To Him Shall You Hearken
“One Who Offers Up Nowadays”
(Zevachim 107b)
The Torah states in Parshas Acharei Mos (Vayikra 17:4): “And he has not brought it [his slaughtered animal] to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to bring it as an offering to Hashem before the Tabernacle of Hashem – it shall be considered as bloodshed for that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from his people.” Such a person is subject to kares, as he has slaughtered outside the camp (shechutei chutz) and has not brought the sacrifice in its proper place, namely the Ohel Moed. This law remains in force upon the building and consecration of the Beis HaMikdash.
The Gemara (112a) derives from the above verse that in order to be liable for shechutei chutz, it must be a sacrifice that is fitting to be brought to the Beis HaMikdash. If, however, the sacrifice is one that is considered invalid, such as a treifah (i.e., the animal has a pre-existing fatal defect or illness), among others cited, there is no kares.
Kedusha Rishona
On our daf there is a dispute between R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish regarding what the law is now that we are bereft of the Beis HaMikdash. R. Yochanan states that if one slaughters for the sake of an offering, he is culpable for shechutei chutz, while Resh Lakish rules that there is no culpability. Their dispute centers on whether the first sanctification of the Beis HaMikdash was for then as well as for all time.
The halacha follows R. Yochanan that one is not allowed to offer up a korban today, as codified by Rambam (Hilchos Ma’aseh Hakorbanos, Chap. 19:15), who states that one is liable both for shechutei chutz – slaughtering outside the precincts of the Temple – as well as for ha’ala’as chutz – offering up a korban even though there is no extant mizbe’ach (altar). The Chofetz Chaim (Sefer Zevach Todah to our sugyah) explains Rambam’s view to mean that the possibility yet exists, theoretically, to build a mizbe’ach.
Eliyahu’s Act
The Gemara (Yevamos 90b) derives from the verse in Parshas Shoftim (Devarim 18:15) “A prophet from your midst, from your brethren, like me, shall Hashem, your G-d, establish for you, to him shall you hearken,” that one must obey the [Divine] directive of a navi even where so doing involves a temporary violation of a Torah law. The Gemara cites as an example the incident of Eliyahu on Mount Carmel with the nevi’ei ha’Ba’al – the false prophets of Ba’al – where Eliyahu offered up a sacrifice outside the precincts of the Beis HaMikdash. Rashi explains that so doing created two violations: both slaughtering and offering up a korban outside the Beis HaMikdash.
Aruch LaNer (to Yevamos 90b) offers that Eliyahu only put the korban on the altar at Mount Carmel but did not light a fire, for Scripture (I Melachim 18:38) relates the miracle that occurred – that a Heavenly fire descended and consumed the korban.
Rashbam on the verse in Vayikra (9:17) “And he caused it to go up in smoke upon the mizbe’ach…” explains that Aharon only placed it there and the fire came (descended) from above to burn it. From his words, we see that Aharon’s placing the korban on the mizbe’ach is considered as if he burnt it. Though Eliyahu’s act was technically in violation, it was done for the sake of Heaven.
Tosafos Yeshanim (Yevamos 90b) goes further and explains even where there is no Divine instruction indicated, as was there (supra 18:36) – “by Your word” – it is incumbent to listen to the navi or our Sages even where they instruct to violate a law. It is obvious in such a case, they only seek to do so for k’vod Shamayim – the sake of Heaven.