Following a security assessment, the IDF ordered that starting on Monday at 6 AM, there will be an extensive road blockade in the entire area near the Lebanese border and in settlements adjacent to the border fence. The decision was reached following an anti-tank missile that was fired on Sunday and hit a home in Kibbutz Avivim and in light of the continued fighting with Hezbollah on the Lebanese border.
On day 80 of Operation Iron Swords, it has become clear that just as the evacuated residents of the Gaza envelope settlements would not agree to go home before Hamas is eliminated once and for all, so do the evacuated civilians of the settlements along the Lebanese border refuse to return unless the Hezbollah threat is removed.
Israel defined the removal of the Hezbollah threat as the retreat of the terrorist group to the north bank of the Litani River, some 28 kilometers from the Israeli border, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The area between the river and the border will be controlled by the Lebanese army and UNIFIL which will be responsible for maintaining the peace there.
But instead of showing any inclination to comply with 1701, Hezbollah is intensifying its war of attrition with Israel, which so far has cost it the lives of more than 100 fighters and the loss of material.
No one in Israel’s security establishment harbors any illusions about the intentions of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, but for the moment, Israel is hoping that the IDF’s numerous tactical achievements during the exchange of blows with Hezbollah’s Radwan force might move the international community to design new rules for the game in southern Lebanon. Preoccupied as it is with the campaign in Gaza, Israel intends to exhaust every avenue toward a diplomatic solution that would pull Hezbollah from the border area. In addition to allowing the IDF to focus on Gaza, this approach would presumably provide Israel with ample justification once it decided it was time to move against Hezbollah in an attempt to crush it in south Lebanon.
For 80 days the northern settlements have been waiting for the imminent war with Hezbollah. They understand better than anyone else the terrible dangers inherent in it, but they also understand that this is a war that must eventually be fought.
“From the first moment it was clear to me that we were facing a long-term event because it comes after so many years of containment during which our enemy built and strengthened its infrastructure,” Kiryat Shmona mayor Avichai Stern told Ynet on Monday.
“My residents understand that it is impossible to do this on the fly, and that deep plowing is required to ensure peace in both the north and the south, and without such a move I don’t see how it would happen,” Stern continued. “We have known difficult days in the past, in previous wars, where we spent weeks and months in underground shelters with dozens of other people in a 20-square meter room. We understand that even now it is inevitable. But despite the great difficulty, it is more difficult to live in a house where you know that one morning thousands of terrorists of the Radwan force can invade, as we’ve seen in the south, and imagine what happens to your family and friends and neighbors.”
THE LESSONS OF 2006
The 2006 Second Lebanon War lasted 34 days and Hezbollah rockets and mortars killed 44 Israeli civilians. At least 19 of the 46 Israeli civilians killed by Hezbollah rockets and mortars were Israeli Arabs. A total of 121 IDF soldiers were killed in the war.
In addition to the cost of lives, Israel sustained crucial damage to its deterrence, which led, eventually, to Hamas planning and carrying out the October 7 massacre. According to the report issued by the Winograd Commission of Inquiry, in the Second Lebanon War, “Israel initiated a long war, which ended without a defined military victory.” The report pointed out that “a semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages.” Hezbollah’s rocket attacks continued throughout the war and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it. Following a long period of using standoff firepower and limited ground activities, the IDF launched a large-scale ground offensive close to the UN Security Council’s resolution which imposed a ceasefire. “This offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed.”
The two men who are associated more than anyone else with the 2006 fiasco are today’s most vicious critics of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his conduct in the war. They are former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who ended up serving time in prison for corruption; and IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, who sold off his investment portfolio three hours after two Israeli soldiers were captured by Hezbollah––the event that led to the war. Halutz was forced to resign over his failure in the war.
Netanyahu is more likely to bring about a satisfactory resolution to the conflict with Hezbollah than the two failed leaders before him. Renowned for his hesitation before launching military campaigns, it appears that Netanyahu has integrated the message that a lingering war of attrition with either terrorist group – Hamas and Hezbollah – is no longer a viable solution. Having suffered an enormous blow to his policy of carefully manipulating Hamas against the PLO, Netanyahu will remain cautious in his approach to the Hezbollah challenge, but in the end, will attack.
