Call To Alms
‘Having Declared It a Burnt Offering, He Rethought…’
(Zevachim 30a)
The Gemara (supra 9a) teaches us that if one wishes to transfer the kedusha (sanctity) of a Korban Olah – an already sanctified burnt offering – to another animal, both animals are sanctified. The original retains its original kedusha status, the second animal acquires the same sanctity, and both are to be sacrificed. This is derived from the verse (Vayikra 27:10) “hu u’tmuraso yihyeh kodesh” – it and its substitute shall be sanctified.
Our daf cites a Mishna in Temurah (25b) which discusses a more complex case. A person declared a non-sanctified animal to be a substitute for an Olah and a Shelamim (a peace offering). Now we must determine his intention. If he originally intended to declare it a substitute for an Olah, then had a change of heart and declared it a Shelamim, his original declaration stands, according to R. Meir.
R. Yosi opines that if such was his intention – since one cannot utter two designations at once – his declaration stands. (It then retains the sanctity of both.) If, however, he declared it first a Korban Olah and then rethought his word and declared it a Korban Shelamim, then it retains the former designation only.
Toch K’dei Dibbur
Elsewhere (Makkos 6a), we find that there is a few-second time span during which one can retract testimony or a transaction. This is referred to as “toch ke’dei dibbur” – non-intermittent utterance, generally the time it takes for a student greet his teacher (“Shalom alecha, Rebbe”). With this rule in mind, the Shita Mekubetzes (to our daf) asks why can’t a person retract a sacrificial declaration within that time span and redeclare a different sanctity (i.e., from Korban Olah to Korban Shelamim)?
Shita Mekubetzes answers that (as per R. Yosi’s view) where the person did have such a lapse of toch k’dei dibbur, he has the ability to change designations. However, the Gemara is referring to a case where there was a longer lapse, and thus his later declaration is viewed as a wish to superimpose the second sanctity (of Shelamim) over the Korban Olah.
Mordechai (end of Bava Basra) is even more restrictive, as he explains that the rule of toch k’dei dibbur is only effective where he specifically states “Chozrani bi,” meaning “I retract.” Rashi (infra 30b s.v. “mihader ka’hadar”) and Rambam (Hilchos Ma’aseh Hakorbanos chap. 15:1), on the other hand, are of the view that once a declaration is made, one may not retract even where it is toch k’dei dibbur.
Amiraso L’Govoha
Tosafos (Menachos 81b s.v. “todah min ha’chullin …”) are of the view that temurah of korbanos is unlike other declarations and there is no retracting, even toch k’dei dibbur, because of the rule “amiraso l’govoha k’mesiraso l’hedyot” – his pledging to the sanctified domain is the equivalent of it being physically handed over to a common person. Thus, his declaration is as binding as a formal transaction.
Charitable Giving
Ketzos HaChoshen (siman 255) asserts that one who pledges money to charity has the power to immediately retract that pledge toch k’dei dibbur because, in his view, the rule of “amiraso l’govoha k’mesiraso l’hedyot” does not apply to pledges of charity. Machane Ephraim (Hilchos Tzedaka end of siman 8) disagrees, citing several opinions that apply the concept of “amiraso l’govoha k’mesiraso l’hedyot,” and accordingly, he rules that one may not retract a pledge to charity. In modern-day terms, it might be considered like a credit card payment or an electronic check, which is instantly paid.