“I’d like to remind you about the $10,000 you borrowed last year,” Mr. Naiman said to his neighbor, Mr. Shuker.
“What are you talking about?” replied Mr. Shuker. “I never borrowed such a sum!”
“Are you kidding or lying?” asked Mr. Naiman in disbelief.
“Neither,” answered Mr. Shuker flatly. “I never borrowed. Is there any evidence of the loan?”
“You signed a loan document,” Mr. Naiman responded, “but I can’t find it at the moment.”
“If you find it, we’ll talk,” said Mr. Shuker.
Mr. Naiman searched his files, but could not find the loan document. Mr. Shuker refused to pay without proof of the loan.
Finally, Mr. Naiman sued Mr. Shuker in beis din. In the absence of any proof, beis din recommended the parties compromise on 30 percent of the claim. Mr. Shuker readily agreed; Mr. Naiman reluctantly agreed, having no better option. Beis din confirmed the compromise.
While cleaning for Pesach, Mr. Naiman found the loan document.
“I found the loan document,” Mr. Naiman notified Mr. Shuker. “You clearly lied in beis din and owe the full amount that I claimed!”
“Even if what you’re saying is true, it’s too late,” replied Mr. Shuker. “We agreed to a compromise that settled the claim. Beis din even made a kinyan confirming the compromise.”
“But new evidence came to light,” argued Mr. Naiman. “Now that I found the loan document, beis din should reconsider the issue; the compromise was in error.”
“If beis din had issued a definitive ruling, I could hear you,” said Mr. Shuker. “But who ever heard of redoing a compromise? Every compromise takes into account that the claim may or may not be true. Your claim is settled; there’s nothing more to discuss.”
Mr. Naiman brought Mr. Shuker before Rabbi Dayan and asked: “Is the compromise still standing, now that I found the loan document?”
“Like other transactions, a compromise based on error is null and void, even if a kinyan was made,” answered Rabbi Dayan. “Shulchan Aruch gives the example of someone who was mistakenly told by beis din that he has to swear and he compromised to avoid the oath.” (C.M. 25:5; Gittin 14a)
“Similarly, if the plaintiff was forced to compromise because he had no available proof,” added Rabbi Dayan, “and he later found witnesses or a document, or the defendant admitted the full amount, the compromise is null and void.” (C.M. 12:14-15; Nesivos 205:9; Aruch Hashulchan 12:12)
“What is this based on?” asked Mr. Shuker.
“The Rashba (Responsa II:278) addressed such a case,” explained Rabbi Dayan. “A person was entrusted without proof money to invest and persistently denied having received the money. He agreed to pay partially if the plaintiff would forgo any further obligation in court and toward Hashem. The plaintiff was forced to agree to recoup part of his money. Rashba was asked whether he is now morally exempt.”
“Rashba ruled he is not exempt, since the plaintiff was forced to accept the agreement, which is void,” continued Rabbi Dayan. “Further, the compromise was in error, since he thought he did not have evidence, whereas Hashem knows he did not forgo with a full heart. Even if the compromise document states that he forgoes ‘without force and without error,’ it is standard text and meaningless unless the plaintiff explicitly acknowledges, “I know that you owe more and am exempting you.'” (Pischei Teshuvah 12:21)
“Nonetheless,” concluded Rabbi Dayan, “many of the binding arbitration forms filled out nowadays when adjudicating in beis din limit the right to challenge the ruling and grant the beis din discretion whether to amend the ruling in cases of error. Thus, beis din would have to decide whether to amend the compromise or leave it standing as is.”