The Gemara mentions three areas of halacha wherein the Sages instruct us to be lenient. They are: eruvin, agunah, and avelus. The first concerns permitting actions that would otherwise be forbidden on Shabbos and which enhance the observance of Shabbos; the second refers to the evidence required to permit a woman to remarry after her husband went missing and is thought to be dead; the third concerns the laws of mourning.
According to most, the leniencies that Chazal encourage relate to things that would otherwise be rabbinically prohibited. That is, we seek leniencies in these areas to overcome a deRabbanan, but not a deOraisa. In general, there are greater grounds for leniency when it comes to rabbinic law, but the three areas mentioned are singled out as areas where we should actively seek leniencies.
Clearly there are many areas of halacha where seeking leniency is inappropriate. Moreover, there are many areas where the question of stringency versus leniency is a matter of perspective. The famous story about Reb Chaim saying that he’s not mekil (lenient) about fasting on fast days but machmir (stringent) about human lives demonstrates that the same practice might be a kula or a chumra depending on perspective. (I will add that this statement by Reb Chaim is overused, and even abused, by people who seek to mask their unprecedented leniencies by dressing them up as ostensibly more acceptable chumros. As a general rule, when you hear someone say, “I’m not mekil on X, I’m machmir on Y,” it’s a good idea to run the other way, unless it’s Reb Chaim himself.)
There are also all kinds of rules governing when it is appropriate to be mekil and when to be machmir in cases of safek (uncertainty). We are generally machmir on any safek pertaining to Torah law and mekil on a safek deRabbanan. If there is uncertainty regarding impurity (safek tumah), then we are lenient in a public domain (reshus harabim) and machmir in a private domain (reshus hayachid). And so forth.
Finally, there are communities that have longstanding traditions about being machmir and mekil on certain things. The Ashkenazic community is famously lenient about chadash (“new” grain that was harvested after the most recent Pesach). In fact, it was in response to people who wanted to be machmir that the Chasam Sofer quipped: “Chadash assur min haTorah.” He opposed and forbade the “new” stringency that forbade “new” grain! Likewise, Ashkenazic custom has several longstanding kulos concerning the kosher status of certain types of lesions on the lungs of a slaughtered animal.
At the same time, it is not appropriate to try to get away with the “minimum” that meets the baseline of halachic observance. This is certainly true if it means picking and choosing customs and practices of different communities or of rabbinic opinions that have fallen out of practice.
In sum, there are areas of halacha where we specifically seek out leniency, there are other areas where leniency is a matter of longstanding custom and tradition of a community, and still other areas where stringency comes at a cost. So while our goal must always be to fulfill the Torah and mitzvos properly, and it is certainly inappropriate to cherry-pick halachic opinions, there is no general rule that it is improper to seek leniencies. Each area of halacha is different – so ask your rabbi!
– Rabbi Elli Fischer is a translator, writer, and historian. He edits Rav Eliezer Melamed’s Peninei Halakha in English, cofounded HaMapah, a project to quantify and map rabbinic literature, and is a founding editor of Lehrhaus. Follow him @adderabbi on Twitter or listen to his podcast, “Down the Rabbi Hole.”
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Kulos are appropriate at certain times but within limits. Hashem has placed some flexibility in halacha so that learned halachic authorities can be lenient when necessary. Consulting a proper posek enables us to know when one rightfully pursues a lenient view and when one is abusing the halachic system. Consulting a posek instead of making arbitrary decisions allows us to live a proper and fulfilling life of avodas Hashem.
– Rabbi Chaim Jachter is a prominent rabbi who serves as the rabbi at Congregation Shaarei Orah, the Sephardic Congregation of Teaneck, and is a popular Torah teacher at the Torah Academy of Bergen County. He also serves as a Dayan on the Beth Din of Elizabeth and has acquired an international reputation of excellence in the area of Get administration. He has authored sixteen books on issues ranging from contemporary Halacha, Tanach, Aggada, and Jewish Thought all available on Amazon.
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Our Sages tells us that “Koach de’hetera adif,” that the power of a heter (permissibility) is preferable. If the majority of opinion is to allow something, or to be “mekil,” then this is preferable. In fact, choosing to be stringent (machmir) is very often against the spirit of halacha.
Rabbi Isaac Bernstein, of blessed memory, in his tapes on Chumash states that chumrot, stringencies, have had only a deleterious effect upon our people generating only dissension and arguments, a feeling of one-up-manship and elitism, causing separation and fragmentation one Jew from the next. It is told of the great Rebbi of Salant, that once when baking matzot for Pesach, his students asked him, what chumrot he had? They thought that they would try to emulate their teacher and assume upon themselves these obligations as well. When asked he responded, treat the woman who is in charge with kindness and sensitivity. She is a widow and she is in need of compassion. That’s my only chumrah.
Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik of blessed memory, once stated at one of the many Chag HaSemicha (rabbinical ordination) ceremonies that “You don’t have to be a rav to be machmir, but you have to be a rav to be meikil.” Anyone can answer no to a question! It is the astute rav who is able to find a leniency and walk the middle path. He once told Rabbi Haskel Lookstein to withstand the pressure and maintain his direction of instruction at the Ramaz School and remain centrist – not to move to the right.
In truth, everyone has a right to live their lives the way they choose. People have a right to assume upon themselves any stringency that they feel comfortable with. They can choose any hashgacha that they want. They may select and follow any chumrah that they feel necessary – which in their eyes would fulfill them religiously and spiritually.
But when these chumrot become a source of dissension and conflict separating one Jew from the next, then they have crossed the line. When people state that if you don’t follow my chumrot you are not up to par in your religious observance and therefore will be excluded from our social grouping, then we have lost sight of the difference between right and wrong.
In short, if there are enough views to rely on, then one can seek out a kulah.
– Rabbi Mordechai Weiss lives in Efrat, Israel, and previously served as an elementary and high school principal in New Jersey and Connecticut. He was also the founder and rav of Young Israel of Margate, N.J. His email is [email protected].
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The Mishna in Pirkei Avos (1:16) directs one to find a suitable rabbi, meaning, on its most basic level, as explained by Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura there (d”h aseih), someone to whom one can turn for halachic direction when one is in doubt as to what to do himself. It is of vital importance for every observant Jew to have someone with whom he or she can converse when questions come up, as they regularly do; one cannot simply say in a case where there is some dispute that he will rule like whomever he wants (see the Rema’s comment in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 25:2). While one may technically “consult” even with a rabbi who is no longer alive, by reading his printed works and hence consistently following his rulings, it would seem prudent to establish a relationship with a rabbi with whom one can actually discuss things in person, as the solution to many questions can depend upon nuances influenced by unique individual circumstances. Once one has identified such a person, he is required to follow his decisions whether they are stringent or lenient.
The Gemara in Avodah Zarah (7a) states that if one asked a question of a certain rabbi and he ruled stringently, the questioner may not then ask another rabbi the same question in an attempt to hear a more lenient decision. This teaching is qualified, however, by Tosafos there (d”h ha-nishal) where it is noted that one may pose his question to a second rabbi – and even to many additional rabbis – provided that he informs him – or them – that he already raised his question to the first rabbi and shares that first rabbi’s response. This ruling is codified by the Rema in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 242:31).
As pointed out there in Tosafos, based upon a Gemara in Niddah (20b) and elsewhere, while a second rabbi is certainly allowed to discuss the question at hand with the first rabbi, if he does not do so, or if the first rabbi maintains his position, this second rabbi may generally not rule differently than the first one did (there are, however, certain exceptions, as cited by the Rema there, among others). It should be noted, though, that this restriction is limited to the particular practical case which the questioner brought up concerning his own specific situation; another rabbi may obviously rule on a similar or even an identical case, though not on this one, as he deems appropriate (see Shu”t Maharik No. 172).
It is clear from the above that it is thus improper for someone to consult with different rabbis with the goal of finding a lenient ruling; once one has asked “his” (or “her”) rabbi, that decision should be adhered to whether it is strict or lenient. It should be noted that some authorities, including Rashi in Niddah there (d”h me’ikara and d”h agmereih), understand that the concern here is for the honor of the first rabbi; a second rabbi should not rule against the first rabbi because that would detract from the latter’s honor and respect. Other authorities, however (see Rashba to Avodah Zarah there, d”h tanu rabbanan), explain that once a (qualified) rabbi has issued a stringent ruling, the item in question becomes categorically prohibited according to halacha, and is to be treated as such; nobody else has the authority to subsequently undo that status. Someone who has been told that something is forbidden thus cannot “look around” for another rabbi who will permit it.
Although we are often taught that it is praiseworthy to adopt a halachic stringency (“hamachmir tavo alav berachah”), there is no doubt that lenient halachic rulings are certainly appropriate in many cases, especially (but not only) when there are pressing circumstances (she’as ha-dechak) or in situations involving financial hardships (hefsed merubah). In general, it must also be stressed that not every stringency is appropriate for every person the same way (see Shu”t Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah 4:24:1). Still, it is clear from the Gemara in Eiruvin (6b) that it is improper to always seek out the lenient position, and if one has been given a stricter ruling by the rabbi with whom he consulted, it is definitely not proper to “shop around” and seek a leniency from another rabbi.
– Rabbi Michael Taubes has been involved in Jewish education, formal as well as informal, for over 40 years, serving both in the classroom and in various administrative posts. He is presently a Rosh Yeshiva at RIETS and Yeshiva University High School for Boys. In addition, he is the spiritual leader of Congregation Zichron Mordechai in Teaneck, N.J.
