Israel killed more than 70 Gazans on Saturday, in an attempt to kill the leader of Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, Muhammad Al-Deif, and his deputy Rafah Salame, the commander of the Khan Younes Brigade of Al-Qassam, Asharq Al Awsat, the pro-Saudi Arabic international newspaper headquartered in London reported Sunday morning, noting that this was at least the seventh Israeli attempt to get rid of Al-Deif over the past 30 years.
While Israel awaits confirmation of Al-Deif’s killing, which, if true, will give it the “image of victory” it has long awaited during the war in the Gaza Strip, Hamas denied the Israeli allegations and said that what happened was merely a new massacre committed against civilians.
If the assassination of Al-Deif and Rafah Salame is proven successful, Israel will have eliminated almost all of the members of the Hamas military council, except for Muhammad Shabana, commander of the Rafah Brigade, Izz al-Din al-Haddad, commander of the Gaza Brigade, and Raed Saad, whose fate is still unknown after Israel previously announced that it had assassinated him, but this has not been confirmed.
Also still among the living are Muhammad Al-Sinwar, and his brother Yahya Al-Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza. The two Sinwar brothers are among the closest to Al-Deif.
In light of all these assassinations and operations that also affected 14 battalion commanders in various regions of the Gaza Strip, in addition to their deputies, company and combat unit commanders, and field commanders, and assuming that Al-Deif was killed and the Sinwar brothers survived, sources in Hamas tell Asharq Al Awsat that Muhammad Al-Sinwar is likely to be the next Al-Qassam commander.
But awaiting the clarification of Al-Deif’s fate, the success of this operation, which is what the Israelis hope for, raises many questions about its repercussions for the Al-Qassam Brigades, especially since many of its prominent leaders have been assassinated since the October 7 attack, which Al-Qassam began with the infiltration by hundreds of its members into the settlements surrounding the Gaza Strip, which led to the killing, wounding, and capture of hundreds of Israelis.
To understand the impact of Al-Deif’s potential absence, the status of the Al-Qassam Brigades must be understood.
Al-Deif was the second commander of the Al-Qassam Brigades, and he assumed his position after the Israeli army assassinated its former commander-in-chief, Salah Shehadeh, on July 23, 2002. But Al-Deif is considered by many to be the architect of its great military power.
Informed sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Al-Deif quickly succeeded, after assuming the position of Al-Qassam in 2003, in obtaining authorization from the leadership of the political level of the Hamas movement to establish a large military force, an army, and he immediately began implementation.
“Despite the attempts on his life that did not stop and the loss of many of his aides and members of his family, Al-Deif did not stop and went on to establish a large army, which over the years became the number one Palestinian force, and formed to some extent a balance of deterrence with Israel, before he surprised it. In a land, air, and sea attack on the seventh of last October, in an operation that turned the equations around,” Asharq Al-Awsat noted.
“Since October 7, the assassination of Al-Deif has become an Israeli obsession, after 6 previous failed attempts,” the report continues. “All these attempts, Al-Deif’s escape from them, and his ability to hide to the extent that Israel was unable until the end of last year to obtain a recent photo of him led to his transformation into a Palestinian symbol that went beyond his functional role in Al-Qassam.”
By the way, Israel believes Al-Deif, and not Sinwar, was the brain behind the Hamas military force and the architect of the massive tunnel strategy.
Al-Deif’s absence could have a moral impact on Al-Qassam, according to the report. “If the Brigades had retained most of their leaders, they would most likely have appointed another commander-in-chief in a short time, as Al-Deif himself acted when Israel assassinated his deputy, Ahmed Al-Jaabari, in 2012, who had assumed the leadership of Al-Qassam during some periods when Al-Deif was absent. He immediately chose Marwan Issa to succeed Al-Jaabari within a flexible system that he had contributed to establishing in the battalions, which was an integrated military system administratively and organizationally, based on 5 brigades, each brigade including a Military Judiciary Authority, Manufacturing Staff, a Control Authority, Support, and Combat Weapons Staff. He also established a Defense Operations Staff that included Intelligence, Home Front, Human Resources, and the Institutes and Colleges Authority. In each brigade, there were several battalions consisting of companies, platoons, military formations, and adjuncts.
But after October 7, everything changed, and the survival of Al-Deif as a symbol became a priority in itself, especially after prominent leaders, including those close to him, were subjected to a series of assassinations. Among the most prominent of these, according to Israel, was Marwan Issa, who was assassinated in a tunnel in the Nuseirat camp in the central Gaza Strip, last March; Ayman Nofal, commander of the Al-Qassam Central Brigade; and Ahmed Al-Ghandour, commander of the Al-Qassam Northern Brigade.
Hamas sources said that the future leadership of the Brigades will be in the hands of the Political Bureau, and according to the field situation that will be determined by the circumstances, but as the war continues, the situation will remain as it is, within a method of action followed since the fourth month of the war, which is for each brigade to lead its region within the scope of hierarchical progression, from the brigade commander if he remains alive, or his representative, all the way to the commanders of companies, units, platoons, groups, and various military nodes.
The sources suggested that Muhammad Al-Sinwar would direct the work of the military council if the success of the assassination of Al-Deif was confirmed. They added: “There is a clear hierarchy in the work of the Brigades, and the assassination of Al-Deif or any other leader will not affect the course of the battle management, and this is clearly evident even after the assassination of previous prominent leaders.”
