On July 11, Hezbollah conducted an attack on the Kibbutz Kabri area in northern Israel using kamikaze drones, and analysis of debris from one of these drones suggested it’s not the Ababil T (Mersad 2) model, which Hezbollah has been employing frequently and has been identified clearly in recent months. The design of the recovered fragments, particularly the body and wing structure, indicated similarities to the Shahed 101 drone, specifically the variant with an electric motor, the Alma Research Institute reported.
This Iranian-designed UAV is utilized by various groups, including Hezbollah, Houthi forces in Yemen, and Shiite militias in Iraq. In Iraq, it’s known as Morad 5, while in Yemen it’s called Khatf 2. Typically, the Shahed 101 is equipped with a basic piston engine. However, recent reports have documented an electric version of this drone. The Shahed has a range of 900 km (about 500 miles).
The use of this particular drone model, if confirmed, could indicate a shift in Hezbollah’s tactical approach and potentially signal access to more advanced drone technology, according to Alma.
According to Kan 11 News, the Shahed 101 is the UAV that last Thursday killed Major Valery Chapunov, an officer of Battalion 9308 in the Alon Brigade.
Unlike the UAVs Hezbollah has been using so far, which were equipped with gasoline engines, the electric UAVs are very quiet and almost impossible to hear from the ground, making them difficult to identify and intercept. A local official in eastern Syria told Kan 11 last Tuesday that in recent days shipments of the electric kamikaze UAV have reached the pro-Iranian militias in Syria from Iraq.
The same source warned that while Israel is busy with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the pro-Iranian militias in Syria are establishing themselves in the field and preparing to attack from a relatively safe distance.
Also, Hezbollah still deploys several brigades in Syria, ready to be thrown into combat by Hassan Nasrallah.
Shahed Aviation Industries is responsible for developing these drones. Despite international sanctions on Iran, the UAVs are constructed using commercially available components sourced from companies based in various countries, including the United States, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Japan, and Poland. The widespread commercial availability of these parts makes them difficult to regulate or control effectively.
According to a report submitted to the G7 by Ukraine, these components are imported into Iran through intermediary countries such as Turkey, India, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Costa Rica. To ensure continuous production in case of aerial attacks, it’s reported that each drone manufacturing facility in Iran has two backup locations.
The development of Iranian drone technology took a significant leap on December 5, 2011, when the Iranian government captured an American Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel UAV. Iran’s cyberwarfare unit allegedly commandeered and brought down the drone. Subsequently, Shahed Aviation Industries reverse-engineered this advanced American UAV. The knowledge gained from this process was instrumental in the development of two notable Iranian drones: the Shahed 171 Simorgh and the Shahed 191 (also known as Shahed Saegheh).
This incident highlights the complex interplay of global supply chains, technological espionage, and the challenges of enforcing sanctions in the realm of drone technology.
