Excluding The Excluded
‘You Are Permitted To Any Man But My Father …’
(Gittin 85a)
In Parashas Ki Teitzei (Deuteronomy 24:1,3) the Torah instructs “… ve’kasav lah sefer kerisus – He shall write for her a bill of severance” – that the get (the bill of divorce) is a bill of severance, which must sever all marital bonds for it to be effective.
Thus, if the husband says this get shall permit you to betroth to anyone except such and such individual, the Sages (supra, Mishna 82a) maintain that such a get is invalid because the marital bonds have not been severed in relation to this individual. Thus she may not marry anyone else unless a get is given that is unencumbered with any restrictions.
The Mishna on our daf (85a) qualifies this halacha and explains that if a man gave a get to his wife that contained a restriction on her “marrying” a relative for which the Torah does not sanction, such as marriage or with a non-Jew, which is also not biblically sanctioned, the get is nevertheless valid. Rashi (ad loc. s.v. “elah le’abba u’leavicha …”) explains that his exclusion is not an exclusion at all since they are nevertheless forbidden to her by Torah law, thus such a get is considered as if all marital bonds are now severed and she may now marry anyone else.
Liability For Sin Offerings
Rabbi David Karlin (Yad Dovid, vol. 2, p. 175 – and cited by Kehillos Yaakov to Yevamos siman 37:1) points out that although it is a sin for an unmarried woman to marry her father or a non-Jew, a married woman who sins with her father violates a two-fold issur and [if the sin is committed inadvertently] she is obligated to bring two chatta’os (sin offerings) to atone for two sins (i.e., incest and adultery). By excluding the wife’s father from the get, the husband maintains a marital bond with his wife in the sense that if she subsequently sins with her father (inadvertently) she will be liable to a sacrifice for the sin of adultery (in addition to her liability for the sin of incest). [Since her father was excluded from the get, with respect to her father she is considered as though she was never divorced and is still married.] Consequently, he asks that a get that permits the wife to everyone except her father should be considered a divorce that lacks total severance and should be invalid.
A Complete Severance
The Chazon Ish (Novella to Gittin, siman 147), however, maintains that when the Mishna validates a get that excludes a relative or a non-Jew, it means to say that such a get completely severs the marital bond – even with regard to those men who were excluded, because a get that permits her to marry everyone with whom kiddushin is possible effects total severance. Thus, if she subsequently sins with her father, she will be guilty only of the sin of incest, but not adultery, since the get totally severed the marital bond, even with respect to her father.
This also seems to be the opinion of the Meiri, who asserts if the non-Jew who was excluded from the get subsequently converts to Judaism, the wife is now permitted to marry him. The Meiri explains that a get that permits the woman to marry all men with whom kiddushin is possible, and effects a complete severance of the marital bond without limitation.
Not A Restrictive Get
The Yad Dovid, on the other hand, is of the opinion that such a get does not sever her marital bond with regard to her father or the non-Jew who was excluded from the get. In his opinion, the Mishna teaches that even though she is still considered a married woman with respect to her father, the get is valid and is not considered a restrictive get since she cannot marry her father even if she is single.
