Bava Basra 83
Our Gemara on amud beis discusses various forms of overcharging and undercharging, and thresholds that would invalidate the sale.
The Chofetz Chaim in Laws of Rechilus (9) discusses conditions under which it would be permitted to alert a purchaser who might have been taken advantage of by an unscrupulous merchant. One of the key criteria is that the disparaging information should serve a constructive and creative purpose. Therefore, it would never be permitted to tell somebody after a purchase that he was misled or duped if it is below the threshold of invalidating the sale, or for some other reason not enforceable in terms of seeking financial redress. In such a case, telling him just causes ill feelings with no benefit or purpose. Actually, one should do the opposite and is supposed to even stretch the truth to induce good feelings after somebody has already purchased an object. The famous example that is also used metaphorically comes from Gemara Kesuvos (17a):
Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel argue about how to honor and compliment a bride. The conundrum is a conflict between the value of honesty versus protecting people’s feelings and promoting a happy marriage:
The Sages taught: How does one dance before the bride, i.e., what does one recite while dancing at her wedding? Beis Shammai say: One recites praise of the bride as she is, emphasizing her good qualities. And Beis Hillel say: One recites: “A fair and attractive bride.” Beis Shammai said to Beis Hillel: In a case where the bride was lame or blind, does one say with regard to her: “A fair and attractive bride”? But the Torah states: “Keep you from a false matter.” (Exodus 23:7).
Beis Hillel said to Beis Shammai: According to your statement, with regard to one who acquired an inferior acquisition from the market, should another praise it and enhance its value in his eyes or condemn it and diminish its value in his eyes? You must say that he should praise it and enhance its value in his eyes and refrain from causing him anguish. In this case too, once the groom has married his bride, one praises her as being fair and attractive.
From here the Sages said: A person’s disposition should always be gracious with others, and treat everyone courteously.
Beis Hillel’s argument seems to be that it is a given that it would be under the category of hurtful speech to denigrate something that another person purchased. Beis Hillel then draws a parallel between that and praising a person’s choice of spouse.
The question is, why is one more obvious than the other? If it is clear that disparaging a purchased object is forbidden because it causes distress, of course it should apply to a choice of spouse. And, if this is not considered forbidden speech, perhaps because there is some rationale to think the person would still want to know that he was misled, then it offers an equal rationale for providing blunt feedback regarding the person’s spouse.
Additionally, why use this proof when it is a well-known dictum: “Mutar lo l’adam lishanot be’dvar hashalom,” it is permitted for a person to depart from the truth in a matter that will preserve peace (Yevamos.65b). If so, why does Beis Hillel need to bolster their argument and compare it to the case of object acquisition?
The answer is that a person may believe that he is giving “constructive criticism and feedback.” After all, perhaps it is more comparable to the situation described by the Chofetz Chaim in which one may inform a person if he was misled if it is not too late for the purchaser to seek legal rectification. This, then, is what Bais Hillel is arguing: Do not think that one can take their spouse back to his or her in-laws for a “full refund.” Yes, technically there is recourse, as spouses can correct themselves, and in the worst case, divorce is possible. However, it is far closer to a non-refundable purchase than a refundable one, because the pain and distress rejection causes should never be taken lightly. Furthermore, while subjectively a person might feel their spouse is defective, the so-called defect might be a reflection of their own defect, or even be utterly their defect.
If I don’t get along with my computer or my refrigerator, I do not have to “work on my middos” to learn how to deal with it. I can just junk it and buy a new one. However, defects attributed to your spouse may be indicators of what you need to work on, rather than to blame others or run away.
(The above is loosely adapted from the Ben Yohayada on Kesuvos.)
Is it Possible To Be Forgiven By G-d Without Repentance?
Bava Basra 89
Our Gemara on amud beis discusses the moral obligation to be absolutely scrupulous when it comes to honest weights and measures. This obligation and prohibition extends to the degree that one is not even allowed to have inaccurate measures around the house, despite using them for other purposes, with no intention to defraud anybody: “A person may not keep in his house a measure that is too small or too large, even if it is used as a chamber pot for urine.”
Bas Ayin (Teztaveh) understands this prohibition metaphorically; the house is his internal chambers of the heart. His actions on the outside should mirror his beliefs on the inside. (This is related to the principle of “speaking truth in one’s heart” that we saw in our discussion about daf 88.)
On the topic of being true to one’s heart, as we are in the month of Elul, I thought it would be good to discuss the common and difficult psychological sugya of repentance even when one knows he will sin again.
The three key components of repentance (Rambam Laws of Repentance 1:1) are:
- Confession
- Expressing Regret
- Resolve to not repeat the sin
Items one and two are generally possible, even when feeling conflicted, because most people regret their sins to an extent that they can be sincere in serious moments. However, how sincere can number three be, as when in regard to many sins of modern life, there is a strong likelihood that it will be willfully repeated, and not just by accident or under unusual temptation?
At first glance, the news is not good. Here is what the Rambam says about incomplete repentance (ibid. 2:2-3):
What constitutes teshuva? That a sinner should abandon his sins and remove them from his thoughts, resolving in his heart, never to commit them again. Similarly, he must regret the past as [Jeremiah 31:18] states: “After I returned, I regretted.” …He must verbally confess and state these matters which he resolved in his heart.
Anyone who verbalizes his confession without resolving in his heart to abandon [sin] can be compared to [a person] who immerses himself [in a mikvah] while [holding the carcass of] a lizard in his hand. His immersion will not be of avail until he casts away the carcass.
However, there is an intriguing dispute in the Gemara (Shavuous 13a) regarding whether Yom Kippur can effect forgiveness even without repentance:
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: For all transgressions that are stated in the Torah, whether one repented, or whether one did not repent, Yom Kippur atones, except for one who divests himself of the yoke of Heaven by denying G-d’s existence, and one who reveals facets of the Torah that differ from its true meaning, and one who nullifies the covenant of circumcision of the flesh. For these, if one repented, Yom Kippur atones, and if not, Yom Kippur does not atone.
However, the Gemara (ibid.) records the opinion of the Rabbis that Yom Kippur does not bring about forgiveness without repentance. The halacha is in accordance with the majority, and so Yom Kippur does not provide forgiveness without repentance (see Rambam , ibid., 1:3 and Shulchan Aruch, OC, Ramah 607:6).
And yet, this is not an open-and-shut case. To begin with, Ramah is verbose, perhaps hinting at another possibility, but not saying it outright so as not to encourage moral laziness. He states (ibid.):
Yom Kippur only atones for the repenters who believe in its [Yom Kippur’s] atonement. However, one who is contemptuous toward it and thinks to himself, “How can this Yom Kippur help me?” for such a person, Yom Kippur does not atone.
Ramah adds a number of clauses that Rambam did not say (even though he refers to him as the source of his ruling). He did not merely describe the person as not repenting, but added a specific disparaging attitude toward Yom Kippur in his description.
We might wonder whether the Ramah is suggesting that ordinarily Yom Kippur has the power to effect forgiveness even without repentance, so long as the person at least believes in Yom Kippur. This might include a person who enters Yom Kippur in a penitent state of mind and attitude, even without doing proper repentance for each and every sin – because he is validating and activating the power of Yom Kippur, which brings about forgiveness broadly. The only person, then, who does not get the Yom Kippur amnesty is one who completely disregards and disrespects the day.
Rav Shlomo Kluger, in his sefer on the Days of Awe (Kehillas Yaakov), goes further, offering a number of creative ideas to argue that we can nowadays follow Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi’s position that Yom Kippur achieves forgiveness without full repentance. Why is this so? We have a general rule of p’sak that in a situation of great duress we may follow the minority opinion (Mishna Eduyos 1:5 and Shu”t Ginas Veradim EH: Klal 2, Siman 1). Since our generation is weak and unable to resolve fully not to sin, without the blanket forgiveness of Yom Kippur, all might be lost. Rav Kluger argues: What could be a greater duress than that?
I will conclude with a final argument from Rav Kluger (Kehillas Yaakov, Yom HaKippurim, Derush 34), a tour de force in creative halachic and legal gymnastics. We have a principle that if one prays for his friend and he is suffering from the same difficulty, G-d answers one’s own prayers first (Bava Kamma 92a). Therefore, if you pray on Yom Kippur for G-d to forgive the Jewish people, even if you have not made complete repentance, if G-d answers your prayers for your fellow Jews, then He will answer your request first, and so you will receive pardon.
