Reaching One’s Objective
‘… The One in Thought and the Other Silently’
(Zevachim 41b)
For the past few weeks, we have been studying the topic of thoughts of pigul (where one had an improper thought regarding a korban, e.g., to eat it at the wrong time) and thoughts of lishmah (where one had an improper thought as to its designation). These are not the only thoughts referred to in the Torah. Our Sages teach (Gittin 31a) that one may separate terumah by mere thought, without speech, as we are told, “and your terumah shall be considered” (Bamidbar 18:27). We are also taught (Shevuos 26b) that one may vow or contribute by mere thought, as we are told, “And each man came whose heart inspired him…” (Shemos 35:22).
Actually, a brief glance at the mitzvos of the Torah reveals that many mitzvos depend merely on thought. Tzitzis must be made lishmah, i.e., when woven and put in the garment, its threads need to be dedicated to the mitzvah of tzitzis. Matzah is to be baked lishmah as well. But to our surprise, as opposed to the halacha concerning terumah, the Mechaber (Orach Chayyim 11:1) rules regarding tzitzis that thought is not enough, and one must orally recite that the threads are being woven for their mitzvah. Why is this so? In fact, the source of this halacha is in Rashi on our sugya, as follows.
According to the Rambam (Mishneh Lamelech, Hilchos Pesulei HaMukdashin 13:1), the avodos of a sacrifice lishmah may be performed by thought, just as regarding terumah, and speech is unnecessary. Therefore, for a sacrifice to not be lishmah, a kohen has merely to think at the time of its slaughtering that the sacrifice is being slaughtered for Shelamim and not for an Olah, with the result that the owner would have to bring a replacement sacrifice.
However, Rashi (s.v. “Kegon”) disagrees, and Tosafos (4b, s.v. “Machashava be’alma…”) concur, insisting on speech, as speech is hinted at in the verse that teaches us about pigul, as we are told, “You shall not slaughter…a bull or a sheep in which there be a blemish, any bad thing” (Devarim 17:1). Davar, Rashi notes, may mean “thing” or “word.” (Shitah Mekubetzes, Bava Metzia 43b, offers support to Rashi from Sifrei; while the Acharonim offer a few Talmudic proofs also in support of Rashi).
We now have the mitzvah of separating terumah, which may be accomplished by thought (Bamidbar 18:27), and on the other hand, lishmah and pigul, which, according to Rashi, require speech. We must now consider all the mitzvos that must be observed lishmah.
Terumah Or Kodshim?
Should they be likened to terumah or to kodshim? The Rishonim discussed this question (cited in the Rosh’s Halachos Ketanos, Hilchos Sefer Torah 3, and in Sefer HaTerumah 192) and because of the doubt, the Mechaber ruled stringently, that there is a need for speech. We see, then, that sometimes the Torah simply requires thought and, at other times, requires explicit speech. The question is, if lishmah regarding kodshim requires speech, why do most of the discussions in our tractate refer to thought – such as “one thinks from one avodah to another” (10a), “thought disqualifies” (13a), “he should not mix in other thoughts” (29a), etc.?
Molding A Thought Into Speech
Rabbi Y.M. Epstein (Aruch HaShulchan He’asid 146) explains that the main point of lishmah depends on thought, as in terumah. However, concerning kodshim, the Torah adds that the person who conceives the thought must forge it into speech. We do not have two separate matters here but actually one – thought – which is the main matter, expressed in speech.
Rabbi Epstein concludes that this logical explanation has a meaningful halachic implication in the case of a kohen who later states that he made a sacrifice pigul but his thought at the time was otherwise. In such a circumstance, he does not make the sacrifice pigul, as he has not carried out the main thing – the thought (see ibid., se’if 8, that he believes that the Rambam agrees with Rashi and Tosafos, but the other Acharonim disagree; see Responsa Minchas Baruch 1, anaf 4).