“It is precisely because of this track record that permitting Iran to have the size and scope of an industrialized nuclear program, permitted under the JCPOA is one of the great flaws of the agreement.
“If what President Obama’s statement, in his NPR interview of April 7th, 2015, that ‘a more relevant fear would be that in year 13, 14, 15 they have advanced centrifuges that enrich uranium fairly rapidly, and at that point breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero’ – is true, then it seems to me that — in essence — this deal does nothing more than kick today’s problem down the road for ten-15 years, and, at the same time, undermines the arguments and evidence we’ll need, because of the dual-use nature of their program, to convince the Security Council and the international community to take action.
“President Obama continues to erroneously say that this agreement permanently stops Iran from having a nuclear bomb. Let’s be clear, what the agreement does is to recommit Iran not to pursue a nuclear bomb, a promise they have already violated in the past. It recommits them to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), an agreement they have already violated in the past. It commits them to a new Security Council Resolution outlining their obligations, but they have violated those in the past as well.
“So the suggestion of permanence, in this case, is only possible for so long as Iran complies and performs according to the agreement because the bottom line is that this agreement leaves Iran with the core element of a robust nuclear infrastructure.
“The fact is — success is not a question of Iran’s conforming and performing according to the agreement. If that was all that was needed – if Iran had abided by its commitments all along — we wouldn’t be faced with this challenge now. The test of success must be — if Iran violates the agreement and attempts to break-out — how well we will be positioned to deal with Iran — at that point. Trying to reassemble the sanctions regime, including the time to give countries and companies notice of sanctionable activity, which had been permissible up to then, would take-up most of the breakout time, assuming we could even get compliance after significant national and private investments had taken place. That indeed would be a ‘fantasy.’
“So the suggestion of ‘permanency’ in stopping Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon depends on ‘performance.’ Based on the long history of Iran’s broken promises, defiance and violations, that is hopeful. Significant dismantlement, however, would establish ‘performance,’ and therefore the threat of the capability to develop a nuclear weapon would truly be permanent, and any attempt to rebuild that infrastructure would give the world far more time than one year.
“The President and Secretary Kerry have repeatedly said that the choice is between this agreement or war. I reject that proposition, as have most witnesses, including past and present Administration members involved in the Iran nuclear issue, who have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and who support the deal but reject the binary choice between the agreement or war.
“If the P5+1 had not achieved an agreement, would we be at war with Iran? I don’t believe that.
“For all those who have said they have not heard — from anyone who opposes the Agreement – a better solution, they’re wrong. I believe there is a pathway to a better deal.
“Advocates of the deal argue that a good deal that would have dismantled critical elements of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure isn’t attainable – that the Iranians were tough negotiators — and that despite our massive economic leverage and the weight of the international community we couldn’t buy more than 10 years of inspection and verification in exchange for permanent sanctions relief, and for revoking Iran’s pariah status. I don’t believe that.