Zevachim, Daf 16
Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses the requirement that a kohen stand when he performs the Avodah, and that if he does not, the service is invalidated. Based on this, the Magen Avraham (beginning of Siman 48, OC) rules that when reciting the liturgy that contains the verses and teachings regarding the sacrifices, one must also stand, because the recitation of the relevant portions is considered a substitute for the Avodah.
Sefer Daf Al Daf quotes the Tevuos Shor (Bechor Shor, Seder Korbanos 12), who disputes this requirement. He argues that while the kohen’s recitation of the relevant verses and teachings is considered as if he brought a sacrifice, the actual recitation is not considered an act of service.
By way of analogy, in Tefillah Zakkah we recite that our fasting on Yom Kippur, and the consumption of the fats and blood volume from our body during the fast, should be considered as if we offered the fat and blood of a sacrifice on the altar. Clearly, we are not suggesting that we are literally sacrifices and subject to all the requirements of sacrifices, such as not being blemished. Rather, we are asking that it count like a sacrifice. So too, Tevuos Shor argues that the recitation of the relevant portions pertaining to sacrifices counts as if one brought a sacrifice, but it is not actually the act of service and therefore not subject to those requirements.
Sefer Daf al Daf also cites a ruling of the Rama (OC 132:2) that one must be careful to recite the portion that describes the incense correctly, because in the Temple service, if one brought it with an incorrect formulation, he would incur a heavenly death decree. Here too, it would seem that the Rama holds that reciting the relevant portion is not merely considered in place of the service, but actually a form of the service in a literal sense.
This position is hard to understand. Even the Rama and Magen Avraham cannot truly hold that it is like performing the Avodah, because what about being ritually impure or having a blemish –both of which disqualify a kohen? Additionally, a non-kohen is forbidden to perform the Avodah, so how is it permitted for a non-kohen to recite?
I believe the answer is as follows. The Rama and Magen Avraham do not consider any psul haguf (invalidation due to a physical or material matter) to be a problem. Since by definition a non-kohen is performing this substitute service, impurity, blemishes, and not being of the priestly caste are all physical invalidations and not included in the requirements of this particular substitute sacrificial order. However, standing or using the correct combination of incense is not a physical invalidation but rather a flaw in the process, and therefore must be adhered to.
What is interesting about this is that the invalidation of having a thought of eating the offering outside of its prescribed time or location, while performing an essential sacrificial service such as sprinkling the blood, might also invalidate the oral recitation according to the Magen Avraham and Rama. On the other hand, since the recitation does not involve eating or a particular location in the Temple, perhaps even they would agree otherwise.
Regardless, at its core, this is a fundamental dispute about whether recitation and study of the relevant passages of sacrifices are considered, in terms of merit, as if one brought the sacrifice as a substitute process, or rather as if one is bringing the sacrifice in actuality. Even regarding the earlier quoted section of Tefillah Zakkah, and possibly the recitation of the Akeidah, the same philosophical dispute might apply. Does it have the same merit as if we had sacrificed ourselves or our only child (Bereishis 22:12), or is it as if we actually did it?
Similarly, the same dispute might be relevant regarding the teaching in Berachos (6a): “Rav Ashi said: If a person intended to perform a mitzvah, but due to circumstances beyond his control, he did not perform it, the verse ascribes it as if he performed the mitzvah.” Is it as if he really performed the mitzvah, or does he merely get credit as if he performed it?
This may also apply to a dispute between Rabbeinu Tam and Rashi on 22b. The Gemara identifies an uncircumcised kohen as unfit for service in the Temple. Rashi says this refers to a person whose brothers died from circumcision, so it is unsafe for him to undergo it. Tosafos (Rabbeinu Tam) here and in Yevamos (70a) disagree. If it is unsafe for him to have a circumcision, he is not penalized. Rabbeinu Tam says our Gemara’s case of an unfit uncircumcised kohen refers to one who is technically healthy enough to undergo circumcision, but too afraid. We may have sympathy for this poor fellow who was not circumcised as a youth and now is fearful of undergoing it (without anesthesia), but this is not sufficient duress to exempt him from the obligation.
How do we understand the conceptual difference between Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam? According to Rashi, in the end, the person who is not circumcised due to medical danger is like one who has a blemish: It may not be his fault, but it still renders him unfit. According to Rabbeinu Tam, it is not even considered a deficiency if he has no practical ability to perform the circumcision. We might say that since this is a covenant, he is included in the covenant as any other Jew, since his refusal does not constitute a purposeful rejection. (Minchas Asher compares this to a woman, who is also included in the covenant, though obviously cannot have a circumcision.)
However, it may go deeper and relate to our discussion about the degree to which recitation of the relevant texts and teachings of the sacrificial service counts as actual service. Is it as if he really performed the mitzvah, or does he get credit as if he performed it, though it was not actually performed? Here too, perhaps Rabbeinu Tam holds that the kohen’s desire to be circumcised counts as if he was actually circumcised – not just a free pass, but full credit.
Whine About Wine
Daf 17
Our Gemara on amud beis quotes a series of verses (Vayikra 10:9-11) used as proof texts both to prohibit a kohen from performing the Temple service after drinking wine, and also to forbid a judge or rabbi from rendering a halachic ruling while under its influence: “Drink no wine or other intoxicant, you or your sons, when you enter the Tent of Meeting, that you may not die. This is a law for all time throughout the ages, for you must distinguish between the sacred and the profane, and between the impure and the pure, and you must teach the Israelites all the laws which Hashem has imparted to them through Moses.”
The Maharal (Gevuros Hashem, Yeyn Nesech) understands the quality of wine in a particular light that informs a number of practices within Judaism. He explains that wine blurs boundaries and reduces the ability to see distinctions. It can lower inhibitions and also cause people to be friendly toward their enemies, which can of course be a double-edged sword depending on the degree of danger. This is why Jews may not drink wine with Gentiles, so as not to blur the distinct character and boundaries of Jewish spiritual and theological orientation, and on a more concrete level, to prevent intermarriage. So too, halachic or legal decisions depend on the ability to draw fine distinctions, which even a small amount of wine will blur. In terms of Temple service, holiness is dependent on distinction and boundaries; hence the myriad laws of purity and process.
Yet the function that wine has of blurring distinctions can also be a positive force, such as during celebration. It allows past feuds to be suspended, worries to be forgotten, and it may also boost access to ecstatic spiritual states, which is why we mark festivals with joy and ceremonial wine.
While it is forbidden to render a halachic ruling after drinking wine for the above reasons, it is fascinating to note that there is an opinion that this applies only to rulings of prohibited versus permitted matters, but not to rulings in civil monetary disputes (Shulchan Aruch, CM 7:5). If we are concerned about a lack of ability to see fine distinctions, monetary and civil law also require keen judgment, so how can we understand this rule? Yismach Moshe (Shemini) explains that when seen from a certain perspective, wine’s quality of blurring differences and allowing for blending may be an asset when it comes to monetary rulings.
Wine is the gematria of 70, which implies the totality of possible perspectives, such as the 70 judges of a Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 2a; there are actually 71 judges, but the 71st is a tie-breaker to avoid a hung court), and the 70 nations and languages of the world (Yerushalmi Sotah 7:5). Monetary matters are considered more complex than straightforward rulings of ritual prohibitions (see Berachos 63b). Therefore, a mild amount of wine is required to attain Divine inspiration to transcend the physical limits of the intellect, as Gemara Eruvin (64a) reports in the name of Rav Nachman: “As concerning myself, as long as I have not drunk a quarter-loug of wine, my mind is not clear.” Yet when it comes to capital matters, joy is not possible, or at least not appropriate, due to the impending pain and suffering; therefore, wine cannot inspire in those situations.
As we see in many halachos, Judaism tends to avoid absolutes and instead seeks balance between competing values and considerations. The Torah’s relationship with wine’s powerful potential as both chaos and inspiration is one such example.
Sober Reflections
Daf 18
Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses Rav’s reluctance to teach publicly after drinking even a small amount of wine: “Rav would not place an interpreter before him, i.e., he would not lecture in public, from the time that he drank wine on one Festival day until the other, the second Festival day, due to drunkenness.”
The Gemara in Kerisus (13b) raises an obvious question: Why should Rav not simply teach his lecture without offering specific halachic rulings, or even just teach midrashim (Rashi ibid.)? The Gemara answers that due to Rav’s stature, it was inevitable that people would seek halachic rulings anyway. Presumably, he was concerned he would be tempted to respond, or perhaps people would read into his remarks matters of practical halachic significance when not so intended.
Rav Soloveitchik (Reshimos Shiurim, Horiyos 2a) notes that the Rambam (Laws of Entering the Mikdash 1:4) has a different slant: “If he was a sage who delivers rulings on a regular basis, he should not teach, for his teaching itself is a halachic ruling.” According to the Rambam, for a great sage, it is deeper than a concern that his words will be taken as a p’sak. His teaching itself constitutes p’sak, whether he likes it or not.
I find this particularly ironic coming from the Rav, as I personally heard complaints from some of his talmidim that others took his musings and chakiros (conceptual analyses) in shiur as halachic rulings. On the other hand, here is an interesting quote from Rav Herschel Schachter, shlita (taken from a magazine article) that pushes in the other direction – though surely context-dependent: “I was fortunate to have been in the Rav’s shiur for ten years, from 1957 to 1967. If you paid attention to the shiur, [you realized that] in many, many cases, the Rav was deriving the halacha from the Gemara and stating his halachic opinion.”