![The site of a Hezbollah missile attack in the Druze village of Majdal Shams, July 27, 2024.](https://www.jewishpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/The-site-of-a-Hezbollah-missile-attack-in-the-Druze-village-of-Majdal-Shams-July-27-2024.-696x464.jpg)
![The site of a Hezbollah missile attack in the Druze village of Majdal Shams, July 27, 2024.](https://www.jewishpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/The-site-of-a-Hezbollah-missile-attack-in-the-Druze-village-of-Majdal-Shams-July-27-2024.-696x464.jpg)
Hezbollah remains resolute in its conflict with Israel, despite suffering significant losses over the past ten months. According to a Washington Post’s Sunday report, the Lebanese terror group has lost nearly 400 fighters and commanders to Israeli strikes. Nevertheless, Hezbollah has maintained its offensive, pausing attacks on northern Israel only once, back in November. More recently, the group has intensified its assaults and expanded its range of targets, striking Israeli towns it claims were previously untouched.
The Biden administration, as Israel’s main ally, has found Hezbollah’s tenacity increasingly challenging. Despite US efforts to prevent a wider regional conflict—which would likely draw in American forces—attempts to negotiate ceasefires in both Lebanon and Gaza have proven unsuccessful. Hezbollah maintains that it is not seeking war, but insists it will continue its operations until a ceasefire is established in Gaza. This stance has complicated US diplomatic efforts and heightened concerns about potential escalation in the region.
As the foremost member of the Iran-aligned axis of evil, Hezbollah wields considerable influence, bolstered by its unmatched military prowess in Lebanon, extensive weaponry, and substantial fighting force. Amid growing hardship in Lebanon, the group has sought to mitigate criticism of its military actions. Hezbollah contends that its strategic approach has contained the violence and prevented the confrontation with Israel from escalating into a broader regional conflict. This narrative aims to maintain domestic support despite the increasing toll on Lebanese civilians.
![](https://www.jewishpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Hezbollah-Secretary-General-Hassan-Nasrallah.jpg)
A GAZA CEASEFIRE WOULD HELP HEZBOLLAH RECUPERATE
Political activist Gad Ivgy wrote in Mida on July 30 that it is worth recalling the aggressive manner in which the US restrained Israel’s response to an Iranian attack of 330 surface-to-air missiles and cruise missiles on Israel on April 13, 2024. “The US was not satisfied with restraint: in fact, the assessment is growing that the US was engaged in coordinating the borders of the sector for the Iranian attack – which was actually a response to the killing of a Quds Force commander in Syria – in front of all parties.”
“We witnessed a play directed by and with American participation. This is exactly how the US is acting these days against Iran, Hezbollah, and Israel about the Israeli response: do not attack in Beirut – neither in Dahya nor at the airport – and limiting the attack according to American doctrine will lead to the end of the round when everyone is satisfied and a return to the familiar rules of engagement. This is how the USA will prevent war,” he surmises.
Ivgy acknowledges that unlike in Gaza, on the Lebanese front, the US has its death grip on Israel, what with its enormous naval contingency capable of both defending and destroying the Jewish State. He also warns that because Israel has kept to a strategy of retaliations in Lebanon, rather than pursuing its own military goals, a ceasefire with Hamas in Gaza would necessarily bring about a ceasefire in Lebanon, allowing Hezbollah to regroup and restock in southern Lebanon unmolested.
“In light of this, we must reject the possibility of a truce or ceasefire in the north and continue to exert continuous military pressure on Hezbollah in its various regions,” Ivgy urges.
Ivgy predicts that “Two central factors will dictate the interim period: the fate of the residents of the north, and our ability to open a gap based on the weakening of Hezbollah and the strengthening of the IDF. As for the first goal, there is a likelihood – not a certainty – that if we act decisively, we can begin to return the residents to some places where there is no threat of a raid due to the removal of the Redwan force, or a threat arising from controlling flat-track fire and observation.
“The town of Shlomi is a good example of this. An interim period will allow examination of operative methods, pushing the envelope and Hezbollah’s frequent position on the horns of a dilemma. Hezbollah is indeed ready for war, but proactively starting a war against Israel when it is ready and getting stronger is not its preferred modus operandi. Hezbollah needs to find out that Israel also knows how to go head-to-head with it.”
Last Tuesday, Hezbollah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah claimed in a speech, “We did not go to escalation, even when our dear leaders were killed.”
But, of course, they initiated the shooting war with Israel shortly after October 7, 2023.
“For 10 months, there’s been a front, martyrs and funerals, and another part of Lebanon where it’s concerts, and leisure, and lunches and dinners,” Nasrallah complained, ever the victim. But “The Israelis are the ones who chose this escalation with Lebanon,” by assassinating his second in command Fuad Shukr in the Shiite neighborhood of Dahya in Beirut.
Once again, as is accepted in the Middle East and everywhere else on the planet, “It all started when Israel retaliated.”