A thorough 750-page investigation by the Israeli Air Force details the events during the first hours of the October 7 war, highlighting significant failures in safeguarding the country’s airspace and protecting communities near Gaza. This raises the critical question of where the Air Force was in the early stages of the war when it was most urgently needed. The report shows the Air Force struggling to account for the gap between its actual activities and the outcomes on the ground.
The squadron logs indicate that Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar was not informed of the initial signs of an unusual event in the Gaza Strip throughout the night between October 6 and 7, and was excluded from all command assessments of the situation.
The investigation highlights several failures, including issues with the country’s air defense, the damage to warning systems due to Hamas attacks, and the fact that the Air Force was unable to reach many areas where massacres and kidnappings occurred. Despite the challenges, the investigation also emphasizes the scale of the Air Force’s efforts, with hundreds of targets struck in the first hours. However, these efforts were overshadowed by the tragic scenes emerging from Sderot, the Gaza envelope, and the Nova party, which were broadcast into homes across the country at that time.
The summary of the investigation into the attacks during the first 24 hours reveals that by 11:00 AM, the Air Force had carried out 150 attacks, firing 1,500 shells from helicopter gunships. By 12:00 PM, the number had exceeded 280 attacks, and by midnight of the first day, approximately 1,000 attacks had been conducted, with 12,000 shells fired from helicopter gunships.
The Air Force commander Major General Tomer Bar woke up that Saturday at 06:30 AM when the alarms sounded. By 07:10, he declared war from the Air Force bunker and, according to the investigation’s findings, scrambled the entire force. The first flight log shows that the Air Force went into offensive action at 07:15, 45 minutes after the massacre in the Gaza envelope began when the first aircraft attacked Netiv Ha’Asarah.
By 07:55, the Air Force had deployed attack helicopters and aircraft that operated until the first fighter jet attack. Five minutes later, at 08:00, the attack helicopters also began targeting terrorist concentrations in the envelope, including areas where hostages were present.
By 09:30, when the division and command still lacked a clear situational picture, the Air Force commander ordered that any area within 500 meters of the fence be attacked. As a result, all aircraft without a specific mission were redirected to target terrorist cells along the fence, eliminating hundreds of terrorists.
The recordings reveal attacks on terrorist concentrations in and around Nir Oz, a settlement that had not been reached by any military forces, while dozens of terrorists were en route to carry out massacres. Additionally, at the Black Arrow memorial, an aircraft eliminated many dozens of terrorists who were preparing for a second and third wave of attacks. By this time, fighter jets were already targeting pre-prepared sites in the Gaza Strip, according to scenarios of the anticipated onset of war.
The investigation also examines the challenges faced in guiding the force from the ground. It reveals instances where guidance came from command posts and air defenses, with some cases involving direct communication with pilots via cell phones. There was significant difficulty in forming an up-to-date situational picture.
Another reason for the initially sluggish air force response was the IDF’s unrealistic and confusing rules of engagement. According to one pilot’s testimony, “It was very difficult to distinguish between terrorists and civilians from the air, as some terrorists behaved like civilians on the ground, creating a major dilemma. Once it was clear they were terrorists, they were attacked immediately. But in some cases, evasive fire was used, and when they fled, it became apparent they were terrorists, and we eliminated them.”
Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar is part of the General Staff that failed in its response, and during the investigation, he took full responsibility, admitting in his own words, “We failed.”
