Categories: Headline / Halacha & Hashkafa / Torah
A Gold Brick in the Sewer

Arachin – Daf 4
Our Gemara on amud beis discusses the laws of arachin, which are the set valuations that apply to different individuals at different ages, as delineated in Vayikra (ch. 27). These valuations are donated to the Temple and are standard amounts. Though they vary based on broad categories of age and gender, they do not vary based on the individual. Moreover, through a Scriptural derivation, the Sages rule that even a repulsive man and one afflicted with boils, is given the same valuation.
What is the message? Shem MiShmuel (Bechukosai 4:18) says that this speaks of the intrinsic inner value of each person. The exterior, even if repulsive, does not affect one’s true worth. I’ll go further and say that even if the person is spiritually repulsive, their value also does not change, as it states in Sanhedrin (44a): “When the Jewish people have sinned, they are still called ‘Israel.’ Rabbi Abba says: This is in accordance with the adage that people say: Even when a myrtle is found among thorns, its name is myrtle and people call it myrtle.”
This is not only true of the Jewish people as a whole but also of the individual sinner. As the Rambam (Laws of Rotze’ach, 13:14) famously states in regard to the Biblical directive to assist the beast who is collapsing under its load, even if the owner is a hated person: “Even if he did not yet repent, if one sees him in panic because of his cargo, it is a mitzvah to unload and reload with him, instead of leaving him inclined toward death, lest he tarry because of his money and be brought to danger. For the Torah showed concern for the lives of the Jewish people, both the wicked and the righteous, for they are attached to G-d and believe in the fundamentals of our faith. And Ezekiel 33:11 states: Say to them, ‘As I live,’ says G-d, the L-rd. ‘Do I desire the death of a wicked man? I desire that the wicked return from his path and live.’”
A gold brick at the bottom of a sewer is still a gold brick.
Simple Sabotage: Infiltration by Inertia
Daf 5
Our Gemara on amud beis describes Ezra’s reluctance to allow gentiles to participate in the building of the Temple (as told in Ezra chapter 4). It was not necessarily because of their status as gentiles, because a gentile may even offer sacrifices to the Temple (Menachos 73b). Rather, there was a fear that becoming dependent upon them through their participation would lead to a loss of motivation or productivity among the Jewish people. The question is, why and how?
Rashi answers: Because they were insincere and would infiltrate the process, but then stall in various ways.
Rabbeinu Gershom says something subtly different: Since their hearts were not devoted to G-d, they would slow down the process.
Rabbeinu Gershom is referring to an unconscious passive-aggressive slacking off that would eventually affect the process because their commitment and level of devotion were subpar. Rashi’s description is of something more deliberate and insidious. The gentiles wanted to join the process, but all along were insincere and just wanted to sabotage it from within.
Rashi’s spin is fascinating because it reflects an aspect of psy-ops used in modern times as well. When we think of spies, we imagine these romantic James Bond-type individuals involved in dangerous missions. However, there seems to be a category of agents who perform mundane sabotage which, in the aggregate, can still be debilitating. The now declassified OSS Simple Sabotage Field Manual (Strategic Services Field Manual No. 3, 17 January 1944) gives specific directions to field agents on how to infiltrate bureaucratic structures and then slow down operations and decision-making under the guise of “caution,” “raising concerns,” and referring to the “need to consult with minutes from past meetings before making a decision.”
My friends, the scariest truths are often hiding in plain sight. Every field of technology has advanced exponentially since 1944, so why should we not consider that psychological spycraft operations have not correspondingly advanced?
What do nations do with almost unlimited budgets for research and a desire to avoid outright warfare, especially with a risk of nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks? Think of how much effort and technology the superpowers must invest on an ongoing basis for psychological operations. Then take a look at the political systems, bureaucracies, and deep states of most of our so-called democracies, including our current two-party – or, shall I say, uni-party – system. Hmmm, why is nothing accomplished? Why do the same issues keep occurring again and again, such as massive fraud and waste? Need I say more?
A Right is Not a Mitzvah
Daf 6
Our Gemara on amud beis rules that one who is on his deathbed or one who is taken to be executed after being sentenced by the court is neither subject to a vow nor to being valuated.
The Rambam in his commentary on this Mishna makes a distinction: This is only in regard to somebody who is sentenced to death by the Jewish court. In that case, the judgment is irreversible. However, someone who is subject to death by royal decree due to insurrection is still considered as any other living individual, since the king may change his mind at any time and grant a pardon.
Sefer Daf al Daf quotes a question raised by Rav Yosef Engel (Beis Ha’otzar, Aleph) on the Maharal, which ties into this Rambam, as we shall see. The Maharal (Gur Aryeh, Shemos 2:12) declares that Beis Din may not pardon someone sentenced to death, even if somehow, they know via ruach ha-kodesh that this person is destined to have great descendants. Justice must be served. This is despite the fact that, according to the Midrash, Moshe paused to look into the future and see if the Egyptian perpetrator would have any meritorious descendants before killing him. That situation is different, argues the Maharal, because Moshe only knew about the Egyptian’s crimes (he was an adulterer and rapist) through ruach ha-kodesh. Therefore, the source of the evidence against him could also override the conviction; this was not a formal legal process.
Rav Engel asks: We have a midrash that Dovid Hamelech spared Shim’i Ben Geira from death, although he had committed insurrection, because Dovid saw in ruach ha-kodesh that Mordechai would be his descendant (Targum Esther 2:5). However, according to the Maharal, what gave Dovid the right to pardon Shim’i on the basis of Shim’i’s descendants? Justice must be served.
Based on this Rambam, we see that a king could pardon and reverse a death decree. The difference is that although a king is entitled to execute somebody for insurrection, this is not based on due process. Rather, it is an extra-legal function that the king has the right to carry out to maintain his honor. At the same time, if he chooses to be merciful, it is not a subversion of justice. This answers the question on the Maharal, as Dovid had a right to pardon Shim’i.
This distinction brings to light an important point. Often, people confuse “rights” with mitzvos. The king has a right to protect his honor up to and including executing somebody who is rebellious or disrespectful, but it is not necessarily a mitzvah to do so in every case. Similarly, leaders within our tradition often have the right to be treated with the authority associated with their status, but that doesn’t make it a mitzvah for them to always enforce that authority. For example, though a child is obligated to honor his parents in extensive and specific ways, the parent should avoid becoming overbearing (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 240:18). Similarly, a rebbe should be treated with great respect and deference, yet the Sefer Chasidim (67) instructs the rebbe not to stand on his honor most of the time when a student is disrespectful. (The one exception is if the disrespect occurred in public; in that case, the rebbe should stand up for his honor and punish the student so that the office is not diminished in the eyes of the people.)
Indeed, having a right does not always indicate that it is a mitzvah to pursue or prosecute those who have ignored that right. Couples who get into power struggles often resort to religious obligations and tropes to bolster their position. One might proclaim to a spouse, “According to the Torah, it is your duty to provide [intimacy or financial support, depending on the gender]…” While there is wisdom in the responsibilities and roles that our tradition dictates in order to foster stability in marriage and accountability, a marriage is in a bad place when a spouse has to resort to pointing to an obligation instead of appealing to love, caring, and respect. And even if the matter at issue is a right or an entitlement, it may not be a mitzvah to pursue it, though it may be a mitzvah for the other person to try to fulfill it.


November 20, 2026 







