Question: When a stranger approaches a congregant in shul asking for tzedakah, should the congregant verify that the person’s need is genuine? Furthermore, what constitutes tzedakah? Is a donation to a synagogue, yeshiva, or hospital considered tzedakah?
Zvi Kirschner
(Via E-Mail)
Summary of our response up to this point: We noted that one never becomes impoverished from giving charity. We also explained the importance of giving charity, especially via a loan so as not to embarrass one’s fellow. The Gemara (Kettubot 67b) discusses the lengths to which one must go to accommodate the needs of a poor person who formerly was wealthy.
We sought to determine who is classified as an impoverished person and thus entitled to charity funds. We also noted the dispute (Baba Batra 9a) between R. Huna and R. Judah regarding one how one verifies that one is needy.
We delved into two differing sources (and views) regarding the economics of poverty (a mishnah in Pe’ah and a mishnah in Eruvin). The Aruch Hashulchan explains that the mishnah in Pe’ah refers to earlier times. We also cited Rav Yitzchak Yaakov Weiss (Responsa Minchat Yitzchak) who discusses this matter in detail and cites the Chatam Sofer who connects the monetary measures set forth by our sages to leket, shikchah, and peah, which we no longer have. The Chatam Sofer connects our charitable giving to the recipients’ most basic needs.
We noted that there are sinners might not be entitled to our largesse, namely sinners. The Mechaber notes that there is a difference between one who transgresses due to an insatiable desire – mumar l’te’avon – and one who does so out of spite – mumar l’hash’chit. We are more lenient with regard to the former, and today there are few today who can be considered sinners out of spite.
We discussed to whom we should give our charity funds first; gabba’ei tzedakah; and the propriety of giving tzedakah funds to institutions like yeshivot and hospitals. We noted that a person should give charity relative to his means. We also discussed whether one may use one’s charity money for another mitzvah.
We then sought to define the annual amount of tzedakah one must give. The Mechaber, based on the Gemara (Bava Batra 9a), says the minimum is a third of a shekel. The Shach, in the 17th century, says it is one Polish zloty. Perhaps the requirement to give this minimum amount is why many shuls have the minhag of having the gabbai circulate the synagogue, collecting charity. In this manner, everyone is sure to at least give the minimum amount over the course of a year.
We also noted the importance of giving tzedakah in a good frame of mind and never turning anyone away empty handed. We also went through the eight levels of charitable giving and noted the importance of maintaining the right temperament when giving charity.
We cited from a related article by my uncle HaRav Sholom Klass, zt”l. He was asked, “Until what age is a father to support his children and may he use his charitable donations for their support as well as paying for their Torah education?” He cited the Gemara to the effect that one must support them until age six; if he is wealthy, he must support them after that as well. The Rambam, based on the Gemara, notes that a father who refuses to support them should be shamed into doing so.
Rabbi Sholom Klass also discussed supporting children from one’s charitable funds and cited many authorities who permit doing so. We cited authorities who disagree. Even Birkei Yosef who claims that it is permitted discourages doing so. The Aruch Hashulchan claims that one deprives the poor of support by using charitable funds for one’s own children. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein notes that social conditions have changed in that children today remain dependent for much longer thus obviating use of ma’aer kesafim for their support.
We cited from Responsa Me’ah She’arim, where Rabbi Yitzchak Silberstein relates an incident involving a fundraiser who asked an elderly Rav Dovid Karliner for funds for the famed Navharodoker Yeshiva. After having received the elderly gaon’s donation he was caught by surprise when the gaon offered to give him another donation, having forgotten that he had just, moments earlier, given him money.
We cited the Rambam (to Avot 3:5) who writes that merits are attained according to the number of one’s deeds. Thus, giving a small sum to many poor people is better than giving one large sum to one needy person. The Chofetz Chayim adds that acting in this manner accustoms a person to giving charity.
We noted that giving numerous times to the same individual also helps a person overcome his yetzer ha’ra. We noted the Chazon Ish’s view that if a giver has the wherewithal and the receiver has the need, he must give him. He notes, though, that our sages caution not to impoverish oneself through giving. Rabbi Silberstein also stresses that a person who asks for funds numerous times from the same individual is guilty of wrongdoing since he deprives other poor people of funds. He notes that it is imperative for a fundraiser to remind an elderly person that he gave him once before. Otherwise, he is guilty of geneivat da’at.
We referred to a unique application of the dictum of Avot 3:15:“Everything is [measured] according to the preponderance of one’s actions” and the Rambam’s explanation that “merits are not attained by a person according to the magnitude of a single action but rather according to the preponderance of the number of one’s many actions.” A person who donates a mezuzah to a synagogue entrance, we suggested, will reap the merits of those who enter and depart each and every day.
We noted, citing Tractate Arachin, that once money reaches the possession of the gabbai tzedakah it no longer belongs to the donor. We presented a dilemma presented to the Noda BiYehuda regarding a charity donation that became mixed with the gabbai tzedakah’s mundane money. He ruled that the gabbai must go to great lengths to determine what the donor might have given.
We discussed a case that came before the Chatam Sofer: someone pledged money “to one of the charities of the city” but did not specify which one. The Chatam Sofer ruled that must give every one. At the very least, he should place the sum before all of them and quickly depart and let them deal with the matter.
Last week, we noted that Rabbi Moshe Stern, the Debrecener Rav (Responsa Ba’er Moshe), was asked whether ignoring a solicitation letter is considered a violation of “lo t’ametz levov’cha” – hardening one’s heart (Deuteronomy 15:7). He replied that one must respond if reputable rabbis sign the letter, but need not if the request is not explicit (e.g., a New Year card sent by a charitable organization in the hope that the recipient will give a donation). He noted the Chatam Sofer’s discussion of testimony – that it must be submitted in person, not in writing. One could perhaps make the same distinction regarding requests for charity.
We concluded with a difficulty. The Torah states, “one who turns away from charity…” Why doesn’t it state “one who turns away from a poor person”? Does this unexpected wording indicate that the poor person need not make his request in person for the prohibition against refusing him to apply?
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Because of the unexpected wording of the Torah, Rabbi Stern suggests that the prohibition of “turning away from charity” applies even when a poor person does not request funds in person. If a beit din, a rabbi of impeccable standards, or a person whose trustworthiness is known to us signs a letter requesting funds for a poor person, one must give money even though the poor person isn’t present. Rabbi Stern writes: “Indeed, this is my personal practice. When I receive a contribution request that bears the signature of a well-known rabbi or beit din who express knowledge of the individual’s suffering, I send a donation, albeit according to the best of my financial ability.”
Elsewhere (Responsa Ba’er Moshe vol 2:6-8) Rabbi Stern cites various other halachot that not only comport with his explanation but actually bolster it. He cites the Mechaber (Orach Chayim 47:3-4) who states: “A person who writes divrei Torah, even though he is not reading out loud, is required to say birkat haTorah.” He states further: “One who thinks divrei Torah is not required to say birkat haTorah.” We thus see that the Mechaber maintains that writing is equivalent to speaking.
He duly notes that both the Magen Avraham and the Taz (Orach Chayim ad. loc.) find great difficulty with the Mechaber’s ruling as they cite the Gemara (Gittin 71) where we find a rule that testimony of witnesses must be heard from their mouths and not from their pens.
In order to resolve this difficulty, Rabbi Stern cites the Yeshuot Yaakov (47:4) who offers a novel interpretation: “True, a person who thinks divrei Torah does not say Birkat haTorah since thinking is not like speaking. He does, however, fulfill the mitzvah of ‘V’hagita bo yomam va’layla – You shall study it [Torah] day and night’ (Joshua 1:8). If he is fulfilling this mitzvah, why doesn’t he say birkat haTorah? Because one does not make a blessing for a mitzvah accomplished only via thinking. In order to say a blessing there must be some sort of deed. Therefore, we now understand with great clarity why the Mechaber differentiates between writing and thinking.”
Rabbi Stern also cites proof from the Torah that the written word is comparable to actual speech. The Torah states (Exodus 18:6) “Vayomer el Moshe ani chotencha Yitro bo eilecha – And he said to Moses: I, your father-in-law, Jethro, have come to you.” Rashi asks how Jethro could have said this to Moses considering that he had not as yet come to the encampment? He answers that he said this to Moses via a messenger. Rabbi Stern points out, though, that this explanation follows the view of R. Elazar HaModa’i (in the Mechilta); R. Yehoshua, his disputant, says that Jethro sent him a letter. (The Ramban offers this explanation as well.) Thus, we see that in the Torah itself writing is compared to speaking (since the Torah uses the word “vayomer”).
Rabbi Stern in numerous responsa cites additional proofs that writing is like speaking and, therefore, a person who disregards a solicitation letter violates “lo t’ametz levov’cha” – hardening one’s heart (Deuteronomy 15:7).
(To be continued)