Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan resulted in several bilateral agreements. This development, particularly Russia’s support for Azerbaijani control of the Zangezur Corridor, a transport corridor that would give Azerbaijan unimpeded access to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic without Armenian checkpoints, has raised concerns in Iran and among its allies. They view the potential strengthening of ties between Moscow and Baku with apprehension.
Hamid Mutashar, leader of the Ahwazi Liberal Party, explained the Iranian regime’s concerns about closer Moscow-Baku relations: “Tehran aims to leverage Putin to pressure the West and America for two key objectives: preventing Western support for the opposition and stopping Israel from crossing red lines.”
Mutashar pointed out that stronger Baku-Moscow ties would likely push Tehran away from Moscow. This shift would undermine the Iranian regime’s strategy of using Putin as a diplomatic tool against the West. Consequently, closer relations between Azerbaijan and Russia could hinder Iran’s ability to achieve its geopolitical goals.
Babek Chalabi, a South Azerbaijani activist, shared a similar perspective: “The prospect of strengthening Baku-Moscow relations is likely to worry Tehran. This concern is amplified by Azerbaijan’s cultural and ethnic connections to Iran, which is home to a significant Azerbaijani community. Historically, Iran has viewed Azerbaijani nationalism with apprehension, fearing it might spark separatist movements within its own territory.”
He added: “As rivals in the global energy market, particularly oil and gas, Azerbaijan and Iran are engaged in regional competition. Strengthened Baku-Moscow ties could be perceived as a challenge to Iran’s ambitions, particularly if it affects Iran’s influence over Caspian energy routes and pipelines, potentially marginalizing Tehran from significant regional projects.”
According to Chalabi, the Iranians view Azerbaijani sovereignty over the Zangezur Corridor as a threat to their national security: “A stronger Azerbaijan, supported by Russia, could shift the regional balance in ways that concern Tehran, particularly if it undermines the security of Armenia, one of Iran’s allies. While Iran and Russia collaborate on various fronts, they also have competing regional interests. Moscow’s improved relations with Baku could strain its ties with Tehran if Iran perceives that its influence in the Caucuses is being undermined.”
He concluded: “In summary, I would say that Iran views the deepening of Moscow-Baku relations with wariness, particularly regarding energy competition, regional security, and its strategic interests in the Caucuses. Iran will continue to closely monitor how these developments unfold, as they have the potential to affect Tehran’s standing in the region significantly.”
Tarlan Ahmadov, the head of the Azerbaijani Society of Maine, added: “Azerbaijan is trying to build a peaceful relationship with all neighbors and countries in the world, balancing between the world powers and regional powers. Russia is our neighbor.” For this reason, Ahmadov stressed that Azerbaijan is trying to build a positive friendship with Russia: “Iran sees this warming of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan as a threat to their interests.”
He emphasized: “The Iranian government is making fake accusations. There is nothing against Iran in an open connection between Nachshivan and Azerbaijan. This does nothing to the border between Iran and Armenia. This is all fake claims. They are just using politics against their neighbors.”
IRAN’S PROXIES ARE ALSO FEARFUL
The strengthening of Azerbaijani-Russian relations has caused concern not only for Iran but also for its proxies, including Armenia. An Iran-backed group called Hoseynun, or ‘Defenders of the Shrine,’ has been gaining influence among Azerbaijan’s Talysh community. This organization has loose connections to the Iran-sponsored Hezbollah movement and is considered part of the ‘Axis of Resistance.’
Hoseynun’s agenda includes: advocating for regime change in Baku; dismantling the Azerbaijani-Israeli alliance; and opposing the improvement of Russian-Azerbaijani relations, which they see as detrimental to Tehran’s interests.
This group’s activities reflect the broader unease among Iran-aligned entities regarding the evolving diplomatic landscape in the region, particularly the warming ties between Azerbaijan and Russia.
The TG channel “Armenian Vendetta” concurred with the other Iran proxy groups that the strengthening of Russian-Azerbaijani ties is not a positive development. After Putin’s visit to Baku, they proclaimed: “Once again, we have to realize with horror how much Aliyev outplays Pashinyan in terms of diplomacy.” Analyzing the situation in the “Armenian-Azerbaijani issue”, the channel’s experts note with bitterness: “Pashinyan has achieved a unique achievement. He not only made it so that Armenia was no longer taken into account, he made it so that Armenia was not present at such negotiations. Yes, yes, everything is discussed without Armenia, because Aliyev does not go to Western platforms, and discussions on the Russian platform are simply held without Pashinyan’s presence. Accordingly, any agreements that are reached between Putin and Aliyev will be a plus for Baku and a minus for official Yerevan for its frankly unconstructive position.”
Another Yerevan publication, Yerevan Today, reprints a comment from the TG channel “Comrade General”: in its opinion, “absolutely everything that was discussed in Baku could have happened in Yerevan. From the transportation of Russian gas to the conditions for delimiting the state border, from the construction of the North-South corridor to the joint celebration of the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War — all of this could have been in Armenia’s hands, not Azerbaijan’s.”
The visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Azerbaijan will remain the focus of experts’ attention for a long time. No “breakthrough” agreements have been announced, but the visit to Baku itself, not only of the Russian President but also of almost the entire Cabinet of Ministers, as well as the “protocol details,” starting from an informal dinner at Ilham Aliyev’s residence and ending with a visit to White City, demonstrate that Azerbaijan and Russia have warm and friendly relations based on the personal friendship of the two presidents. Without a doubt, this has been demonstrated. Azerbaijan is one of the few countries in the post-Soviet space that has managed to build normal relations with Russia without ceding state sovereignty or becoming a satellite, and in Tehran and Yerevan, this is a cause of great concern.
