Sandhedrin 25
Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses why the Mishna needs to delineate the disqualification of two different kinds of gamblers: one who plays with dice and one who bets on pigeons. This Gemara holds that the reason a gambler is disqualified is that betting is tantamount to theft. How so? Because the person who is betting doesn’t fully commit to losing, and therefore, when the winning bettor collects winnings from the losers, he is essentially stealing their money. The Gemara explains why it is necessary to specify both the dice gambler and the pigeon gambler due to the different psychology of the bettors in assessing their odds of losing and their resulting level of commitment.
The Gemara explains why it is necessary for the Mishna to teach that both types of gamblers are disqualified. Had the Mishna only mentioned pigeon gamblers, one might assume that only they are disqualified, as they believe their skill, such as knocking on trees to speed up pigeons, gives them an edge. But with dice, perceived as pure chance, we might think dice gamblers are fully committed to the possibility of losing. Yet the Mishna disqualifies them as well, highlighting the gambler’s psychological tendency to overestimate their chances.
This Gemara touches upon the human psychological process of rationalizing and overestimating one’s ability or skill. This is known as the Dunning-Kruger effect, discovered by researchers David Dunning and Justin Kruger. Dunning and Kruger discovered an interesting and persistent form of cognitive bias: People who were unskilled in a particular area tended to grossly overestimate their ability, while inversely, people who were competent in a particular area tended to underestimate their ability. These findings resonate with the adage, “The more you learn, the more you realize that you do not know.”
In a series of experiments, Dunning and Kruger had people evaluate their skills in a particular area, such as logic, humor, and grammar. In each of these separate experiments, people in the 16 to 25% percentile of competence evaluated themselves as being closer to the 60-65% percentile – in other words, above average. Ironically, the top 25% tended to think their skills were in the 70-75% percentile, although their performances were actually in the 87th percentile.
How do we account for this? Dunning and Kruger attribute it to a meta-cognitive deficit. In plain English, that means that the same lack of intelligence and skill which caused their poor performance also accounts for their inability to perceive that their performance was poor. Imagine a person enjoying singing completely out of tune, but not knowing it’s out of tune and not being bothered by it, because they don’t have the ability to recognize whether they are in tune or not. The same can be said for hard skills like mathematics and even softer skills like emotional intelligence. How would you know if you’re hurting somebody’s feelings if you have insufficient empathy?
Later researchers have critiqued Dunning and Kruger’s attribution and have come up with other interesting explanations for the effect. Some argue it is simply a matter of statistics, particularly the concept of regression toward the mean. If we look at self-assessment scores in the entire population, and the average score is a certain number, the lowest performers, whose scores are lower, will by definition estimate a higher score, as they apply the average ability to their own self-assessment. In other words, those with lower competence will tend to overestimate their abilities because they fail to accurately assess themselves within the larger statistical average.
Others argue that the bias arises from a lack of incentive to be accurate. People may be incentivized to overestimate their abilities in certain situations. For example, when applying for a job, if a person is humble and talks about their weaknesses, it could hurt their chances, whereas overestimating their abilities might increase their chances. However, this can backfire if the person is exposed as incompetent. The irony is that some irrational behaviors persist because, in certain ways, they confer short-term benefits, and sometimes even long-term ones.
Where this cognitive bias becomes dangerous is in professions or situations where a high degree of skill is required and the consequences for a lack of skill are great. For example, you would not want your surgeon to be overconfident in their abilities, although, ironically, a certain degree of overconfidence and cockiness might be necessary to have the steel resolve to perform surgery. Similarly, in relationships such as marriage or parenting, where emotional intelligence, communication, and conflict management are crucial, a person lacking sensitivity in these areas may not even be aware of their deficiencies, especially according to Dunning-Kruger’s meta-cognitive explanation.
The lesson for us is that while we should be optimistic about our abilities and take leaps of faith, we must also be realistic about our blind spots, particularly when it comes to recognizing our deficiencies and our ability to assess them.
False Testimonies, Real Trauma:
PTSD And Divine Justice In Halacha
Sandhedrin 27
Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses the halachic and hashkafic implications of the legalities surrounding conspiring witnesses. There is a fundamental and intrinsic illogic to the law. On one hand, witnesses are considered the highest form of verification, and ordinarily, if two sets of witnesses contradict each other, it results in a stalemate. We cannot assume that one group is more credible than the other. Yet if the second set of witnesses disqualifies the first indirectly – by claiming, “According to your testimony, you were in such and such a place observing the act, but we saw you at the same time in a totally different location” – the second set is believed, and the first set is punished in a unique way. Whatever they sought to inflict through their false testimony is now inflicted upon them. For instance, if they testified that someone owed $1,000, now that they have been exposed as conspirators and liars they must pay that sum. There is a presumption that this amount will be paid to the intended victims.
However, since there is an intrinsic lack of full legal rationale in this law, we consider the law of the conspiring witnesses to be unpredictable in certain areas of halacha. It does not necessarily allow us to extrapolate or make inferences beyond what is literally stated. This is why, in our Gemara, there is an opinion that the witnesses are not retroactively disqualified. Even though we treat them as false witnesses going forward, there isn’t a logical consistency to this particular position, so we have no reason to assume that it applies to the past. The overarching question remains: Why should we believe one pair of witnesses over another?
In an interesting application of the principle that we cannot make extrapolations or deductions regarding the rules of conspiring witnesses, Sefer Yereim (168) raises an intriguing question. The author notes that there is an assumption that the payment is made to the intended victims. Yet since it’s not fully proven that the witnesses were false, and there is even an opinion in the Gemara (Makkos 2b) that the payment is a penalty fine rather than actual reimbursement, there are implications. If the witnesses preemptively confess their sin, there would be no liability. Returning to Sefer Yereim’s question, where is the scriptural source or indication that the payment should go to the victims?
Sefer Daf al Daf quotes Rav Yisrael Salanter, who offers a psychological answer. Since the verse tells us to inflict upon the conspiring witnesses the same fate they plotted for the victim (Devarim 19:19), Rav Salanter explains that they must suffer in the same way as the victim would have. He elaborates: It is a different feeling to make a payment to a court of law; although frustrating, it is still an impersonal transaction. On the other hand, to be deceitfully forced to give your hard-earned money to another person, who has been gloating in their cruel and manipulative behavior, causes a different degree of pain and defeat. Since this is the pain the victim would have suffered, it is essential to do the same to the conspiring witnesses. This is why the payment must go to the victim and not to the court, as in an ordinary fine.
This insight from Rav Yisrael Salanter aligns with modern research on trauma. Studies indicate that when people experience interpersonal trauma, the incidence of PTSD symptoms is much higher compared to trauma caused by a natural disaster. In other words, trauma resulting from personal harm, such as being robbed or murdered, has a greater emotional impact than financial loss or death caused by a hurricane or other natural disaster. Research reveals that the overall rate of PTSD is 15.9%, with variation depending on the type of trauma and gender. Boys exposed to non-interpersonal trauma are at the lowest risk (8.4%), while girls exposed to interpersonal trauma show the highest rate (32.9%).
We may theorize that trauma disrupts a person’s sense of safety. When it comes from an interpersonal, malicious force, the pain is greater because it makes the world feel like a mean and unsafe place. On the other hand, natural disasters can be rationalized as impersonal events. For religious individuals who believe in a compassionate G-d, there is comfort in knowing that their prayers and/or repentance can have an effect on the future. However, when someone experiences interpersonal cruelty, it is much harder to restore their sense of safety.
I believe the higher PTSD susceptibility among females – who are generally more relational – supports this hypothesis. Disruptions in their environment, especially those perceived as originating from hostility, lead to a greater lack of safety and relational disruption. Even natural disasters can be interpreted by someone with a relational perspective as a personal punishment from G-d, leading to fear and insecurity.
