Dr. Bomzer had done some freelance work for one of his clients. He sent him an invoice for $2,000.
A month passed with no response; Dr. Bomzer inquired about the payment. “I’m sorry, but I can’t pay you right now,” replied the client. “G-d willing, I’ll send a check in the next week or two.”
Another two months passed before Dr. Bomzer finally received the check. With it was a note: “Attached is payment for your services. I added $100 for the delay.”
“That was considerate,” Dr. Bomzer thought to himself. He deposited the check, but was concerned that the additional $100 might entail prohibited ribbis that he had to return.
“You didn’t ask the client for extra,” one person said. “He added the $100 of his own accord. What’s the problem?!”
“That doesn’t make a difference,” insisted another. “In all cases of ribbis, the borrower agrees, and the Torah prohibits it even so!”
“It’s irrelevant at this point,” claimed a third person. “You already deposited the check. There’s no point in returning the money now.”
“Why not?” chimed in a fourth. “If you hold money that you shouldn’t have taken, you should return it!”
“Who said there’s any problem here of ribbis,” argued a fifth person. “You didn’t lend your client anything. He withheld your payment, which was wrong of him in the first place! He owes you some compensation!”
Dr. Bomzer considered the various viewpoints. “You’re all raising valid points,” he said. “What should I do?”
“Why don’t you call Rabbi Dayan and ask,” one of them suggested.
Dr. Bomzer called Rabbi Dayan and asked:
“Am I required to return the extra $100?”
“The rules of returning ribbis depend on the severity of the ribbis,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “The Gemara (B.M. 61b) teaches that ribbis ketzutzah – standard, stipulated interest for a loan, which is biblically prohibited – must be returned and the borrower can demand it in beis din. Returning avak ribbis – most forms of rabbinically prohibited ribbis – is not enforceable. Nonetheless, many Rishonim write that the lender has a moral responsibility to return even avak ribbis” (Y.D. 161:2,5; Machaneh Efraim, Ribbis #15).
“However, Rama, based on Responsa of the Rashba, rules that there is not even a moral obligation to return ribbis me’ucheres – which the borrower gives on his own initiative after repaying the loan. Gra (161:8) explains that this is because the borrower gave it as a gift to the lender.
“Seemingly, the rationale is that since the borrower gives the additional amount on his own initiative as a gift – there is sincere mechilah, were it not for the prohibition of ribbis. Thus, while the lender is not allowed to accept ribbis me’ucheres – once it was already given, post facto there is not even a moral obligation to return it” (Bris Yehuda 8:32-33[110]).
“When the borrower adds extra of his own accord when returning the loan, not afterwards, regarding certain halachos this is more severe than ribbis me’ucheres. Regarding this halacha, there is a dispute whether there is a moral responsibility to return the extra. Many Achronim rule that it is like ribbis me’ucheres and the lender does not have even a moral obligation to return it. The aforementioned rationale applies here, as well” (Shach 160:4; Chavos Daas, Y.D. 160:2).
“In addition, some authorities rule that debt emanating from work is different from a loan, so that an employer who withheld wages is permitted to compensate the employee for the delay. Although others do not differentiate, it is not clear that this is prohibited ribbis” (see Bris Yehuda 2:17).
“Thus,” concluded Rabbi Dayan, “while it is questionable whether you were allowed to deposit the large check, post facto you do not have even a moral obligation to return the extra $100.”
Verdict: Although there is a moral responsibility to return avak ribbis, the lender does not have to return ribbis me’ucheres, which the borrower gives on his own initiative, especially for withheld work earnings.
