Resident Aliens: Three Definitions of Ger Toshav

Chulin – Daf 114

Our Gemara on amud beis refers to a certain non-Jewish resident of Israel. Though he is not a member of the tribe, there is still an obligation to look after his welfare. This person is known as a ger toshav, literally a “resident stranger.” The halachic definition of a ger toshav is subject to a three-way dispute.

Gemara Avodah Zara (64b) reports: “Anyone who has accepted upon himself before three cḥaverim (i.e., before sages of a certain stature who are committed to the meticulous observance of mitzvos, especially halachos of ritual purity, teruma, and tithes) not to worship idols; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

“And the Rabbis say: Anyone who has accepted upon himself observance of the seven mitzvos that the descendants of Noah accepted upon themselves is a ger toshav.”

“Others say: These have not entered the category of ger toshav. Rather, who is a ger toshav? This is a convert who eats unslaughtered animal carcasses, which are not kosher, but who has accepted upon himself to observe all of the mitzvos that are stated in the Torah except for the prohibition against eating unslaughtered carcasses.”

What is the logic behind these three distinct ways that we determine if this person is fit to dwell in Israel even though he is not Jewish?

Perhaps the key can be found in a verse in Shemos (23:33): “They shall not remain in your land, lest they cause you to sin against Me; for you will serve their gods, and it will prove a snare to you.”

We therefore surmise the criterion for a non-Jew being allowed to reside in the land of Israel is that he be sufficiently observant so that he will not cause others to follow in sinful ways. Rabbi Meir requires a basic minimum of at least not being an idolator, the Rabbis require a commitment to all seven Noachide laws, and the “Others,” quoted in the third opinion in the Gemara,require even further commitment – observance of almost all the mitzvos except Shabbos, because that is a special covenantal gift to the Jewish people alone.

What is the root of this dispute? Psychologically speaking, it is a discussion and meditation about influence. The most lenient opinion considers it sufficient for the person to be monotheistic, while the strictest opinion requires almost parallel observance.

This is an important consideration when it comes to parenting and peer groups. Sometimes, such as when a child is part of a kiruv family serving out of town, it is sufficient for him to know that he belongs to a group with a higher level of observance so that he is not influenced by his less observant peers, so long as the different levels of observance are acknowledged.

In other words, the ger toshav would not necessarily entice his neighbors so long as he is committed to a certain level of observance, and everybody knows that his personal obligations are different and less stringent than those surrounding him. That is one opinion and one philosophy, which is expressed by the final opinion in the Gemara. The most stringent opinion, meanwhile, is concerned with influence no matter what the intentions are, so long as there’s a disparity in levels of observance.

No Stumbling Block: Sanctifying Without Sinning

Daf 115

Our Gemara on amud aleph considers the permissibility or prohibition of certain foods or objects that were used for a sin – such as, according to one p’shat in Rashi, the mother bird that was not sent away from the nest in violation of the commandment. The Gemara reasons that since there is still a command to send the bird away, how could the Torah send something forbidden out into the world? Even if it could be ruled as lost in the majority, apparently it is improper to set up a situation of possible violation. It is, at least in spirit, a violation of lifnei iver, placing a stumbling block in front of a person.

Related to this requirement, Kli Chemdah (Vayetzei) raises a question: How could Yaakov have made a mizbe’ach out of the stone he had slept upon, especially as this was destined to become the site for the Temple, as described in Bereishis (28:11, 17, 18 and 22)? He tries to make the distinction that Yaakov did not actually declare it to have the sanctity of the vessels in the Temple.

I have a different thought about this. Yaakov’s point was to sanctify this location to be a place of prayer and dedication to G-d. That’s not necessarily considered putting a stumbling block in front of people and causing others to sin. Quite the contrary, he wanted it to be a rallying point. While technically, there may be those who would not respect the sanctity of the place, or it might end up becoming overrun, we can say the same thing about our Temples that were destroyed. There are those who ask a similar question regarding the stones that had the Torah written on them in all the languages (Devarim 27:8) – how could they be left as a stumbling block for people to study Torah when it is forbidden, unless for the purpose of conversion (Sanhedrin 59a)?

But according to a similar line of thinking as with Yaakov’s mizbe’ach, I don’t see why this would be considered causing others to sin. The main idea is to publicize the Torah so that many people will be inspired. If somehow others become affected improperly, that’s not the main concern or intention. That is different than simply freeing a bird with no direct benefit other than the ritual itself.

If You Had a Body, You’d Sin Too: The Angels’ Excuse

Daf 116

As we discussed on daf 103 of Chulin, there is much debate and have been various proposals offered to resolve how the angels who visited Avraham could have eaten milk together with meat. Sefer Daf al Daf offers an answer based on our Gemara on amud aleph, which states that Rabbi Yossi Haglili’s rationale for permitting chicken and milk is because the verse states “in its mother’s milk” (Shemos 23:19) and chicken does not have mother’s milk. There is a tradition that Avraham created the calves using Sefer Yetzira. Since such a calf also has no mother’s milk, it should be permitted to eat its meat with milk.

Sefer Daf Al Daf also offers a different answer (it seems to be based on Rav Yonasan Eibshutz –see Tiferes Yonasan on Shemos 23:19 – but there are differences). There is a Midrash Tehillim (8:2) which records the angels as arguing before G-d that they should keep the Torah and it should not be given to humans. G-d answers with two rebuttals: (1) The Torah has commandments having to do with ritual purity, sexual prohibitions, and honoring parents, which clearly do not relate to angels. (2) The angels believed that they would keep the Torah, yet they violated eating meat and milk when they visited Avraham.

Let us go deeper into this story. The angels very well understood G-d’s point that the Torah has many commandments which relate to physicality. Their argument must have been, “Let us assume the role of physicality, and in that capacity, if you gave us bodies, we would do a better job than humans and not sin.” This is why G-d made the second point in His rebuttal: When you had a physical body – during your visit to Avraham – you also sinned. In a lomdishe vein, if they wanted to consider their spiritual incarnation as physical, then even if the calf was created by Sefer Yetzira, it too should be considered a full physical entity and subject to all the requirements of physicality, and therefore the prohibition against eating its meat with milk should apply.

I believe this is part of a deeper idea represented as well in Zohar (Bereishis 25a): The angels criticized Adam after he had sinned. G-d said to them, “If you were on Earth like him, you would sin worse.” And this is the backstory of the fallen angels (Bereishis 6:4) who seemed to have sinned with sexual immorality. The psychological lesson is that it is easy to judge and look down upon the sins of others, but if you were in that person’s place, you might sin even worse. As the idolatrous King Menashe scolded Rav Ashi in a dream: “Had you been there at that time, you would have taken and lifted the hem of your cloak and run after me to worship!” (Sanhedrin 102b).