Makkos 8
Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses an exemption for the punishment of exile for involuntary manslaughter. In this case, even though there was still enough negligence that ordinarily would warrant exile, if the person was involved in a mitzvah he receives a special dispensation. The Gemara says that this includes a father who disciplines his son via corporal punishment. Should his son die as a result of these blows, since he was performing a mitzvah the father is exempt from exile. (We presumably are discussing an unfortunate reaction that involved some negligence but not outright murderous rage and intent, which would subject the perpetrator to more severe punishment.) The Gemara on amud beis even further asserts that it is a mitzvah for a father to strike his son, even when the latter is behaving studiously, so as to keep him in line, so to speak.
Such ideas are quite difficult to understand from a modern perspective. It is one thing to advocate corporal punishment. Many parents and experts might disagree and find it unhelpful, but it is an old and venerable parenting practice, and in most states absolutely legal, so long as it is not cruel and unusual. However, to consider it a mitzvah to hit even a child who is obedient sounds outrageous. Yet our revered Talmud states exactly that – and we who believe in the divinity of the Oral Law cannot ignore this. Let us study the matter further.
Rav Moshe Feinstein interprets our Gemara differently. The Talmud was suggesting it is a mitzvah to hit a child who previously disobeyed and now is compliant, as that is still necessary to enforce future obedience. But it would not be a mitzvah to hit a child who has not been disobedient at all. (See Igros Moshe YD 1:140, which, interestingly, is addressed to his son Rav Dovid Feinstein, zt”l.) Rav Moshe also forbade striking in a cruel manner, such as with a stick, or even threatening to do so (Igros Moshe YD 4:30:4), as this would cause excessive fright. This certainly reduces the severity if our Gemara’s directives.
There are instances in the Gemara where, though corporal punishment is accepted as a practice, there is a disapproving response when it is done unfairly or excessively:
There was a teacher who Rabbi Acha made a public vow that he should no longer teach because he was negligent (according to Rashi, “He hit excessively”) (Gittin 36a).
(Oddly, the Talmud goes on to tell us that this same teacher was reinstated because they could not find a suitable replacement. While surely the teacher was in some way chastised and less likely to abuse his charges again, the fact that they allowed him to return suggests that they were not too scandalized by his actions.)
The great Amora Shmuel, who became Rosh Yeshiva of Nehardea, as a youngster had a run-in with a teacher who was overly zealous with his rod:
Shmuel’s father found him crying. He asked him, “Why are you crying?” Shmuel answered, “My teacher hit me for not observing the washing ritual” [as it turns out, Shmuel was correct about the halacha, and the particular situation described did not require washing]. Shmuel’s father exclaimed, “It is not enough that the teacher does not know the halacha, but he also has to hit?!” (Chulin 107b).
Notwithstanding that it was accepted to discipline children via hitting them, Maimonides warns:
Whoever hits a Jewish person of good standing, whether he be a minor or an adult… in a quarrelsome manner violates a negative commandment (Mishneh Torah – Chovel Umazik 5:1).
Rav Moshe Feinstein interprets the term “quarrelsome manner” (nitzayon, Shemos 2:13) as hitting for a past misdeed. He explains that the purpose of hitting in the mitzvah of chinuch is to train future behavior, not to punish or avenge past deeds (Igros Moshe C.M. 4:3). Also see Igros Moshe E.H. 4:68, where a petitioner asks for permission to use birth control because he and his wife have many children, and she is hitting them excessively. Rav Feinstein grants them the heter and also comments that the excessive hitting is due to the disease of “nerven” (anxiety? stress?). He also warns that hitting children wildly without any kind of plan or intent for the child’s betterment would be a violation of a Biblical prohibition against hitting a fellow Jew (Igros Moshe Yoreh De’ah 2:103).
This is an important distinction because now, according to this interpretation of Jewish law, the term “corporal punishment” is actually a misnomer. It is not actually a punishment but rather an inducement or disciplinary action used to affect future behavior, and must be performed by a parent with that intention. If not, such action may violate a Torah prohibition against hitting a fellow Jew, as described by Maimonides above.
Maimonides also warns against even feeling anger when disciplining a child; instead, the parent must appear angry only to instill discipline while still remaining calm inside (De’os 2:3). Similarly, Rav Feinstein rules that in order to mete out corporal rebuke, the parent or teacher must be thoroughly convinced that it will be helpful and justified, and it must be done in a state of calm thoughtfulness, without any anger. Rav Feinstein compares it to an act of a rabbinical court, and therefore it requires due process and valid evidence (Igros Moshe – Yoreh De’ah 2:103).
There are opinions that, on the surface, seem to take a more strict and punishing approach. For example, Orchos Tzadikim states:
One must hit his son with the rod of rebuke, even with cruelty, because this kind of cruelty is actually merciful [on his soul] (The Gate of Mercy, Gate 7).
While the Orchos Tzadikim is not in actuality contradicting the Rambam, as he can be referring to outward behavior and not inner mental states, one is still left with an overall impression of encouraging harsher responses than Rav Feinstein, Maimonides, and some other sources support.
There are other instances that the Gemara discusses in which hitting a child would be forbidden:
It was taught in a beraita, “Do not place a stumbling block in front of a blind man.” (Vayikra 19:14). This verse refers to one who hits his big son (“beno ha-gadol”) (Mo’ed Kattan 17a).
The Talmud rules that since a “big” son might be induced to retaliate against his father’s violence toward him, the mere act of hitting him is forbidden because it is considered a provocation to sin.
While ordinarily the word “gadol” in reference to a son means age 13, in this context, it is difficult to know. It could possibly mean an even older child because it is difficult to ascertain at what age the Talmud considered the child’s sense of self to be strong enough that we should fear retaliation against his father. Indeed, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch rules:
This aspect of being big (“gadlus”) is not dependent on his age. Rather, it is determined based on the nature of each child, at whatever age there is a concern that he will defy and fight back… and this can be even younger than bar mitzvah age” (143:18. Similar sentiments are echoed by Rav Shlomo Wolbe in the first chapter of Zeriya Ubinyan Bechinuch).
There are poskim who spoke about child-rearing and made it clear that they were indeed following the guidance of modern psychologists. For example, Rav Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg responds to a question regarding a teenage boy who had a hobby that involved practices which were problematic halachically. He instructs the parent petitioner as follows:
For pedagogical reasons, it is proper to abstain from control tactics with a child who is straying from the path. You already mentioned that the prohibition of hitting an older son in Mo’ed Kattan (17a) is not just referring to hitting but any means of force that might bring about an opposite reaction. The modern pedagogical experts have already proven that forcing… evokes in the young man, who is at the age of adolescence, oppositional behavior and rebellion (Responsa Seridei Eish 3:95).
On the opposite side of the spectrum, we find Rav Eliyahu Dessler explicitly rejecting modern psychological concerns about the damage of corporal punishment as ideas alien to the Torah, and condoning hitting children as an important part of chinuch (Michtav Mi’Eliyahu vol. 3, p. 360).
I will add a chiddush of my own. There is a verse in the beginning of Melachim (I:1:6) that criticizes King David for not disciplining his son Adoniyah which seems to indicate that a moderate, non-corporal approach was normative as well. The verse states, “And his father had not grieved him ever, saying to him, ‘Why have you done so?’” It would seem that King David was held accountable for not having given his son verbal rebuke, which indicates that had he done so, this may have been sufficient.
I will conclude with this thought. Regardless of how we interpret this Gemara and the various sources that guide us in a practical halachic manner today, this Gemara remains one of the more difficult ones to understand from a modern mentality. The typical G-d-fearing approach would be to say to oneself, “Obviously our sensibilities have been distorted by secular values.” Indeed, this may be so. However, recently a powerful quote was brought to my attention via Marc Shapiro’s new book on Rav Kook, Renewing the Old, Sanctifying the New: The Unique Vision of Rav Kook. In Shemoneh Kevatzim (I:75), Rav Kook speaks strongly regarding the importance of not ignoring a natural sense of what feels moral:
A person [must] not allow the fear of heaven to push aside his natural [sense of] ethics, because then that is no longer a pure fear of heaven.
The sign of a pure fear of heaven is that a person’s natural [sense of] ethics, planted in his upright nature, rises in accordance with [his fear of heaven] to higher levels than it would reach without [the fear of heaven].
But if there may be imagined a fear of heaven of such a type that, without its influence on a person’s life, his life would tend to bring about more goodness and bring about matters useful for the individual and the whole, [whereas] in accordance with its influence the power of such activity would diminish, such a fear of heaven is an invalid fear.
Six Mitzvos, One Sanctuary: Your Portable Divine GPS
Makkos 9
Our Gemara on amud beis discusses the six cities of refuge designated for the person who commits involuntary manslaughter. These cities functioned as a form of exile and punishment because there was negligence involved, but also as a protection from a relative who might kill him in retribution. This is why the cities’ names have an implication of refuge, with the literal translation of arei miklat being “cities of being gathered in.”
The Sefer HaChinuch in his introduction says there are six constant mitzvos which correspond to the cities of refuge. These six mitzvos act as a personal, portable sanctuary in the challenges of life. The six mitzvos are:
- To believe in G-d
- To not believe in anything besides Him
- To conceive of His oneness
- To love Him
- To fear Him
- To not wander after the thoughts of the heart and the vision of the eyes.
The first five are exclusively about belief in G-d, and we can understand conceptually why they are constant and also how, via being mindfully attached to G-d, there can be some form of protection and providence. Indeed, the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim (III:51) describes in beautiful detail the process of attachment to G-d through continuous awareness and meditation, and how that brings about supernatural guidance, protection, and insight.
However, the sixth mitzvah seems to have nothing to do with the first five. The super-simple peshat is: “Nu, who says it has to be connected to those? It is part of the six because it is a continuous mitzvah, but no more significantly connected to the other five than that.” This is a possible explanation, but one might wonder, “Still, these are only six out of 613 mitzvos which are to be observed constantly; it follows that there should be some conceptual unifying principle linking them.”
Therefore, we can offer another simple answer. The actual verse that is the source for this mitzvah is from the Shema, found in Bamidbar (15:39):
That shall be your fringe; look at it and recall all the commandments of G-d and observe them, so that you do not follow your heart and eyes that you stray after.
The overall context of that section is the acceptance and recognition of the commandments. While classically this verse is understood as a prohibition against lustful thoughts, the simple reading may very well be a directive not to allow heretical thoughts to confuse and disrupt faith. The Ramban (ibid.), quoting the Sifre, interprets the verse as referring to both heretical thoughts and sexual thoughts. If so, the sixth mitzvah also is one of remaining in contact with G-d.
Additionally, G-d is described as particularly despising sexual immorality (Sanhedrin 106a). We must reflect on this description. G-d is neither vulnerable nor fickle, and He does not actually experience emotions of disgust, or any emotions, as they imply materiality and limitations. Only physical entities are subject to influence and therefore weakness and entropy. This can never be applied to G-d (see Rambam Yesodei HaTorah ch. 1). To use this particular anthropomorphic term implies not the emotion of disgust, but rather a hint at the process. Just as something that a human finds disgusting is something they need to be far away from, this gives us an understanding that sexual immorality is particularly distancing from G-d. It’s not a G-d thing; it’s a human thing. This sin, unlike others, does something that hollows out the soul, and therefore it is specifically tied into the other five mitzvos, which are about cultivating an awareness of G-d. Not managing lust leads to a loss of ability to be aware of and in contact with G-d.
Why might this be so? The instinctive sexual drive is clearly about life itself. It brings tremendous energy and power to a person and ultimately is the source of creation of life. If this precious commodity is not respected and managed, it will inevitably lead to a loss of this G-dly, creative force. Why is it that there is nothing so exciting as fresh, new feelings of love and connection, and nothing so cheap and empty if the experience is not maintained either through a continuous, deep connection or a frenetic, manic running from one relationship to another? Deep down, we know there is life inside this. And that life comes from G-d’s presence.
