Ariel Sharon – possibly the most determined and unbending prime minister Israel has had since its founder, David Ben Gurion – has been frantically at work attempting to impose and enforce his plan for disengagement in the Gaza Strip on rivals and buddies alike.
The enormous political and strategic risks that he is prepared to shoulder in his brash and inexorable way can only be gauged against the background of an aging statesman and general who has seen it all, has left a tremendous impact on the battlefield, and wishes to leave an equally indelible mark on statesmanship before he vacates the scene.
Sharon during his tormented career sought finality, but was always shoved to the sidelines before he could accomplish anything of permanence. Therefore his record is one of half-baked enterprises and never-accomplished tasks. He was an illustrious field commander who never made it to the top of the military command and never had the chance to forge the military his way in order to achieve his goals. He launched the vertiginous momentum of building settlements in the territories, always arguing that only established facts on the ground could determine the future boundaries of Israel and secure its long-term strategic needs. But the change in government in 1992, when Rabin embarked on the Oslo path, paralyzed him mid-way and drastically reversed the trend.
Finally, Sharon was catapulted by default to the head of the political pyramid in the face of dire warnings, issued in Israel and across the Middle East and Europe, that disaster would strike the region and the globe should he – the “murderer,” the relentless and brutal “occupier” and “oppressor” of Palestinians – take the helm.
Once in power, Sharon, following President Bush’s example, reversed the policy of his predecessors who had not dared destroy the Palestinian infrastructure of terrorism lest the “peace process” be harmed. He smashed the terrorist organizations by eliminating or isolating their leaders, all domestic and international criticism notwithstanding.
When he was able to ensure Bush’s support, in an unprecedentedly close strategic cooperation that had no peer in the Western world, Sharon raised the envy of his rivals at home who had never been able either to erase terrorism or to ensure such unfailing American support for Israel.
Europe and the Arabs remained disgruntled, but Sharon kept his cards close to his vest and, when the moment of his choosing came, stunned the world with a carefully and patiently crafted plan that for the first time suggested that the builder of settlements was ready to pull down some of them. His most vicious critics suddenly became his fans, singing his praise and celebrating his courage and wisdom.
Something must have happened to so dramatically shuffle the cards and leave the analysts dumbfounded. Sharon had confounded the most knowledgeable Sharonologists, outdone his rivals on his left, and stunned the Europeans who now huddled around him to dismiss Arafat, their darling of yesteryear. Conversely, to his equally astounded supporters at home and his embarrassed fellow ministers who witnessed him renege on all his (their) principles, he seemed a turncoat.
But he would not budge, for he had made up his mind. No fool in strategic matters, and no wimp in political bargaining, he decided to stake his prestige and his political career on a daring plan that was as pregnant with enormous risk as it was full of promise – if it worked. Sharon had no time for games, and the occasion merited the gamble.
Sharon?s gamble is predicated on the assumption that most Israelis want to disengage from Gaza. What he needs is a quid-pro-quo to convince Israelis that this withdrawal would be different from the unilateral withdrawal from Southern Lebanon that had assuredly triggered the Al-Aqsa Intifada.
Sharon also believes that in order not to reward the most militant elements in Gaza, who might be emboldened to pursue the Israelis after a withdrawal, he needs to submit the evacuated territory to a responsible Palestinian entity capable of maintaining order. Most important, by retreating from Gaza and some token settlements in Northern Samaria, Sharon hopes to reinforce his grip on the rest of the West Bank, with the sort of American backing that was vaguely indicated in his agreement with Bush.
The problem, one fears, is far beyond what Sharon imagined when he first launched his initiative. Underlying the enthusiasm for the plan voiced by the Europeans, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, and even Hamas, is a small nuance that Sharon seems to want to ignore: his newfound international support is predicated on the Gaza withdrawal being the first link in a chain of withdrawals.
Israel retreat? Why not? It should be encouraged to do so, by all means! Hamas has already announced that it would not desist from its violent acts of terrorism until the “full withdrawal of Israel” is completed, namely from the entirety of Judea and Samaria, something that neither Sharon, nor his party, nor Bush, envisage. But the UN, Mubarak and the Europeans certainly do.
Fast forward a year or two: before Sharon even has the chance to reap the fruits of his diplomacy of unilateral retreat, he is called to task by his angry supporters as Israel continues to come under unrelenting attacks from Hamas and its peers. At this point, what does Sharon do? Beg for his political life? Remind the hungry predators of his conciliatory record of withdrawal?
In the meantime, he would have lost his party, and possibly much of Israel’s public opinion. His gamble of gaining a lot (in the West Bank) by paying a little (in Gaza) would have evaporated under the barrage of blood and iron that Hamas is promising us today and to which end it is preparing itself by increasing the smuggling of advanced weaponry through the tunnels of Rafah.
The Egyptians, under whose eyes that smuggling continues while they voice support for Sharon’s withdrawal, must know something we don’t.
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