Clearly, the Palestinian leadership and Hamas failed to honor their Oslo commitments. On the contrary, they initiated, encouraged, incited, and organized violent activity close to the delimiting fence in direct and deliberate contravention of the Oslo Accords commitments.

Faced with the widely publicized appeals and incitement directed by Hamas to Palestinian civilians to charge the fence and to attack and kill Israeli soldiers and civilians, Israel was duty-bound to view the protests as potentially violent, and thus to prevent the anticipated violation of the border fence and danger of violent infiltration into sovereign Israeli territory.

In the course of doing so, Israel’s soldiers guarding the fence, under strict orders to engage only those violating the fence with explosive devices and attempting to infiltrate, found it necessary to direct fire against Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives actively attacking and infiltrating the border fence. In one day of clashes, a senior Hamas official told an interviewer that 50 out of 62 fatalities were Hamas operatives.12

Other people were injured by inhaling gas used to distance the masses of protesters from the fence area.

A Classic Case of a Sovereign State Protecting its Borders

This was not a situation of armed conflict, nor had it anything to do with the laws of armed conflict and occupation of territory. It was routine border protection by a sovereign state, from within its sovereign territory, facing a blatant threat of border violation by violent elements on the other side of the line.

As such, accusing Israel of committing war crimes, massacres, and violations of international humanitarian law, as well as invoking criteria and norms – including the customary international law rule of proportionality – that are applicable to, and characteristic of situations of armed conflict, have no relevance vis-à-vis the situation along the delimiting fence between Israel and the Gaza Strip.

This obvious factor did not prevent the automatic and immediate spate of accusations against Israel of massacres, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of international humanitarian law.

Proportionality

The concept of proportionality is a basic norm in the sphere of the laws of armed conflict in which armed forces in a state of combat operate against targets necessary to achieve their purpose of dealing with an enemy. In this context, the principle is that “Loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.”13

The accepted norm of international customary law relevant in armed conflict, as codified by the ICRC in its International Humanitarian Law Database, sets the limits of proportionality to the necessity “to achieve the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,” yet “without causing excessive incidental loss of life, injury or damage” to civilians.14

Even if one assumed that the stand-off between the Hamas-directed demonstration and Israel’s border guards was a situation of armed conflict, clearly, the fact that Israel strictly limited its use of firepower solely to those Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives violating the border fence, is an example of Israel’s proportionate use of force. Hence, accusations of disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force have no factual or military basis.

International Criminal Court

Finally, the highly publicized visit by the Palestinian Foreign Minister to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), armed with a new set of complaints and accusations against Israel’s leaders and senior commanders, including of war crimes and violations of the Geneva Conventions along the fence, cannot be considered to be anything other than a flawed and cynical manipulation of the Court.

This is an attempt by the leadership of the Palestinian Authority to “climb onto the Hamas bandwagon” and reap political and public-relations benefit from the situation along the border fence generated by Hamas. The action was taken despite the inherent and ongoing hostility and rupture between the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas terror organization ruling the Gaza Strip.

The oft-repeated Palestinian propensity to turn the International Criminal Court into its own, private, Israel-bashing tribunal, undermines the objective status of the court as set out in its founding statute. It also undermines the Court’s purpose of dealing with the gravest of international crimes and above all lacks legal validity. The ICC is a court composed of states only, and the court’s jurisdiction can extend only to the sovereign territory of states members of the court.15

While the court’s prosecutor has accepted Palestinian membership of the court, relying on a questionable and non-binding UN General Assembly resolution upgrading the Palestinian status in the United Nations, the very issue of the Palestinian status vis-à-vis the court has yet to be determined juridically.16 This is all the more evident in light of the fact that pending a negotiated resolution to the issue of the permanent status of the territories, as agreed-to in the Oslo Accords, witnessed by the major powers and endorsed by the UN, there exists no sovereign state of Palestine and no sovereign Palestinian territory over which the ICC could exercise its jurisdiction.

Thus, the Palestinian attempt to manipulate the ICC lacks legal validity. The present attempt to bring the court to examine allegations of war crimes by Israel in the context of the recent events along the delimiting fence between Hamas and Israel is incompatible with the requirements of the court’s statute, which clearly defines its powers “to exercise jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of international concern.”17

* * *

Notes

1 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/44510/Statement%20by%20High%20Representative/Vice-President%20Federica%20Mogherini%20on%20violence%20in%20Gaza%20and%20latest%20developments

2 http://www.worldbulletin.net/middle-east/202180/macron-slams-israels-heinous-gaza-actions

3 http://en.rfi.fr/20180514-france-calls-israel-exercise-restraint-gaza

4 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/Newsroom/gaza/1890254

5 https://www.ngo-monitor.org/human-rights-ngos-ignore-violence-and-terror-at-gaza/

6 https://www.unwatch.org/full-text-un-draft-resolution-gaza-omits-hamas/

7 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23100&LangID=E

8 Article 100(2) of the UN Charter

9 UN document  ST/SGB/2017/1 – Regulation 1(2)(f)

10 Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/stop-demonizing-israel-for-defending-itself/2018/05/18/694ef654-5ab8-11e8-858f-12becb4d6067_story.html?utm_term=.f1db1d20d47c

11 THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP

Annex I Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements, Article VI(2)(c) Security Arrangements in the Gaza Strip http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/THE%20ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN%20INTERIM%20AGREEMENT%20-%20Annex%20I.aspx#article6

12 Dr. Salah Albardawil, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/50-of-dead-in-gaza-protest-were-hamas-activists-says-hamas-official-1.6094899

13 U.S. Army Field Manual FM27-10: Law of Land Warfare

14 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14

15 ICC Statute, https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf Article 125

16 UN General Assembly resolution A/Res/67/19, 26 November 2012 https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/19862D03C564FA2C85257ACB004EE69B  See article by present author at http://jcpa.org/article/the-palestinian-un-upgrade-setting-things-straight/

17 ICC Statute, Article 5