Three days before the U.S. presidential elections, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave a Nov. 2 speech to students. One of them, invited in advance, asked him to alter his fatwa (“religious decree”) that forbids the production of nuclear weapons. Khamenei responded that Iran will do all that is necessary regarding warfare and armament.
In the Iranian propaganda sphere, Khamenei’s statements quickly turned into declarations by military officials. The commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps., Gen. Hossein Salami, warned the United States and Israel that Iran will arm itself with whatever it needs to achieve victory. If Salami was hinting at Iran’s nuclear capabilities, Kamal Kharrazi, a senior adviser and head of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, stated openly that Iran is capable of producing nuclear weapons and “the only barrier is Khamenei’s fatwa, which forbids [their] production.”
In the days leading up to the U.S. elections, the Iranian regime built a narrative of “nuclear threshold deterrence” based on the assumption among Iranian analysts that this was what had restrained Israel militarily. No less important, the narrative claimed, this deterrence had given Tehran the confidence to carry out two direct attacks on Israel. Alongside the Biden administration’s admonitions, it had prevented Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities in its Oct. 26 counterstrike.
When it turned out former President Donald Trump had won the elections, Iran realized that it would have to reassess its strategy. In particular, when Trump’s high-level appointments were announced, the regime recalculated its moves out of fear that any provocation could turn the incoming president into a more dangerous adversary and could give Israel the green light to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The Iranians now understand that the order of the day is to maintain the status quo. That means they need to establish a communication channel for a nuclear agreement, primarily with the Trump administration. This would allow them to buy time, preserve the nuclear threshold status they have reached—and above all, forestall an Israeli attack on their nuclear program.
The danger lies in the “new Israel” that has emerged. Iranian analysts have concluded that Israel no longer sees itself as fighting an “existential war” and will not repeat its past behaviors. They now feel that they misjudged Jerusalem’s capabilities in the past. Israel, it turns out, is capable of enduring a prolonged war. Israel, in Tehran’s view, had the audacity to target and kill Hamas senior leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and was prepared to attack inside Lebanon, including successfully assassinating Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. This revised outlook on Israel reinforces Iran’s belief that Israel will eventually attack Iran’s nuclear facilities once the opportunity arises.
Amid the threat of such an Israeli attack, Iran decided to alter its messaging both internally and externally. In recent days, residents of various Iranian cities, particularly Tehran, have been experiencing intentional power outages caused by the stoppage of electricity production. Simultaneously, regime-affiliated outlets began circulating Khamenei’s declarations from seven years ago that “nuclear energy is essential for Iran’s future, which requires the production of 20,000–30,000 megawatts of nuclear-generated electricity in the coming years.” This looks suspiciously like an Iranian attempt to signal to the world that: “We need nuclear energy for electricity and energy independence, and so we need nuclear facilities in the country.”
According to supporters of Iran’s regime, the visit to Tehran on Nov. 14 by International Atomic Energy Agency director Rafael Grossi offered an opportunity to undermine Israel’s media campaign about the urgency of the Iranian nuclear threat and the need to attack it amid the current tensions. Iran has warned the agency and countries of the region that an Israeli attack coupled with an Iranian response would expose the region to a significant nuclear threat involving extensive radiation.
At the same time, Iran is aware of the complexity of dealing with the IAEA, since it does not want or is not yet in a position to make concessions to the agency before reaching an understanding with Washington. Iran views concessions to the IAEA at this stage as weakening its negotiating stance with the main party holding sway over sanctions relief—Donald Trump.
Trump, commentators say, does not trust international institutions and would prefer that all disputes and resolutions be directly handled. He is likely to view any agreement with the IAEA as resulting from fears about his election, and that could influence his stance towards Iran and the nuclear issue in the near future.
This perspective aligns with a recent report in The New York Times that Trump’s close ally, Elon Musk, met with Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations in New York City for exploratory talks. Iranian analysts believe that the meeting was coordinated with Trump and marked an attempt to create a direct negotiation channel with Tehran. By choosing a prominent businessman like Musk for this task instead of a political or military figure, Trump, they say, is signaling his readiness for negotiations and an agreement.
Assuming that the leakers were Iranian, as the Times claims, their main objective was to lower the anxiety level in Iran over Trump’s victory. Similarly, Iran’s denial of the meeting is viewed as a “negotiation game” aimed at emphasizing its internal constraints amid opposition to dialogue with the United States, so that Washington will not present tough demands at the outset.
Iran’s fear of an Israeli attack is driving the need to stall for time and recalibrate. Iran understands that, from the start, it must avert an Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities. In Iran’s view, the Trump administration may allow such an attack, especially considering the recent pro-Israel appointments and the backdrop of the ongoing war with Hamas, Hezbollah and other Iranian-supported terror proxies.
In light of these developments and the primacy of energy concerns, Iran seeks to undermine the “nuclear threshold” narrative and portray nuclear power as a solution to its energy crisis. Tehran understands that, at this point, it is better to project a willingness for dialogue and work toward an agreement that will provide immunity from an Israeli strike while preserving its nuclear capabilities for a future date. Iran’s ultimate goal of destroying Israel is seen as immutable and extending beyond Trump’s administration, so a temporary delay—a new “poisoned chalice”—is a necessity.
Israel must act in concert with the Trump administration to damage or destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities and set back its arms race for years. Only after that can Iran present a “plan” for an agreement and oversight.
{Reposted from the JCPA site}
