Review of “Judaism 3.0: Judaism’s Transformation To Zionism”

In Chapter VI, The Transformation of Judaism — American Jews, Kalev
notes that political Zionism originally had little to offer Jews in America.
Political Zionism was a way to address the misery of the Jews suffering from
antisemitism. That was a powerful message in Europe, but America in the 20th
century, by contrast, offered Jews freedom and a level of acceptance that
they had not experienced in Europe. Jews integrated in American society.
They did not need Zionism, and saw it as an encumbrance if not a threat to
their status in America.

This integration led to a change in their Jewish identity in America. There
was a denationalization from ‘Judea’ — the yearning to return
to ‘Judea’ and the association with Israel changed. Judaism
went from a nation-religion to being reduced to being a mere religion.

And then on top of that came the secularization.

With the weakening of religion as the glue that anchored Jewish identity,
over the past 80 years, other ‘glues’ served as substitutes to maintain that
sense of Jewish identity:

1. Memory of the Holocaust: The Holocaust has been the most
significant Jewish issue that united the Jews in the second half of the
20th century through today. The Holocaust, along with its lessons and
memories, drives Jewish organizational policy and has dominated much of
the Jewish community ethos…

2. Nostalgia for Ashkenazi/Eastern European roots: The second
American Jewish glue was the culture of Yiddish, the shtetl, Jewish food
(gefilte fish, bagel and lox) and Eastern European Jewish heritage. [p.139]

According to Kalev, while the memory of the Holocaust — and nostalgia for
the Eastern Europe past — have succeeded in replacing “the fading glues of
religion, insularity and discrimination,” memories of the Holocaust are
fading as the generations of Holocaust survivors die. The same holds true
for nostalgia for “the old country” — which may actually be for the best.

On this point Kalev notes:

Astonishingly, nostalgia to the old country became nostalgia to
values and elements of life which the Jews utterly detested while they
were there</i >. The ghetto life in Poland that was considered miserable in real time,
became idolized in America…The retroactive glorification of Yiddish and
Polish/Russian old country was done since there was no tangible connection
to the real old country — to Zion. [143; emphasis added]

Today, in the face of the weakening if not outright lack of “glues” for
their Jewish identity, for a growing number of Jews, as important as their
Jewish identity may be for them, it takes a back seat to other roles and
other cultural identities. He is less likely to bring up his synagogue or
Jewish school and more likely to bring up his college, a country club or his
job. Instead of discussing the weekly parsha, he is more likely to want to
talk about the newest restaurant or movie.

The concern that Kalev is focusing on in his book is not the Orthodox Jews
who connect with their Jewish identity through its religious component, nor
what he refers to as “engaged Jews” who are active in Jewish causes and
events.

Instead, the concern is for the majority of the Jews for whom being
part of the Jewish community is not an important commitment and is low on
their hierarchy of identities and priorities. The culture of the typical
American Jew is the American culture. Jewish culture today for many is
eating a bagel with lox and cream cheese.

What passes for Jewish culture today for the majority of Jews is not enough
to maintain a sustainable connection to their Judaism.

One attempt to create a new expression of Jewish identity in progressive
circles is found in the call for Tikkun Olam — righting wrongs,
doing good deeds, doing charitable work and making the world a better place
to live. But Kalev writes that as an attempt to strengthen Jewish identity,
it is doomed to fail, because

that is a very weak connector, since other groups engage in similar
charitable actions.

If anything, it supports the notion of universalim — of Judaism not being
any different than any other group, religious or otherwise.

Moreover, a Jewish person engaging in such good-doing does not need to do
it in a Jewish context. [p. 147]

In other words, the failure of Tikkun Olam as a bond to Judaism lies in the
fact that it does the opposite of what it is alleged to do. Instead of
connecting Jews to their unique identity, it promotes the idea of
universalism, that Judaism is no different from any other religion.
No different than any other group. This is especially true when Tikkun Olam
is made all about human rights or humanitarian aid. The approach to
inspiring Jewish identity through Tikkun Olam is self-defeating and doomed
to failure.

Along with this weakening of Jewish identity in the US we are witnessing the
ambivalence of Jews towards their Jewish leadership. In the 20th century,
these leaders were not only looked up to by American Jews — they were
influential and other leaders, both national and international, met with
them regularly.

But today, while the appearances continue, as new faces replace the old
familiar ones, the Jewish community does not accept the Jewish leadership as
unquestioningly as it once did. The new leaders do not carry the same
gravitas, and besides — American Jews are free to bypass them:

An American Jew can access his own tailor-made basket of leaders that suits
his own evolving preferences: A rabbi, a teacher, a blogger, a progressive
Jewish thinker, a comedian, a tour-guide he had in Israel or an Israeli
political leader. Hence the Jew can now turn away from Jewish Federations,
the UJA and other Jewish structures as the point of orientation for Jewish
leadership, and instead turn towards Israel. [p. 151]

Going a step further, Kalev suggests the same applies to the end of the old
Jewish icons. He contends that Jerry Seinfeld, Barbara Streisand and Jon
Stewart are no more personifications of today’s Judaism for those less
affiliated than J. R. Ewing and his family are personifications of today’s
Dallas. Similarly, the old image of the Woody Allen stereotype of the “weak”
Jew is now historic and no longer contemporary. Jewish symbols
like Yiddish, a pastrami sandwich and bagels & lox are no longer
singularly relevant to the Jewish identity as much as they have become
“relevant to Americans of all backgrounds as a Jewish reference point…This
is just like most customers in Italian restaurants are not Italian and most
of those ordering Chinese takeout are not Chinese [p. 155].”

Enter the Israelization of the American-Jewish experience, where

thanks to the expanding array of relatable Israeli products and experiences,
Judaism, through Zionism, is becoming increasingly relevant for the
young American Jew. This is not by duty, but by choice. [p. 157; emphasis
added]

Israel is no longer seen as an object of charity, as symbolized by
the blue JNF box. That was in the past. Today, Israel is considered for what
it offers, both internationally through its innovations,
entrepreneurial spirit, art and culture, wine industry, academic centers and
think tanks.

Kalev is not talking about inspiring a sense of Jewish pride and identity on
the abstract level. He writes about concrete elements that American
Jews can connect with as expressions of their Jewish identity. He suggests
that this allows for a non-political connection with Israel, one that makes
it possible to embrace Israel even while disagreeing with its policies —
something that Palestinian Arabs are beginning to realize:

The ability to disconnect or suppress politics paved the way for
Palestinians in the West Bank to seek employment and mentorship by Israelis,
and to even get funding for Palestinian start-ups from Israelis.
This underscores how audiences can connect to Israel’s success and
desirability without endorsing or having a particular opinion on political
issues</i >. [p.158; emphasis added]

In a similar way, an American Jew who enjoys Israeli products does not do
this as an endorsement of Israeli policies — and will not suddenly stop
identifying with Israel just because of a policy he disagrees with.

This does not ignore the fact that there are those who support BDS, but
there too, due to the wide range of Israeli products it becomes evident that
a literal boycott of all Israeli products is not the goal of the BDS
movement, but rather the attention that can be gained by advocating for that
cause.

The Israelization of the American Jewish community is therefore not a
political phenomenon, but rather a cultural one. Israeli shows
such as Fauda, Shtisel, Mossad 101 and
Tehran are now showing up on American TV, with the result that
American Jews are exposed to new Jewish icons.

Today, there is a lot of discussion about the current status of the
connection between American Jews and Israel, a connection that is often
portrayed as weakening. But there is a development in Zionism that may
indicate a change that will help to strengthen those ties: Aliyah. Above, it
was pointed out that there is a distinction between duty and
choice. The same applies here, as Zionism is understood to go
beyond immigration to Israel:

Zionism was perceived to be about the establishment of the State of Israel
and making Aliya. Indeed, Aliya was essential in the early years of Israel,
and for decades Israeli leaders urged American Jews to make Aliya. A Jew
choosing to stay in the Diaspora was viewed with disappointment by Israelis,
exerting some degree of guilt feeling — someone who is not fulfilling his
“duty” as a Jew. [161]

Not only were Jews expected to make Aliyah — once they arrived they were
expected to “Israelize”. He was expected to shed his Diaspora identity and
accept the Israeli culture. Today, there is still an expectation that upon
making Aliyah, he will learn Hebrew and speak the language. In the 1920s,
this expectation led to the formation of
Hebrew Language Brigades which would reprimand people who did
not speak Hebrew to each other. Kalev compares this to France today, which
has tried to do something similar with its own immigrants. (An obvious
difference is that unlike Muslim immigrants to France, Jews returning to
Israel have a cultural and historical bond to the country.)

Today, the pitch is not to make Aliya but to maintain strong connections
with Israel, including coming to visit Israel, but also to be exposed to the
country without having to be on a path toward Aliya — even experiencing
Israel through a phone or laptop — and don’t forget
Birthright trips. In addition to the practical side — Aliyah —
there is also the ideological side. Kalev quotes Herzl that Zionism includes
“not only the aspiration to the Promised Land…but also the aspiration to
moral and spiritual completion.”

The removal of the Aliyah requirement frees the way for unaffiliated
American Jews to gain greater involvement and exposure to their Judaism
through Zionism.

Today, since Judaism is not the defining element of the Jewish identity of
most American Jews, in order for Judaism to be relevant, it has to be
attractive and desirable. According to Kalev, the challenge is that
“American Judaism needs to thrive in a non-committal environment.”

An American Jew increasingly seeks the non-committal component for his
various experiences, including for his affiliation with Judaism. But such
non-committal affiliation is not possible under Judaism 2.0. The “ask” for
the American Jew is to commit more: join and come to synagogue more often,
send your children to Hebrew school, donate to the UJA, be a member of the
Jewish community center and the other community Jewish organizations.
[p.175]

Kalev contrasts this with those Israeli Jews for whom their religious
affiliation is secondary to their Jewish identity. For such an Israeli Jew,
his experiences in Israel shape his Jewish identity. Whatever his attitude
toward Jewish religiosity may be, he remains committed and fully affiliated
with Judaism. This is in contrast with what Kalev calls Judaism 2.0, where
Jewish
religious affiliation is the primary measure of the depth of one’s
connection to Judaism.

Those American Jews who are not among the 20% who are Orthodox or among the
“strongly committed” are in danger and many are already disaffiliated. For
them, Judaism 3.0 — through Zionism — is not necessarily going to
bring them back to Judaism, but it does
provide new ways to connect with Judaism. For some, this will prevent
further estrangement, while for others it may serve as a catalyst to
reconnect.

Today, one aspect of the lives of American Jews acting as a catalyst is
antisemitism, which is reaching levels that just a few years ago would have
been unimaginable. We are in a situation where Jews on campus are afraid to
openly identify themselves as Jews.

But this rise in antisemitism can have a different effect as well:

This forces the unaffiliated and under-engaged Jew right back into his
Jewish identity. But what is this identity? What is the point of Judaism
that such a “Jew in abstention” passively seeks to “go back to?” It is not
the synagogue which he has not frequented, nor the Holocaust that he does
not think much about. The rise of such “Jewish existential thinking” leads
the Jew into Israel as his identity benchmark — this is the relevant
association with his Jewish affiliation — this is where he hears or thinks
about Judaism.This reality is exactly what Herzl envisioned when he said
that anti-Semitism is a propelling force into Zionism. [p. 177]

From this perspective, the current rise in antisemitism as anti-Zionism
pressuring American Jews to criticize Israel actually has a positive
dimension. Kalev argues that “the more an American Jew engages with the
issues of Israel’s policies, the stronger his connection to Judaism.” Since
much of the criticism directed towards Israel comes from “unaffiliated Jews”
who are drifting away from Judaism anyway, “paradoxically, the
‘coincidental’ engagement with Israel of this group helps keep them
Jewish.” If Not Now could be seen as an example of this.

Kalev is not suggesting a plan of action. On the contrary, he sees this
transformation where Zionism becomes a key component of Jewish identity as
something natural and organic. And it is a process that is happening now.
Judaism 3.0 is as natural a transformation as the transformation to Rabbinic
Judaism from Judaism 1.0.

And the future of Jewish identity depends on it.