Bava Metzia 8
Our Gemara on amud aleph makes a seemingly contradictory assertion that a deaf-mute is lacking in enough intelligence or discernment to acquire possessions. The rabbis enacted a ruling that regardless, they should be allowed to possess objects. This was in order to forestall and protect a vulnerable population (the mentally impaired) from financial abuse. If two people pick up an ownerless object at the same time, they acquire it jointly, even though each does not have full possession nor has made an act of full acquisition. In effect, there is a tacit agreement that each becomes the other’s agent to achieve a joint acquisition. Therefore, what will be the case if two deaf-mutes simultaneously attempt to acquire an object? Technically, lacking in proper intellectual discernment, they cannot function as agents for the other. Nevertheless, the rabbis extended their enactment to even this case, in order to prevent these two deaf-mutes from quarreling with others, who could legally take the item from their hands, as they did not really acquire it.
So far all this is understandable. Then we have a surprise ruling. If a deaf-mute and a fully rational person attempt to jointly acquire an object, neither ends up owning it. The deaf-mute cannot function as an agent for the rational person, so the rational person has no partner in acquisition. Since the object must be jointly acquired if it is being picked up simultaneously, and neither person alone has full possession, the rational person will not acquire the object, nor will the mentally incompetent person.
Why are the rabbis not concerned in this scenario that it will also lead to quarrel? The Gemara answers that the deaf-mute will see that his counterpart did not acquire the object, and though he may not possess the intelligence to follow the Sages’ rationale, he will accept it as fair since both parties lose out equally. So long as he perceives fairness, it will not lead to a quarrel. This is a surprising idea that a deaf-mute, deemed by the rabbis as mentally incompetent and unable to make acquisitions, can still be considered intelligent enough to discern moral fairness.
This shows that morality might be partially instinctive and not just subject to society’s arbitrary values. There have been a fascinating series of experiments conducted on young infants, whereby measuring their actions and choices following an observed staged event, seems to show moral instinct. According to research conducted by Paul Bloom and colleagues (NYT, May 5, 2010, “The Moral Life of Babies”), the following was observed:
- The research involved children watching animated movies featuring geometric characters with faces. In one scenario, a red ball attempted to ascend a hill, sometimes aided by a yellow square and hindered by a green triangle. The study aimed to understand infants’ expectations regarding the ball’s attitudes towards the characters assisting or hindering it. Results indicated that both 9- and 12-month-olds showed surprise when the ball approached the hinderer, suggesting they expected it to approach the helper.
- Further studies explored whether infants’ preferences were due to attraction to helpful individuals, repulsion from hinderers, or both. Introducing a neutral character into the animated movie revealed that infants preferred helpers over neutrals and neutrals over hinderers, indicating both inclinations were at play.
- The research also examined whether babies possessed subtle moral capacities beyond preferring good and avoiding bad. Testing 8-month-olds, the study found that babies preferred puppets who rewarded good behavior and punished bad behavior. Interestingly, despite their overall preference for good actors, babies were drawn to bad actors when they were punishing bad behavior.
That last finding is the pièce de résistance, showing amazing discernment and nuance. The 8-month-olds who ordinarily rejected the aggressive puppet still prefered the aggressive puppet if its aggression was a justified punishment of an offending puppet.
This research supports the idea that individuals with limited intelligence possess an intuitive sense of morality, as proposed by the Gemara. The Rabbis, drawing from tradition and divine insight, were keen observers of human nature, even in unexpected ways.
Does Religion Make People Anxious?
Bava Metzia 9
Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses the method of acquisition known as “chatzer = courtyard,” where an object can be acquired by being placed in the person’s domain. A mobile courtyard, such as vessels to be acquired that are placed on one’s moving animal, cannot acquire the objects. However, a boat is not considered mobile despite moving on the water, as the subjective experience is one of relative stability and standing still. Therefore, one’s boat might acquire fish that jump inside.
Mei HaShiloach (Volume I, Shemos 1) and Tiferes Yosef (Tiferes Yosef, Nitzavim 5) both use this concept metaphysically. The verse in Mishlei (30:18-19) states:
“Three things are beyond me; four I cannot fathom:
“How an eagle makes its way over the sky; How a snake makes its way over a rock; How a ship makes its way through the high seas; How a man has his way with a maiden.”
The simple peshat in this verse is by listing three occurring subjects and objects in the world that seem to achieve a balanced relationship despite the tumultuous environment, it is an inspiration that it is possible to achieve a sense of peace between man and woman. This is itself an important reminder that it is intrinsic within relationships to have opposite tendencies and conflict. How you handle yourself and others within that encounter makes all the difference.
Tiferes Yosef suggests, by way of derash, that these different relationships hint at different challenges in maintaining proper middos, despite conflicting impulses and tendencies. Mei HaShiloach says that the boat being relatively stable amidst the turbulent water, is akin to the person who can find peace and contentment via appropriate yiras shamayim, fear of heaven. He goes on to say that fear of heaven is not like regular fear. Instead of inducing anxiety, it leads to serenity and fulfillment.
What does psychological research say about religion and anxiety? Is the religious lifestyle protective, or just the opposite, and the guilt and pressure of religious life creates more stress?
The Gemara itself (Shabbos 86b) observes that Jews, who are concerned about fulfilling mitz vos, may have a body temperature that is hotter than a gentile’s, and therefore, there may be different standards and timelines for the absorption and breakdown of various biological materials. Interestingly, the Gemara considers the opposite reasoning as well: “Perhaps, since gentiles eat detestable creatures and creeping animals, their body temperature is also hot?”
Researchers Malinakova, et al. (“Religiosity and Mental Health: A Contribution to Understanding the Heterogeneity of Research Findings.” International Journal of Environmental and Residential Public Health. 2020 Jan; 17(2): 494.) reported the following:
“Most studies report a positive association between religiosity and spirituality and aspects of mental health, a lower prevalence of anxiety and depression, suicidal tendencies, and substance abuse, and better cognitive functioning.”
While that was the predominant finding, some studies indicated the opposite. The authors sought to hypothesize what accounts for when religion protects from anxiety versus increasing anxiety. They considered the possibility that:
“Associations may be different for those living in more secular countries. Some studies report that religious individuals show better subjective health only in countries in which religiosity is common and socially desirable.”
This makes sense, as being part of a community is an important form of support, status, and social reinforcement. Additionally, they suggested:
“Research shows that a believer’s perceived relationship with G-d meets the defining criteria for attachment relationships and can function psychologically – much like other attachments…relating to G-d also contributes to personal happiness and that it has a strong positive impact on spiritual well-being…Taking into account participants’ image of G-d may therefore represent another way of taking into account the heterogeneous nature of religiosity and spirituality.”
The implications are that we may make G-d in our image, that is to say based on one’s attachment style with early caregivers, one may see G-d, our Father, as literally a father, for good or bad. People who have contentious relationships with parents and loved ones may have similar mistrust, fear and avoidance in their relationship to G-d. However, most human behavior is systemic and circular. So perhaps if one develops a more stable and trusting attachment with G-d, it might assist in developing better relationships with others and vice versa.
