roads.’
Does Uri Dan really believe that this will happen? An unsettling question.
Sharon’s U-turn was soon emulated by the Jerusalem Post itself. In an editorial of April 10, 2004, titled ‘Respect the New Consensus,’ the Post argued that those opposed to the disengagement plan were defying ‘the broad consensus that has emerged [in Israel] in recent years.’
But it appears the Post was not part of ‘the broad consensus’ just two months prior to that particular editorial: In a Feb. 3, 2004 editorial titled ‘Land for Nothing’ the paper had argued: ‘unilateral withdrawal is a bad idea…to withdraw in the face of terror is to inspire further terror….Why should the Palestinians make peace with Israel if they can get the land without making peace?’
The Post’s U-turn presents another unsettling question.
In the July 16, 2004 edition of the Hebrew-language Makor Rishon, Sofia Ron-Moriah explained that while the number of MKs – 61 – required to replace the prime minister without recourse to a general election is potentially there, the constellation of forces, pressures and influences compel lawmakers to ‘fortify themselves in their own corners’ and not take resolute stands.
According to Ms. Ron-Moriah, the prime minister is executing the strategy of ‘divide and rule’ with the Likud Knesset faction in general and with his senior ministers in particular. Finance Minister Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Shalom and Education Minister Livnat – all of whom expressed strong reservations about the disengagement plan – have ‘fallen into line,’ each finding his or her own rationalization to eventually support it.
In May 2004, after Likud Party members in a referendum overwhelmingly rejected Sharon’s plan, I asked a former ambassador – one who’s been an adviser to Likud prime ministers – the following question: If the Likud were in the opposition and a left-wing government proposed the identical plan, would Sharon, Netanyahu, Shalom, Livnat and their colleagues support it or oppose it?
He laughed and said that the Likud leaders, if in the opposition, would unquestionably oppose such a plan, and would do all they could to scuttle it.
What can be said of the three senior Likud ministers? These politicians face the classic dilemma: to remain loyal to one’s principles even at the cost of losing one’s hard-earned position, or to remain loyal to one’s office even at the cost of betraying one’s principles.
Without minimizing the depth of the dilemma confronting the Likud ministers and MKs, and the difficulty of calculating the potential ramifications of standing up for their principles, it is indisputable that they still retain free choice.
Then-senator John F. Kennedy was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1957 for his book Profiles in Courage, which recounted the stories of eight historical colleagues who were willing to risk their careers by acting in accordance with their consciences. Indeed, in the present conjuncture in Israel, some politicians, such as Effie Eitam and Yitzchak Levy, have given up their ministerial posts on principle, while others, such as Uzi Landau and Natan Sharansky, have manifested a willingness to do so if confronted with such a challenge.
In the Talmud (tractate Eruvin, page 65b), Rabbi Ilai says that one of the ways in which a person’s true character can be perceived is ‘be-kiso’ – by his wallet. The commentator Rashi explains: ‘He deals honestly with people.’
Perhaps we can make a play on words and emend the sage’s observation to say that a way to measure the true character of a politician is ‘be-kis’o ‘ by his or her [parliamentary/cabinet] seat. Is that politician’s ultimate loyalty to his or her seat – or to his or her principles?
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