The Plucked Apple
‘…Which Cannot Become Permitted’
(Nedarim 58a)
It is prohibited to derive any benefit from an act of Shabbos desecration. Strictly speaking, this rule should not apply when one desecrates Shabbos for the sake of a dangerously ill person since doing so is permitted. Nonetheless, our Sages forbade a healthy person from eating the leftovers of food cooked for a sick person on Shabbos. They feared that the next time one cooks for the sick person, one will cook extra for the those who plan on eating the leftovers.
When this concern does not apply, however, a healthy person may eat the leftovers. For example, if an animal is slaughtered on Shabbos to feed a sick person, a healthy person may eat the leftover meat raw. There is no concern that one might shecht extra next time since the meat of one animal is sufficient for several meals (Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 318:1, 2).
Muktza Fruit
The Rema (ibid.) adds that if fruit is plucked on Shabbos for a sick person, a healthy person may not eat the remains. Fruit attached to a tree when Shabbos begins remain muktzah for the entire Shabbos. Even if the relatives of the sick person planned to pluck the fruit on Shabbos – and thus removed its muktzah status – the fruit is still prohibited since it continues to grow on Shabbos and the new growth is muktzah. Although their intent can remove the muktzah status of the part of the fruit that existed before Shabbos, it cannot remove the muktza status from the part of the fruit that did not yet exist.
The part of the fruit that grew on Shabbos, however, is clearly minimal. Why is it not, then, batel b’rov (nullified in the majority of permitted fruit)?
Redeemed Revai Fruit
Our daf discusses orlah fruit that was mixed with non-orlah fruit. Elsewhere (Ma’aser Sheni 5:2) our Sages teach that this batch of fruit is permitted but may only be eaten in Yerushalayim. If one so wishes, one may redeem the revai fruit – replacing it with money – and purchase other food to be eaten in Yerushalayim.
Tosafos (Bava Kama 69a s.v. “kol hanilkat”) write that if a farmer redeems his revai fruit while it is still attached to the tree, the part of the fruit that grows afterwards has the sanctity of revai. Therefore, the fruit must be redeemed again after it is plucked.
Tosafos note that the principle of batel b’rov does not apply in such a case. Since the fruit can be rendered permissible via a second redemption, it is considered a davar she’yaish lo matirin, a substance or matter which can become permitted, which is never batel.
Immediately Permitted
The Rema bases his ruling regarding muktzah fruit on this Tosafos, since muktza is also a davar she’yaish lo matirin – it becomes permitted after Shabbos. Therefore, the prohibited muktzah part does not become batel in the permitted part.
The Magen Avraham, though, argues with the Rema, noting that although the Ran agrees with Tosafos, many other Rishonim disagree (Mordechai, Shabbos 8:259; Shita Mekubetzes, Bava Kama 68b, citing R’ Shmaya; Issur V’Heter, 25:20). These Rishonim posit that the prohibition of davar she’yaish lo matirin applies only when the prohibited substance existed before it was mixed with the permitted majority. If, however, the prohibited substance came into existence already mixed with the permitted substance, it is batel even if it is a davar she’yaish lo matirin because the prohibited substance never had an identity of its own. Therefore, as soon as it comes into existence, it becomes permitted.
Thus, revai and muktzah parts of a fruit that grow into permitted parts are batel, even though they both fall under the category of davar she’yaish lo matirin.
The Reason for the Debate
Rabbi Akiva Eiger, zt”l (Teshuvos 189) writes that this disagreement between Tosafos and the other Rishonim is based on the debate over the rationale behind davar she’yaish lo matirin. According to Rashi, the rationale is: “rather than eating it while it is prohibited it, eat it when it is permitted.” The Rishonim upon whom the Magen Avraham relies argue that there never was a prohibited substance in these cases. As soon as it came into existence, it was already nullified in the majority of permitted food. Thus davar she’yaish lo matirin is not relevant.
According to the Ran, however, the rationale behind davar she’yaish lo matirin is that a substance that ultimately becomes permitted is not really considered prohibited at all. It is in essence identical to the permitted substance, and the laws of bitul do not apply to two identical substances. Thus, even if a prohibited substance was immediately mixed together with a permitted substance as soon as it came into existence, it still is prohibited because it cannot become batel.