He writes that the Democrats were caught “virtually speechless and defenseless” by Republican attacks during Iran-Contra, a characterization that few who remember that period would likely share. Likewise, he renders the Florida recount of 2000 in tones not distinguishable from those of the recent HBO film: it’s the tale of a shrewd, expert political party making mincemeat of the idealistic, slow-footed, naive one that only wants to “count all the votes.”
Reagan’s place in history, of course, is above all linked to the Cold War. Here, the academic debate has begun to narrow, as Wilentz’s verdict – sure to pain liberal partisans – makes clear: Reagan’s “success in helping finally to end the cold war is one of the greatest achievements by any president of the United States,” he writes, “and arguably the greatest single presidential achievement since 1945.”
That sounds like game, set, and match, but it’s worth noting the differences Wilentz has with conservatives on how much credit Reagan should receive, and most important, on the character of Reagan’s contribution – which conservatives tend to see as a triumph of principled leadership, but Wilentz views as something closer to pragmatic adaptability.
“There is little credible evidence that Reagan’s massive military buildup of the early 1980’s did anything to persuade the Kremlin to come to the bargaining table,” Wilentz writes. Such a claim sounds odd when you consider the spiraling Soviet military spending in the 1980’s. Wilentz also contests the notion, held by some on the right, that Reagan intentionally set out to bankrupt the Soviets. But even conceding that this wasn’t his explicit plan is not the same as saying that his military buildup had no effect.
Similarly, Wilentz scants the impact of Reagan’s proposed missile-defense system – the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), more commonly known as Star Wars – on Soviet thinking. His dismissal flies in the face of the near-desperation with which Mikhail Gorbachev fought to confine SDI to the laboratory. Wilentz argues that the Soviet leader was merely worried about SDI’s political ramifications – its violation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty and the potential for launching an arms race in space – and not that the system might actually work.
But according to Derek Leebaert’s underappreciated Cold War history, The Fifty-Year Wound, senior officials of the Soviet Ministry of Defense convinced Gorbachev that SDI in fact could work; what’s more, they saw no effective way to counter it. Occam’s Razor provides another, simpler way of looking at the SDI question: if SDI posed no threat, and at the same time would cost Reagan so much to explore, why should Gorbachev resist it so fiercely?
Minimizing the impact, then, of Reagan’s toughest Soviet policies, Wilentz instead credits the president with being free enough of ideology to break with hard-line, right-wing dogma and embrace Gorbachev during these crucial years. There is some truth in this: hawks on the right did find Reagan’s relationship with the Soviet leader and his willingness to sign arms-reduction agreements extremely troubling.
For Wilentz, Reagan’s dealings with Gorbachev represent an unmistakable shift from confrontation to conciliation, as if Reagan finally succeeded by becoming a liberal. (Similarly, Diggins argued that Reagan ultimately prevailed by “calling off” the Cold War.)
But there is less in Reagan’s evolution than meets the eye. Reagan had expressed willingness to meet with Leonid Brezhnev early in his term to discuss arms reduction, and he had made conciliatory overtures to Soviet leaders before Gorbachev. Reagan was indeed more flexibly minded than his most hawkish advisors, and he came to see that the achievement of his objectives was possible through an alteration of tactics. His ability to recognize that the landscape was shifting is a testament to his singular political gifts. But it’s myopic to interpret a leader’s achievement of long-held goals through evolving means as a change of heart.
Still, even with these qualifications, Wilentz confers honor on Reagan that the president’s admirers probably thought they’d never live to see: “If greatness in a president is measured in terms of affecting the temper of the times, whether you like it or not, Reagan stands second to none among the presidents of the second half of the twentieth century.”
When such a powerful judgment comes from the other side of the political spectrum, it signals something like consensus.