IDF Major General Aharon Haliva, head of the Military Intelligence Directorate (Agaf Ha’Modi’in, or “Aman”) has taken responsibility for the events of October 7 and those following, according to a Hebrew-language report Tuesday by the Walla! news outlet.
Conceptzia: IDF Knew about the Hamas Attack but Generals Ignored the Reports
The Military Intelligence Directorate includes the acclaimed Unit 8200 cyber warfare branch, the secret technology Unit 81, the elite Sayeret Matkal special operations and reconnaissance unit (sometimes simply known as “the Unit”) and the Havatzalot Program, a training course in intelligence.
Multiple female soldiers in the observation (“spotters”) unit along the Gaza border reported having seen terrorist preparations for an attack in the months prior to October 7 – and REPORTED those activities to their supervisor.
The supervisor then reported the information to his own commander, who ignored the warnings and waved it off, claiming what they saw was “routine” activity. The messages were never passed up the chain of command and in at least one case, a female soldier was even warned not to “bother” her commander again with “this nonsense” on pain of being court-martialed.
It has since been learned that Hamas had been preparing for its invasion of Israel and mass slaughter of the inhabitants of the villages along the Gaza border for at least three years.
And yet, it was not until the early hours of Shabbat Simchat Torah (2:30 am) that top IDF brass and the head of the Shin Bet gathered on the “encrypted red line” to discuss the intelligence warnings.
Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Operations Division head Major General Oded Basiuk and Southern Command commander Major General Yaron Finkelman were all on the line, but Haliva was not included during that phone call, according to Walla! It’s not clear why.
It was determined during the conversation that the Hamas training activities seen along the border were only likely to result in a “single attack on the border” and even that was defined as a “low probability.”
Shin Bet director Ronen Bar also spoke with Halevi separately about the intelligence that had emerged; in the end decided at 4 am to send the “Tequila” teams to the border to investigate reports that hundreds of Hamas terrorists were gathering at a training base in Gaza.
The Shin Bet at that point sent four vehicles to the south, but by that time it was far too late. Most of the agents were slaughtered by invading Hamas terrorists.
“Already that morning I understood that it was over. After the war I will have to go,” Haliva said.
The question now is when exactly Haliva will retire, and if in fact he can retire, rather than face charges of dereliction of duty.
Meanwhile, the war is not nearly over, but the battle to determine Haliva’s successor has already begun.
