Seller’s Remorse
‘He Sold Because He Ostensibly Needed The Funds’
(Ketubbot 97a)
Our Gemara relates that a certain individual sold land to R. Papa since he needed funds. It later turned out that he had no such need. When he approached R. Papa to abrogate the sale, R. Papa agreed to do so. Initially the Gemara states that R. Papa’s behavior is reflective of his piety since it assumes he would have been within his rights to refuse. However, the Gemara then questions its assumption: Is it, in fact, the case that a sale made for a specific reason remains a valid sale if the reason is no longer relevant?
The Gemara concludes that if a seller indicates that he is selling his land because he need funds for a certain purchase, it is considered as though he explicitly stipulated that the sale was contingent on his needing the funds. Therefore, if it turns out that he doesn’t need the funds, he can cancel the sale.
Eretz Yisrael-Bound
Similarly, the Gemara (Kiddushin 49a) states that if a man who sold all his property, mentioning that he was doing so because he wanted to go to Eretz Yisrael, he has the same status as a person who explicitly stipulates that the sale is contingent on his moving to Eretz Yisrael. If, in the end, he is forced to cancel his plans to emigrate, he can nullify the sale and recover his property.
Movable Objects vs. Land?
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 207:5), citing Rashi, distinguishes between real estate, which, as a rule, people are reluctant to sell, and metaltelin (movable objects), which are sold more readily. It is unusual to sell real estate without a good reason. (This is probably based on Midrash Vayikra Rabbah 22:1, which states that there is no greater void than not owning land.) Thus, if one mentions that he is doing so because he intends to emigrate or because he needs money, it is considered as if he made an explicit stipulation. However, when a person sells movable objects and mentions his intention to emigrate, there is no presumption that he wishes to make the sale conditional on his emigration (unless he says so explicitly) since it is a routine occurrence to sell movable objects (c.f., Tosafot s.v. “zavin”).
Physical Possession
Alternatively, the Haggahos Asheri (cited by Pis’chei Teshuva, Choshen Mishpat 207:5-6) explains that the sale of movable objects is different than the sale of real estate because a person who buys movable objects generally takes physical possession of his purchase, making him a muchzak – his taking hold of the object establishes immediate legal possession – whereas a person who purchases real estate is not a muchzak since the land cannot be physically placed in his domain. In order for a seller to recover his movable objects from a buyer, he must conclusively prove that the sale was conditional since the buyer is the muchzak. If he did not explicitly state the stipulation, he cannot retrieve his chattels from the buyer since he cannot conclusively prove that the sale was conditional.
The Pri Tevuah (Responsum 31) states, accordingly, that the seller of movable objects can nullify the sale based on an unspoken condition if the buyer has not yet taken the movable objects into his possession (i.e., he used kinyan sudar, acquisition via a kerchief, rather than kinyan meshicha, acquisition by physically pulling or moving the object).
The Chasam Sofer (Responsum Choshen Mishpat 102) followed this reasoning in the following case: A person sold a silver vessel for cash (i.e., there was no physical kinyan) because he wanted to buy a boiler. The buyer had not yet taken possession of the silver vessel, and, in the meantime, the seller inherited a boiler. The Chasam Sofer rules that sale could be cancelled.
Buyer’s Remorse?
There is a difference of opinion among poskim (Rabbenu Yona and Rabbenu Chananel, cited by Pis’chei Teshuvah ad loc. Choshen Mishpat 207 s.k. 5) as to whether a buyer can cancel a sale based on an unspoken understanding. Tosafot (Ketubbot 47b, s.v. “shelo kasav”) discuss a case in which a cow perished shortly after it was sold (due to no fault of the seller) and the buyer demanded a refund, claiming that it was a transaction based on a mistake. Tosafot explain that the buyer’s claim lacks merit – and the sale is not retroactively nullified – even though it is understood that he did not buy the cow for the purpose of feeding its carcass to dogs.