Call To Alms
‘Having Declared It A Burnt Offering, He Rethought…’
(Zevachim 30a)
The Gemara (supra 9a) states that if someone tries to transfer the kedushah of a korban olah to another animal, both animals are now holy. The original animal retains its kedushah and the second animal acquires its sanctity. As Vayikra 27:10 states: “hu u’tmuraso yihyeh kodesh – it and its substitute shall be sanctified.”
Our daf cites a mishnah (Temurah 25b) that discusses a more complex case. A person declared that a non-sanctified animal should serve as a substitute for an olah and a shelamim. R. Meir maintains that the animal now has the keduashah of an olah. R. Yosi opines, however, that it has the kedushah of both. But if he first said “olah” and then reconsidered and said “shelamim” as an afterthought, it only has the kedushah of an olah.
Toch Ke’dei Dibbur
Generally speaking (see Makkos 6a), a person can retract a statement “toch ke’dei dibbur” – within the time it takes for a student to greet his teacher (“Shalom alecha rebbe“). The Shita Mekubetzes (to our daf) therefore asks: Why can’t a person retract a sacrificial declaration (e.g., decide that his animal should be a shelamim rather than an olah) within that time span?
The Shita Mekubetzes answers that he, in fact, can. The Gemara, though, is discussing someone who waited longer than toch k’dei dibbur to change his mind. And once that time lapsed, his declaration is seen as a desire to super-impose the sanctity of a shelamim on an olah, which can’t be done.
The Mordechai (end of Bava Basra) is even more restrictive; he explains that a person can only retract a statement – even toch k’dei dibbur – if he specifically states “chozrani bi – I retract.” Rashi (infra 30b s.v. “mihader ka’hadar”) and the Rambam (Hilchos Ma’aseh Hakorbanos chap. 15:1) maintain that once a declaration is made, one may not retract even toch k’dei dibbur.
Amiraso L’Govoha
Tosafos (Menachos 81b s.v. “todah min ha’chullin …”) argues that temurah of korbanos is unlike other declarations and no retracting is possible, even toch k’dei dibbur, because of the rule that “amiraso l’govoha k’mesiraso l’hedyot – pledging to the sanctified domain is like giving to a common person.” Thus, his declaration is as binding as a formal transaction.
Charitable Giving
The Ketzos HaChoshen (siman 255) asserts that one who pledges money to charity has the power to immediately retract that pledge toch k’dei dibbur because, in his view, the rule of “amiraso l’govoha k’mesiraso l’hedyot” does not apply to charity pledges.
The Machane Ephraim (Hilchos Tzedaka end of siman 8) disagrees, citing several opinions that do apply “amiraso l’govoha k’mesiraso l’hedyot” to charity pledges. In modern-day terms, we can compare the pledge to a cerdit card payment, which is instantaneous.
