“So in five months, we seek to resolve a major issue that has taken the better part of a decade to have access to, and with a highly questionable inspection regime as a solution. And, according to an AP story of August 14th – and I quote:
‘They say the agency will be able to report in December. But that assessment is unlikely to be unequivocal because chances are slim that Iran will present all the evidence the agency wants, or give it the total freedom of movement it needs to follow-up the allegations. Still, the report is expected to be approved by the IAEA’s board, which includes the United States and other powerful nations that negotiated the July 14 agreement. They do not want to upend their July 14 deal, and will see the December report as closing the books on the issue.’
“It would seem to me that what we are doing is sweeping this critical issue under the rug.
“Secretary Kerry has said that, ‘We have absolute knowledge with respect to the certain military activities they were engaged in,’ yet, for years we have insisted on getting access to Parchin and acquiring the knowledge we need to know.
“General Hayden, the former CIA Director, said, ‘I’d like to see the DNI or any intelligence office repeat that for me. They won’t. What he is saying is that we don’t care how far they’ve gotten with weaponization. We’re betting the farm on our ability to limit the production of fissile material.’ Now, if they want to make that bet, they can, but the Administration should level with us and not insist revelations of PMD are unimportant. Instead General Hayden says, ‘he’s pretending we have perfect knowledge about something that was an incredibly tough intelligence target while I was director and I see nothing that has made it any easier.’
“For me, the administration’s willingness to forgo a critical element of Iran’s weaponization — past and present — is inexplicable. Our willingness to accept this process on Parchin is only exacerbated by the inability to obtain anytime, anywhere inspections, which the Administration always held out as one of those essential elements we would insist on and could rely on in any deal. Instead, we have a dispute resolution mechanism that shifts the burden of proof to the U.S. and its partners, to provide sensitive intelligence, possibly revealing our sources and the methods by which we collected the information and allow the Iranians to delay access for nearly a month, a delay that would allow them to remove evidence of a violation, particularly when it comes to centrifuge research-and-development, and weaponization efforts that can be easily hidden and would leave little or no signatures.
“The Administration suggests that — other than Iraq — no country was subjected to anytime, anywhere inspections. But Iran’s defiance of the world’s position, as recognized in a series of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, does not make it ‘any other country.’ It is their violations of the NPT and the Security Council Resolutions that created the necessity for a unique regime and for anytime, anywhere inspections.
“Mark Dubowitz, the widely-respected sanctions expert from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, has said:
‘For Secretary Kerry to claim we have absolute knowledge of Iran’s weaponization activities is to assume a level of U.S. intelligence capability that defies historical experience. That’s why he, President Obama, Undersecretary Sherman and IAEA chief Amano all have made PMD resolution such an essential condition of any nuclear deal.’
“He goes on to say:
‘The U.S. track record in detecting and stopping countries from going nuclear should make Kerry more modest in his claims and assumptions. The U.S. missed the Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Washington underestimated Saddam’s program in 1990. Then it overestimated his program in 2003 and went to war to stop a nonexistent WMD program.’
