In Beirut, Hamas executive Osama Hamdan told Le Figaro he had learned about the October 7 attack “by listening to the news” in his office. The only one to have been alerted was his superior in the Lebanese capital, Saleh al-Arouri. Half an hour before the launch of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Arouri received a phone call from the attack’s mastermind Yahya Sinwar asking him to “warn” Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah and Hamas’s main ally in Lebanon, according to Figaro, citing a source close to the pro-Iranian Shiite militia.
The idea of a land invasion of Israel had been in the air for two years, a source close to the Hamas leadership in Jordan confirms to Le Figaro: “The first time I heard about it was in 2021.” Was the invasion carried out with the knowledge of Hamas’s political echelon which is based abroad, or did Sinwar decide on his own, together with Mohammed Deif, the head of Hamas’s military wing in Gaza?
Hamas’s political leader, Khaled Meshaal, who is based in Qatar, told Le Figaro, “We can answer neither yes nor no.” According to him, “Hamas’s strategy, which aims to end the Israeli occupation and offer freedom to the Palestinians, falls under the movement’s policies, and all operational details are entrusted to the military authorities” of an organization.
Le Figaro concludes that the time and date of the attack were known only to three or four individuals. Its investigation in Lebanon, Jordan, and Qatar, suggests that Sinwar and Deif had carefully camouflaged some of their preparations. In the preceding months, Sinwar had replaced the leaders of most of Ezzeddine al-Qassam’s brigades, but the replaced leaders, who were known to Israel, continued to occupy their positions.
“Ayman Nofal, for example, announced after his death by Israel at the start of its response as being the head of the intelligence services of the Ezzeddine al-Qassam Brigades, had not held that job for a long time, he was a battalion commander,” a Hamas member who left Gaza for Beirut a month ago, but remains in contact with the enclave, told Le Figaro.
The cover-up may have included the head of the armed wing, Mohammed Deif, claims the Figaro source, who suggested the real leader of the Ezzeddine al-Qassam is neither Deif nor Marwan Issa, officially his deputy, but Sinwar’s brother, Mohammed Sinwar, whom Israel believes orchestrated the astonishing construction of the largest tunnel discovered by the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip.
Sinwar has tense relations with his allies in Qatar. “He doesn’t trust them too much,” says Le Figaro’s Hamas-Lebanon source, and the information was confirmed by a source close to Hamas in Jordan. “He is aware that his creditors could abandon him. He mistakes them for a checkbook. I remember an episode before the war. Israel had blocked money from Qatar intended for Hamas. The Qatari ambassador arrived with only 13 million dollars instead of the 30 million expected each month. Sinwar told him: ‘Take the 13 back and return with the other 17 as planned.’ The Qatari said: ‘Yes, but assure me that the Jewish holidays will be peaceful.’ Sinwar told him to leave with his millions.’”
Sinwar doesn’t lose his temper only with Qatar. At the end of October, during the first week of the Israeli ground operation in the northern Gaza Strip, Sinwar transmitted a message to Hezbollah asking why it was not engaging in more serious confrontations with Israel. Hezbollah has opted to “protect Lebanon,” and its reluctance may have been insulted by Sinwar’s mistrust at the start of the attack, and its surprise that Iran was not trusted either.
When, in the first weeks of the crisis, the Qatari mediator sought to probe Sinwar about Hezbollah’s intentions to join the war or not, Sinwar warned Hezbollah that Qatar spent more time “extracting” information from him about what Hezbollah was going to do than negotiating for the freedom of Israeli hostages.
