Question: Are women supposed to count Sefirat HaOmer?
S. Feldman
Answer: Last week we quoted the Gemara (Kiddushin 29a), which exempts women from time-bound positive precepts. The Kol Bo explains that the Torah exempts them because of their heavy household responsibilities.
The Rambam rules that Sefirat HaOmer is only incumbent upon males. The Kesef Mishneh explains this is due to it being a time-bound precept. The Ramban, though, rules otherwise, including Sefirat HaOmer among those mitzvot that are not time-bound.
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The Avnei Nezer (on Orach Chayim 384) wonders how the Ramban can claim that Sefirat HaOmer is not time-bound when it is only operative between Pesach and Shavuot.
In Orot HaPesach, Rav Shlomo Wahrman, late rosh yeshiva of Yeshiva of Nassau County, suggests that women must count the Omer because nowadays (after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash) this mitzvah is rabbinical in nature and women must fulfill time-bound rabbinical commands (Birkei Yosef, Orach Chayim 291:8, who quotes the Orchot Chayim and Rabbeinu Tam. We find this rule in Sefer Hamanhig as well, which uses it to explain why women must eat three meals on Shabbos). Both the Tur and Mechaber maintain that the mitzvah of Sefirat HaOmer is rabbinical nowadays (although other authorities disagree – see the Chinuch, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yoel Halevi, R’ Amram Gaon, Ritz Gaos, and the Be’er Halachah).
Tosafot (s.v. “Mi shelo Ra’ah Meorot…,” Megillah 24a), however, proves that women are even absolved from rabbinic time-bound positive precepts from the fact that the Gemara has to provide a special reason to explain why women must light Chanukah candles, drink four cups of wine at the seder on Pesach, and read Megillat Esther (i.e., “they too were beneficiaries of the miracle”) – even though these obligations are all rabbinic in nature.
Moreover, the Ramban clearly refers to Sefirat HaOmer as a non-time-bound precept. We thus remain with the Anvei Nezer’s question as to how Sefirat HaOmer can be considered a non-time-bound positive mitzvah.
One possible answer emerges once we understand why some Rishonim posit that women are obligated to fulfill all rabbinical precepts, even time-bound ones. The Rambam (Sefer Hamitzvot, shoresh 1) and Ba’al Halachot Gedolot both rule that these precepts are really biblical in nature because the Torah (Deutoronomy 17:11) states: “lo tasur min hadavar asher yagidu lecha – you shall not turn aside from that matter that [the sages] tell you.” In other words, when lighting Chanukah candles, we are arguably not fulfilling a rabbinic command, but a biblical one – to listen to the sages. This mitzvah is obviously not time-bound, and that perhaps is why women must, for example, light Chanukah candles even though this mitzvah only applies on eight days of the year.
Rabbi Wahrman, however, questions this explanation and suggests another. He writes that some mitzvot would be possible to fulfill were it not for certain explicit biblical statements. For example, regarding the mitzvah of tefillin, the Torah states (Exodus 13:10), “Veshamarta et hachukah hazot l’moadah miyamim yamima – You shall keep this law in its times, from time to time.” In the Gemara (Eruvin 96a) we find that the first instance of “yamim – days” teaches us that the mitzvah doesn’t apply at night.
In other words, perhaps only mitzvot (like tefillin) which the Torah specifically restricts to a certain time period are considered time-bound. Sefirat HaOmer, though, is arguably not one of these mitzvot. We count when we do (the 16th of Nissan) because the wheat happens to ripen at this time of year. If it would ripen at another time, perhaps we would count at that other time. Perhaps this then explains why the Ramban does not considered Sefirat HaOmer time-bound.
Regarding the actual halacha of women counting the Omer, Rabbi Wahrman quotes the Magen Avraham (Orach Chayim 489), who states that women are exempt from counting because doing so is time-bound; he adds, though, that “they have already accepted upon themselves [this mitzvah] as obligatory.”
Sha’ar Hatziyun quotes the Pri Chadash, who states that women are indeed exempt from this mitzvah, making no mention of them having accepted upon themselves to observe it. In addition, the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 206) questions the Magen Avraham’s reasoning. Nowhere, he says, do we find the idea that a person becomes obligated to fulfill an optional mitzvah once he started fulfilling it.
The Mishnah Berurah (ad loc.) quotes the sefer Shulchan Shlomo that at the very least women should not recite the berachah before counting the Omer because they may forget one day and because women as a general rule do not know the blessing’s meaning.
Rabbi Wahrman finds this last statement difficult since many women today are quite learned and understand the meaning of the blessing. He concludes by quoting the Aruch Hashulchan: “And women are exempted because it is a time-bound precept, but they have nevertheless accustomed themselves to [fulfill this mitzvah] like all time-bound mitzvot such as shofar, sukkah and lulav.”
Rabbi Zvi Cohen writes in his sefer Halachot U’Minhagim Hashalem, Sefirat Haomer volume (4:18), that a woman who is accustomed to recite the blessing of Sefirat HaOmer can fulfill the obligation of another woman (but not of another man). He quotes the gaon Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky who says this rule applies even though she is not obligated to say the blessing.
In the responsa work Tiferet Tzvi (of Rabbi Nachum Tzvi Kornmehl, zt”l), siman 6, we find the following interesting distinction among time-bound mitzvot. Some concern kedushah al ha’guf (sanctity of the body) – i.e., the body is the object of the mitzvah. Such mitzvot include wearing tefillin or sitting in a sukkah. Women do not say the berachot for such time-bound mitzvot. They do, however, say the berachot for time-bound mitzvot that concern objects (e.g., lulav and shofar), where the object itself is the mitzvah.
If a wife’s minhag differs from that of her husband in regards to women counting the Omer, she should follows her husband’s minhag (see Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah vol. 4:3, who attributes this rule to Chullin 110b).